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181.
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2011,7(4):331-350
In this paper we reconsider existence of Bertrand equilibrium in a symmetric‐cost, homogenous‐product oligopoly. We prove the following main results. (a) If the cost function is strictly superadditive on [0, ∞) then there exists a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium. Such Bertrand equilibria are necessarily non‐unique. (b) If the cost function is strictly subadditive on [0, ∞) then there exists no Bertrand equilibrium, either in pure strategies or in mixed strategies. 相似文献
182.
The paper explores whether financial liberalization promotes improved credit risk management in Indian banking in the form of fewer problem loans. Using annual data on state-owned banks for the period 1996–2005, the paper finds that, after controlling for a myriad of factors, financial liberalization is influential in lowering banks' problem loans. Robustness tests reinforce these findings . 相似文献
183.
184.
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach under which to examine the source of the increased wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in US manufacturing. Rather than imposing the assumptions inherent in a given structural form, we posit a long‐run equilibrium relationship between international trade, technology, and the wage premium using a vector error‐correction model. We first test for the existence of a long‐run relationship using cointegration tests. If a cointegrating relationship is found, we then conduct tests on the direction of the long‐run relationship and of Granger causality. We apply our approach to each two‐digit and four‐digit SIC industry and find evidence in support of international trade being an important source of the wage gap. Our results suggest that it is premature to dismiss international trade as a possible suspect behind the rising wage premium. 相似文献
185.
Abstract . The majority of the trading blocs to date are between similar countries, rather than between developed and developing countries. This paper provides a rationale for why trading blocs among similar countries may arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. It develops a model of an asymmetric world economy in which there are at least four countries. The countries are differentiated with respect to their market size and they choose their trading partners. In the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, either there is global free trade or free trade areas are formed among similar countries. 相似文献
186.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between net exports and wage inequality in the U.S. The short-
and long-run analyses of the U.S. trade and wage data are undertaken. Cointegration test results indicate that net exports
and wage inequality are related in the long run. The main contribution of this paper lies in its focus on the short-run investigation
of the relationship between net exports and wage inequality. This investigation was conducted using the vector error correction
(VEC) testing framework. Contrary to the prevailing view, the VEC test results indicate that trade has no statistically significant
impact on wage inequality in the U.S. Instead, the empirical evidence shows a negative causal impact of wage inequality on
net exports. 相似文献
187.
188.
The Babu and the Boxwallah: Managerial Incentives and Government Intervention in a Developing Economy 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In developing economies a firm's strategy is directed more often at the government than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions this paper considers a situation where a government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit and the former chooses a tax rate and maximizes tax revenue. The government and the monopoly can delegate the final decision-making to, respectively, a bureaucrat and a manager. The incentive equilibrium of the model is characterized. It is shown that this kind of industrial setting is likely to exhibit greater inefficiencies than that which arises in standard models. 相似文献
189.
Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar 《Bulletin of economic research》1996,48(1):83-91
In a simple homogeneous product setting, the paper looks at the debate on whether firms should choose quantity or price as their strategic variable. It examines a two-stage game between firms with symmetric costs in which the firms choose the strategic mode of operation in the first period and then, in the second period, price or output are chosen simultaneously according to the mode chosen in the first stage. In this game it is possible to have two Nash equilibria where either both play in quantities or both play in prices. One firm choosing price and the other quantity can never be a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game. Both choosing quantity is always a Nash equilibrium. Both choosing prices may be a Nash equilibrium only in some situations: the structure of the cost functions decides this issue. 相似文献
190.
Chinmoy Ghosh Raj Varma J. Randall Woolridge 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》1996,23(1):107-114
Exchangeable calls are not convertible into the calling firm's common stock but into the common stock of a target firm in which the calling firm has an ownership position. In addition to reducing leverage, exchangeables change the asset composition of the calling firm through the divestiture of the calling firm's ownership stake in the target firm. In contrast to the evidence on convertible calls, our findings indicate that announcements of exchangeable debt calls are not associated with an abnormal capital loss for the calling firm shareholders. For target firms, announcements of exchangeable calls reduce shareholder wealth. A lower probability of takeover resulting from diffusion of ownership concentration of the target firm's common stock may contribute to this result. 相似文献