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Valuation of bankrupt firms   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
This study compares the market value of firms that reorganizein bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management'spublished cash flow projections. We estimate firm values usingmodels that have been shown in other contexts to generate relativelyprecise estimates of value. We find that these methods generallyyield unbiased estimates of value, but the dispersion of valuationerrors is very wide - the sample ratio of estimated value tomarket value varies from less than 20% to greater than 250%.Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the variation in theseerrors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders' incentivesto overstate or understate the firm's value.  相似文献   
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During the recent financial crisis, U.S. bankruptcy courts and debt restructuring practitioners were faced with the largest wave of corporate defaults and bankruptcies in history. In 2008 and 2009, $1.8 trillion worth of public company assets entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection—almost 20 times the amount during the prior two years. And the portfolio companies of U.S. private equity firms faced a towering wall of debt that, many observers predicted, was about to wipe out most of the industry. But far from the death of private equity or a severe contraction of corporate America, the past three years have seen an astonishingly rapid working off of U.S. corporate debt overhang, allowing corporate profits and values to rebound with remarkable speed and vigor. And as the author of this article argues, corporate America's recovery from the recent financial crisis provides a clear demonstration of the importance of U.S. bankruptcy laws and restructuring practices in maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. companies and the long‐run growth of the U.S. economy.  相似文献   
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In September 1967, the Federal Government established a Task force on Agriculture which was given the major objective of assessing agricultural goals and policies in Canada. The Task Force submitted its report, Canadian Agriculture In The Seventies , to the Federal Minister of Agriculture in December 1969.  相似文献   
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大多数计算机维修管理系统(CMMS)没有起到管理系统应有的作用,或者实施以后限制了管理的能力.另一个重要的事实是:如果实施时间少于二年,大约有50%的CMMS实施是注定要失败的.笔者采用Peter Senge的观点,把学习组织(Learning Organisations)作为新方法来实施和使用CMMS.探讨如何成功地把这个方法应用于Rio de Janeiro天然气化工厂,保证全面使用CMMS.  相似文献   
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The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.  相似文献   
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In this first of five sessions of a recent Columbia Law School symposium devoted to discussion of his new book, Prosperity—and The Purpose of the Corporation, Oxford University's Colin Mayer begins by calling for a “radical reinterpretation” of the corporate mission. For all but the last 50 or so of its 2,000‐year history, the corporation has combined commercial activities with a public purpose. But since Milton Friedman's famous pronouncement in 1970 that the social goal of the corporation is to maximize its own profits, the gap between the social and private interests served by corporations appears to have grown ever wider, helping fuel the global outbreaks of populist protest and indictments of capitalism that fill today's media. In Mayer's reinterpretation, the boards of all companies will produce and publish statements of corporate purpose that envision some greater social good than maximizing shareholder value. To that end, he urges companies to make continuous investments of their financial capital and other resources in developing other forms of corporate capital—human, social, and natural—and to account for such investments in the same way they now account for their investments in physical capital. Although the author appears to prefer that such changes be mandatory, enacted through new legislation and enforced by regulators and the courts, his main efforts are directed at persuading the largest institutional owners of corporations—many of whom are already favorably predisposed to ESG—to support these corporate initiatives. Marty Lipton, after expressing enthusiasm about Mayer's proposals, suggests that mandating such changes is likely neither feasible nor desirable, but that attempts—like his own New Paradigm—to gain the acceptance and support of large shareholders is the most promising strategy. Ron Gilson, on the other hand, after voicing Lipton's skepticism about the enforceability of such statements of purpose, issues a number of warnings. One is about the political risks associated with ever more concentrated ownership of public companies in a world where populist distrust of all concentrations of wealth and power is clearly on the rise. But most troubling for the company themselves is the confusion such proposals could create for corporate boards whose responsibility is to limit two temptations facing corporate managements: short‐termism, or underinvestment in the corporate future to boost near‐term earnings (and presumably stock prices); and what Gilson calls hyperopia, or overinvestment designed to preserve growth (and management's jobs) at all costs.  相似文献   
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