A methodology for determining public investment criteria

Cost-benefit analysis is a popular method of evaluating both public and private investments. This paper explores the theoretical basis of cost-benefit analysis, the methodology of its application and the policy ramifications arising from its application in terms of public investments. The discussion presented in this paper is relevant to public investments undertaken at all levels of government. A main conclusion of this paper is that the social conscience of the planner or decision-maker and his knowledge of the benefits and shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis are key factors in successfully implementing public investments.     

U.S. REAL PRODUCT AND REAL FACTOR INPUT, 1929–1967

The objective of this paper is to provide a conceptual basis for separating social product and social factor input accounts into price and quantity components. Despite the essential similarity between concepts of real product and real factor input, the measurement of social factor outlay in constant prices is not well established in social accounting practice.
Production accounts are constructed for the United States in current and constant prices, including social product and social factor outlay, for the period 1929–1967. The resulting estimates are applied to the measurement of total factor productivity and the study of the responsiveness of product and factor intensities to price changes.     

Household tax evasion

Household members share public goods and make intra-household transfers. We show how these features of the household interact with the tax evasion decision, and identify the dimensions in which household evasion differs from individual evasion. In the model we present two members of a household choose how much to contribute to a household public good and how much self-employment income to evade. We are interested in how different evasion possibilities interact with the contribution decisions to the household public good and the role of income transfers within the household. We show the household evasion decision differs from the individual decision because it affects the outcome of the household contribution game. When household members are taxed as individuals neutrality applies when choices are not constrained. If the evasion level of one household member is constrained then an income transfer can generate a Pareto improvement. When the household members are jointly taxed there is a couple constraint on strategies and corner solutions can emerge.     

The Small Firm in a Quantity Choosing Game: Some Experimental Evidence

We demonstrate with a grim trigger strategy that the small firm should be more willing to collude tacitly as its market share declines; large firms should be less willing to cooperate. The small firm is not a maverick. The intensity of rivalry between two firms with asymmetric market shares is studied in experimental markets. Treatments give duopolists (1) 50% shares, (2) a 60 or 40% share, and (3) an 80 or 20% share. Choices for the small firm in the latter treatments are not significantly larger than the collusive choice. Irrespective of relative size, firms in all three market environments exhibit collusive behavior.