Chaos and the exchange rate

Chaotic exchange rate models are structural models built in discrete time (difference equations), and show that with orthodox assumptions (PPP, interest parity, etc) and introducing plausible nonlinearities in the dynamic equations, it is possible to obtain a model capable of giving rise to chaotic motion. However, none of these models is estimated, and the conclusions are based on simulations: the empirical validity of these models is not tested. In this paper, a continuous time (the exchange rate is obviously a continuous variable) exchange rate model is built as a non-linear set of three differential equations and its theoretical properties (steady state, stability, etc,) analysed. The model is then econometrically estimated in continuous time with Italian data and examined for the possible presence of chaotic motion. This paper also shows that the continuous time estimation of economic models built as systems of nonlinear differential equations is a very powerful tool in the hands of the profession.     

Internet peering as a network of relations

This paper applies results from recent theoretical work on networks of relations to analyze optimal peering strategies for asymmetric Internet Service Providers (ISPs). From a network of relations perspective, ISPs’ asymmetry in bilateral peering agreements need not be a problem, since when these form a closed network, asymmetries are pooled and information transmission is faster. Both these effects reduce the incentives for opportunism in general, and interconnection quality degradation in particular. The paper also explains why bilateral monetary transfers between asymmetric ISPs (Bilateral Paid Peering), though potentially good for bilateral peering, may have negative effects on the sustainability of the overall peering network.     

fines,leniency, and rewards in antitrust

This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well‐run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white‐collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.     

The Role of credit in a Keynesian monetary economy

Abstract

This paper describes the features of a monetary economy on the basis of Keynes's distinction between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In The General Theory, Keynes identifies the reasons for the non-neutrality of money by highlighting the store of wealth function of money; this approach has been adopted by most Keynesian economists. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach only partially explains the reasons for money non-neutrality and that important elements which demonstrate the relevance of monetary variables emerge when the means of payment function of money is considered. Investigating the role of this function requires that we deal explicitly with how spending decisions are financed. The paper argues that the market for credit must be considered separately from the market for money, and that a viable credit theory can be built from Keynes's post-General Theory writings.     

SCALE ECONOMIES AND HETEROGENEITY IN BUSINESS MONEY DEMAND: THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

This paper investigates the demand for money by firms and the existence of economies of scale in the Italian manufacturing industry. We estimate a model for cash elaborated by Fujiki and Mulligan using a different estimation procedure from the previous literature. We then introduce an iterative procedure based on backward exclusion of firms from model estimation which points out the high heterogeneity of Italian companies in money demand. Our estimates show that the Italian manufacturing industry, considered as a whole, does not enjoy scale economies in money demand. However, our iterative procedure points out that the cause of this result has to be ascribed to small firms which are characterized by thin cash money holdings and a consequent very modest opportunity cost.     

Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investor, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or non-existent, depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors. Adding signalling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders' behaviour much stronger.     

Fiscal deficits, public debt, and government solvency: Evidence from OECD countries

This paper discusses different empirical tests of public sector solvency and applies them to a sample of 18 OECD countries. Under the maintained hypothesis that the government solvency constraint needs to be imposed, these tests develop from the idea of verifying whether the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector would be satisfied (a) if the fiscal and financial policy in the sample had been pursued indefinitely and (b) if the relevant macro and structural features of the economy were stable over time. If solvency is not supported by the empirical evidence, a change either in the policy or in the relevant macro and structural variables (growth, inflation, interest rates, demographic factors) must occur at some point in the future. Among the G-7 countries, public sector solvency seems a serious issue in Italy, whereas it does not appear to be a problem in Germany and Japan. The evidence for the United States is mixed. Problems of sustainability of the current path of fiscal policies are also present in Belgium, Ireland, The Netherlands, and Greece.