»Die Befragung in der Kommunikationswissenschaft: Innovationen,Operationalisierungen, Standardisierung«

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Diversity of incentives for private forest landowners: An assessment of programs in Indiana, USA

 Many government and private programs provide incentives for non-industrial private forest (NIPF) owners. Due to the complexity of this web of programs, the incentives of the programs are unclear. We focus on four specific programs that represent different rule structures—a federal cost-share program, a state tax incentive program, a nationwide private stewardship program, and a local private conservation organization. We perform institutional analysis of the formal and informal rules of the programs based on literature review, discussions with officers, and formal guidelines of the programs. We classify different types of rule structures, and explain them in relation to goals and organizational structures of the programs.     

Sequential voting with abstention

Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34–55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting: the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.     

The reliability of self-reported home values in a developing country context

This paper provides an analysis, in the context of a developing country, of the reliability of homeowners’ estimates of the value of their houses, as obtained through a household survey. We show that non-response to the home value question by the owner is uncorrelated with the appraised value of the house and other demographic characteristics of the respondent. We also document that homeowners with long tenure largely overestimate the value of their home. Moreover, both the bias and the lack of precision in homeowners’ estimates are correlated with tenure, but not with socioeconomic characteristics. However, we also show that self-reported home values from short-tenure homeowners can be used to obtain unbiased and precise estimates of the average house value at the census tract level.     

TECHNICAL CHANGE AND FORMATION OF EXPECTATIONS

The aim of this paper is to discuss the implications for the process of expectation formation as developed by Keynes and the Post‐Keynesians when technical change (as understood by the Evolutionary and Institutional school of thought) is taken into account. The claim made here is that the traditional division of expectations in short and long period is insufficient to deal with all features of technical change, and thus, a new type of expectations (medium‐period) is proposed. Moreover, it is claimed that the independence among different types of expectations cannot stand when medium‐period expectations are taken into account.     

Intergenerational mobility and sample selection in short panels

Using data from the first 11 waves of the BHPS, this paper measures the extent of the selection bias induced by standard coresidence conditions—bias that is expected to be severe in short panels—on measures of intergenerational mobility in occupational prestige. We try to limit the impact of other selection biases, such as those induced by labour market restrictions that are typically imposed in intergenerational mobility studies, by using different measures of socio‐economic status that account for missing labour market information. We stress four main results. First, there is evidence of an underestimation of the true intergenerational elasticity, the extent of which ranges between 12% and 39%. Second, the proposed methods used to correct for the selection bias seem to be unable to attenuate it, except for the propensity score weighting procedure, which performs well in most circumstances. This result is confirmed both under the assumption of missing‐at‐random data as well as under the assumption of not‐missing‐at‐random data. Third, the two previous sets of results (direction and extent of the bias, and differential abilities to correct for it) are also robust when we account for measurement error. Fourth, restricting the sample to a period shorter than the 11 waves under analysis leads to a severe sample selection bias. In the cases when the analysis is limited to eight waves, this bias ranges from about 40% to 65%. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated.