Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States

Zusammenfassung Koordinierte Strategien für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten. - In diesem Aufsatz wird die dynamische Spieltheorie auf die Koordinierung der Politik zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der EWG in einem stark aggregierten Modell angewandt und folgendes gezeigt: (i) Eine Politik, die den Einflu\ von Ma\nahmen anderer L?nder vernachl?ssigt, führt in den USA zu Fiskalischen Einschr?nkungen und einer Verminderung der staatlichen Interventionen, in Europa dagegen zu einer Nachfragestimulierung, verbunden mit einer kontinuierlichen Herabsetzung des Diskontsatzes. Die EWG-L?nder sind, da sie ihre Politik nicht koordinieren, nach einigen Jahren wegen Zahlungsbilanzschwierigkeiten zu einer kontraktiven Nachfragepolitik gezwungen. (ii) Koordinierte Strategien best?tigen, da\ nicht-synchronisierte Politiken die Weltwirtschaft stabilisieren k?nnen. (in) Kooperation verbessert die wirtschaftlichen Leistungen, ausgedrückt in den Wachstumsraten und den Zahlungsbilanzen. Allerdings erbringt die ausdrückliche Zusammenarbeit kaum noch zus?tzliche Vorteile zu denen, die bereits im Rahmen der vollen Koordinierung erreicht werden k?nnen.

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Resumen Estrategias coordinadas de cooperación económica entre Europa y los EEUU.- La aplicación de un modelo dinámico de teoría de juegos a la coordinatión de política económica entre los EEUU y la CEE, como parte de un modelo altamente agregado de la economía mundial, permite concluír en este trabajo que (i) políticas que ignoran la influencia de medidas tomadas en otros países dan lugar a una contractión fiscal y a una menor interventión del Gobierno en los EEUU, pero a una estimulación de la demanda combinada con reducciones continuas de la tasa de descuento en Europa; al seguir políticas descoordinadas los países de la CEE están obligados a contraer la demanda agregada al cabo de unos a?os, debido a los problemas de balance de pagos, (ii) estrategias coordinadas confirman que políticas no sincronizadas pueden estabilizar la economía mundial; (iii) la cooperación favorece a la economía en términos de tasas de crecimiento y balance de pagos. Sin embargo, los beneficios adicionales de una cooperatión explícita resultan marginales en comparación con los beneficios ya alcanzados por la solución con coordinación total.

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Résumé Stratégies coordonnées pour la coopération entre l’Europe et les E.U. - En appliquant la théorie dynamique de jeu à la coordination de politique entre les E.U. et la CEE dans un modèle fortement agrégé de l’économie mondiale, cet article arrive aux conclusions suivants: (i) La politique qui ignore l’influence des actions suivies dans d’autres économies mène à la réduction fiscale et à moins interventions gouvernementales dans les E.U., mais à une stimulation de la demande avec des réductions continuelles du taux d’escompte en Europe. En cas d’une politique pas coordonnée les pays CEE sont forcés à prendre des mesures pour freiner la demande agrégée après quelques années à cause des problèmes de la balance des paiements. (ii) La stratégie coordonnée confirme que des politiques pas synchronisées pourraient stabiliser l’économie mondiale. (iii) La coopération peut élever le taux de croissance et améliorer la balance des paiements. Cependant, les gains additionnels d’une coopération explicite sont petits en comparaison avec les bénéfices déjà gagnés à l’aide d’une solution complètement coordonne’e.

     

Concepts and Indicators of Local Authority Performance: An Evaluation of the Statutory Frameworks in England and Wales

A conceptual framework for evaluating statutory performance indicators for local authorities is developed. The framework, which contains 14 dimensions of organizational performance, is then applied to the indicators set for local government from 1993/94 to 2001/02. The results show that the validity and comparability of the indicators has improved substantially over time. However, a critical weakness that remains is the absence of indicators that link spending with service outcomes. Such indicators are essential if judgements about value for money and Best Value are to be made.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

Should Chinese Local Governments Be Allowed to Issue Bonds?

I.IntroductionDespite China’s impressive economic growth,its fiscal sustainability has increasinglybecome one of the most watched risk indicators facing the economy.Although China’sexplicit national debtto GDP ratio israther manageable by theOECD standard,at about20 percent of GDP,given its small share of tax revenue to GDP,currently at18.5percent ofGDP,this fiscalsystem may stumble upon major challenges in themedium to long term ifChina’slargecontingent fiscal liabilitiesare als…     

Boundedly complete families which are not complete

Summary Completeness of a family of probability distributions implies its bounded completeness but not conversely. An example of a family which is boundedly complete but not complete was presented by Lehmann and Scheffe [5]. This appears to be the only such example quoted in the statistical literature. The purpose of this note is to provide further examples of this type. It is shown that any given family of power series distributions can be used to construct a class containing infinitely many boundedly complete, but not complete, families. Furthermore, it is shown that the family of continuous distributions , is boundedly complete, but not complete, whereU denotes the uniform distribution on [a, b] and {P _ϑ,ϑ ∈ IR}, is a translation family generated by a distributionP ₀ with mean value zero, which is continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.     

Purchasing practices in a hospital environment: an ethical analysis

The critical state of the hospital industry, as previously described, generates a difficult decision environment for the materiel manager and those in the purchasing function. The unique life- and death circumstances of hospitals impose a further onus on those who manage them. In the name of saving lives, they can find a convenient excuse to disregard all moral principles, forgetting the Socratic dictum "it is not enough that one lives, but that one lives well." Without the moral "right stuff," they can easily give in to the seductions of momentary gains and glory through ethical short-cuts. There is wisdom and consolation in the words that "nice guys may appear to finish last, but usually they're running in a different race." Studies have established a direct relationship between corporate excellence and ethical values. The reality of competition in the hospital industry dictates that the integration of ethics into the life of the organization should happen by design and not by accident. This is what is meant by strategy. If hospitals would strive for excellence to survive and grow, they should have a strategy with a mission statement that also embodies its moral values and moral agenda. Such an approach does not guarantee that an organization will become immune to moral contamination, but it does provide an antidote.