The Effect of Health and Poverty on Early Childhood Cognitive Development

Although evidence of a link between socioeconomic status and child health has been researched extensively, much less attention has been devoted to studying the link between child health and cognitive development. This paper seeks to determine whether early childhood illnesses and poverty significantly impede cognitive development. The empirical model attempts to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity through the use of panel data models. Results indicate that a child’s cognitive development is not directly related to health problems acquired after birth or socioeconomic standing. Rather, cognitive development is primarily influenced by unobserved child- and family-specific factors that happen to be correlated with health and socioeconomic status. On the other hand, birth weight appears to affect cognitive performance later in childhood, even after taking unobserved heterogeneity into account.     

Consumer adoption of Internet banking in Jordan: Examining the role of hedonic motivation,habit, self-efficacy and trust

Despite the rapid growth of Internet banking (IB), customers in developing countries still hesitate to adopt this technology and its use in the Middle East remains low. This study aims to identify and examine the factors that predict behavioural intention and adoption of IB in Jordan. Four factors – hedonic motivation, habit, self-efficacy and trust – are proposed in a conceptual model. Data was collected by means of a survey with bank customers in Jordan. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was used to analyse the data. The results strongly supported the conceptual model. Further, hedonic motivation, habit, self-efficacy and trust were all confirmed to have a significant influence on behavioural intention. Trust was found to be strongly predicted by both hedonic motivation and self-efficacy. This study provides both academics and practitioners with an insight into the factors that can be used to encourage customer adoption of IB specifically in a Middle East context.     

What Plato Knew About Enron

This paper applies Plato’s cave allegory to Enron’s success and downfall. Plato’s famous tale of cave dwellers illustrates the different levels of truth and understanding. These levels include images, the sources of images, and the ultimate reality behind both. The paper first describes these levels of perception as they apply to Plato’s cave dwellers and then provides a brief history of the rise of Enron. Then we apply Plato’s levels of understanding to Enron, showing how the company created its image and presented information to support that image, and how the public eventually emerged from the cave to realize the truth about Enron’s actual accounting practices and financial state, which led to the corporation’s downfall. We find Plato’s allegory both useful in analyzing the relationship between Enron and the public and instructive about the power and moral responsibility of Enron’s executives.     

Umgang mit Aggressionen

Herausforderndes Verhalten bei Demenz - Wenn Aggression, erh?hter Bewegungsdrang, starke Orientierungsprobleme, Selbst- und Fremdgef?hrdung oder andere „herausfordernde“ Verhaltensweisen auftreten, wird die Pflege und Begleitung von Demenzkranken als Belastung erlebt. Doch Pflegende stehen dem Problem nicht hilflos gegenüber. Eine interdisziplin?re Expertengruppe gibt mit ihren Empfehlungen ein Handlungsgerüst.     

The contextual nature of the predictive power of statistically-based quarterly earnings models

We present new empirical evidence on the contextual nature of the predictive power of five statistically-based quarterly earnings expectation models evaluated on a holdout period spanning the twelve quarters from 2000–2002. In marked contrast to extant time-series work, the random walk with drift (RWD) model provides significantly more accurate pooled, one-step-ahead quarterly earnings predictions for a sample of high-technology firms (n = 202). In similar predictive comparisons, the Griffin-Watts (GW) ARIMA model provides significantly more accurate quarterly earnings predictions for a sample of regulated firms (n = 218). Finally, the RWD and GW ARIMA models jointly dominate the other expectation models (i.e., seasonal random walk with drift, the Brown-Rozeff (BR) and Foster (F) ARIMA models) for a default sample of firms (n = 796). We provide supplementary analyses that document the: (1) increased frequency of the number of loss quarters experienced by our sample firms in the holdout period (2000–2002) vis-à-vis the identification period (1990–1999); (2) reduced levels of earnings persistence for our sample firms relative to earnings persistence factors computed by Baginski et al. (2003) during earlier time periods (1970s–1980s); (3) relative impact on the predictive ability of the five expectation models conditioned upon the extent of analyst coverage of sample firms (i.e., no coverage, moderate coverage, and extensive coverage); and (4) sensitivity of predictive performance across subsets of regulated firms with the BR ARIMA model providing the most accurate predictions for utilities (n = 87) while the RWD model is superior for financial institutions (n = 131).

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The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.