The Economy: Returning to Balance?

In October 1981 in "An Economy Out of Balance" we examined the state of the economy following the severe shocks of 1979 and 1980. We warned that adjustments in some markets, particularly for goods and labour, might be "painfully slow", In this Viewpoint we bring that study up to date. We argue that the recent fall in the exchange rate has helped to correct some of those imbalances and that there should now be the basis for a recovery of output and a check to the rise in unemployment.     

Economic Viewpoint The Company Sector and the Economic Recovery

Prospects for the economy in the coming years depend largely on whether the private sector will expand activity and increase its employment. The immediate concern is to reverse the falls of output and employment since 1979; the longer-term concern is to generate sustained growth. In the short term. the recovery of output will depend signficantly on whether companies are prepared to rebuild stock levels. In the longer term, a sustained increase in output and employment will require an expansion of the capital stock. In each case what is needed is an increase in company expenditure. Recent experience suggests that such an increase will require a rise in the company sector's income. In this Economic Viewpoint we consider how an increase in the company sector's income and expenditure could be achieved and argue that a cut in the National Insurance Surcharge is a particularly efficient method .     

External Networking and Internal Firm Governance

We use panel data on S&P 1500 companies to identify external network connections between directors and CEOs. We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint directors with ties to the CEO. Using changes in board composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that CEO‐director ties reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to substitute for board oversight. Moreover, firms with more CEO‐director ties engage in more value‐destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that network ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring.     

Government Popularity and the Economic Cycle

In June 1987 the Conservatives under Mrs. Thatcher were re-elected with a majority of over 100 seats against Labour. They received 42.3 per cent of the total vote, the size of the majority owing much to the significant number of votes received by third parties. But it is also believed that the Conservatives' share of the vote, unchanged from 1983, reflected the performance of the macro economy. In the four years of Mrs. Thatcher's second term, output rose more than 3 per cent a year and by the time of the election inflation was below 1 per cent, interest rates were under 10 per cent, and unemployment had come back below 3 million. If Mrs. Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues had planned an economic strategy for the next four (or five) years in order to be in a strong position to win a fourth term of office, it might have included the following factors: output growth of 2–3 per cent a year; inflation staying around 1 per cent; interest rates of 10 per cent or thereabouts; unemployment down further from the near-3 million mark of June 1987. On our current forecast, that is, with the exception of output, the economic record of the Conservatives' third (Thatcher/Major) term. Yet the Conservatives have been running neck and neck with Labour in tile opinion polls and, barring unforeseen developments, the coming election will be extremely close, with the possibility still of either a small Conservative majority or a small Labour majority or even a hung Parliament. Why is it that, against the background of a similar economic performance in aggregate, the Conservatives have lost popularity? The arguments are complex and a full explanation would include the introduction of the community charge arid the fall of Mrs. Thatcher herself. But the economy is part of the explanation. The economic literature on Government popularity examines the state of a number of economic variables at the time of the election. At its most extreme, some believe that all a Government has to do to be re-elected is deliver a low mortgage rate in time for the election. Other analysts have explained Government popularity in a simple regression framework, with a lagged dependent variable to capture sluggish adjustment. A weakness of this research is that it implicitly believes all the Government has to do is to ‘get it right on the night’. As long as the economy falls into place by the time of the election, re-election is certain. This implies that the electorate both forgets and forgives, and is indifferent to the course of the economy in the previous three or four years. But it cannot be the case that the electorate evaluates only the average performance of the economy over the lifetime of a Parliament or even the most recent developments. As in any simple utility maximisation problem, it is not just the mean of the distribution that counts but also its variance. In other words the combination of late 1980s' boom and early 1990s' recession counts against the Government in a way that four or five years of steady progress would not have done. If this is correct, it may not be sufficient for the Government to deliver low inflation and interest rates and some recovery in output in time for the election; it may simply be that the electorate remains unforgiving of a five-year track record of boom and bust.     

Briefing Paper: Why has the economy recovered?1

By the end of last year GDP (though strike affected) was 9 per cent higher than in the first half of 1981, an annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent. In this Briefing Paper we seek to explain the recovery from the recession. We conclude that much of the recovery represents a natural response of the economy after the oil and price shocks of 1979-80. The recovery occurred in spite of the deflationary Budget of 1981 and the sharp rise in interest rates in the autumn of 1981. Since 1981 fiscal policy has been stable, whereas the original intention was to tighten fiscal policy progressively in subsequent years. This stability and the fall in the inflation rate that accompanied it allowed growth to resume. We believe that the upturn would have been rather weaker (though inflation would have been lower) if the progressive tightening of the original Medium- Term Financial Strategy had been adhered to.     

Focus: Productivity in UK Manufacturing Industry

Manufacturing industry has been the major casualty of the recession, recording a total fall in output of about 20 per cent. It is unusual for productivity to rise when output is falling, yet in the last two years output per person employed in manufacturing has risen by 15 per cent. As a result, and in spite of earnings growth of over 25 per cent between 1980 and 1982, the increase in unit labour costs was held to under 15 per cent in the same two-year period. In this Focus we examine how and why these developments have taken place. Our general conclusion is that, with a recovery now under way, normal pro-cyclical productivity gains are reinforcing the abnormal achievements of the last two years and that, in consequence, industrial costs and profits are improving sharply.     

A Policy Framework for the New Chancellor

In the Mansion House speech, Mr. Clarke, the new Chancellor, left his options very clearly open. He reconfirmed his commitment, like his predecessors, to low inflation; but added that low inflation is not enough, asserting the importance of commerce. He asserted the need to reduce the public sector deficit, but did not commit himself to further measures beyond those already announced by Mr. Lamont. He argued for lower taxes, but said that taxes cannot always fall. He acknowledged the importance of narrow and broad money, but said that he would monitor a range of indicators in formulating policy. Even the greater emphasis relative to his predecessors on growth may have been more a matter of presentation, not a shift in policy emphasis.