Coase (1937) revisited: Endogenous fiat in firms and markets

Coase (Economica 4:386–405, 1937) observed that, within firms, employees are directed by fiat. Ever since it has been argued that hierarchical control and fiat are institutional attributes of firms. In contrast with this view, there is evidence that the organizational structure of many interfirm relations, from supply networks to franchising, is also hierarchical. To reconcile Coase’s insight with the evidence, I develop a model where the obligations of both a firm’s contractors and its employees cannot be enforced by courts, so they must be self-enforcing. I show that fiat, in the form of relational contracts where the agent obeys the principal in equilibrium, occurs both when the agent is an employee—so the principal owns all the assets—and when she is a contractor—so the agent owns some assets. However, the principal can give more orders to an employee (contractor) when decisions sufficiently above (close to) those that maximize the value of the contractor’s assets are optimal—for instance, because there are strong positive externalities between the assets. The model has several implications for the theory of the firm, the distinction between markets, hybrids and hierarchies, and the choice between in-house provision and outsourcing of public services.     

Intellectual property rights,imitation, and development. The effect on cross-border mergers and acquisitions

In this paper, we analyze whether the recent global process of strengthening and harmonization of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects decisions of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We investigate if IPRs have a differential effect across sectors of different technology content and for countries of different development level. Also, we study how imitation abilities of target countries interact with the tightening of IPRs. Using data for the post-TRIPS period (1995–2010), we estimate an extended gravity model to study the bilateral number of M&As, including a measure of the strength of IPRs systems on target countries and a set of control variables usually considered as determinants of M&As. The estimation results verify the gravity structure for M&As and show that IPRs –and enforcement– influence decisions of cross-border M&As in all sectors regardless of their technological content. However, IPRs are more important in countries with high imitation abilities and in sectors of high-technology content. Furthermore, a strengthening of IPRs leads to a larger increase of M&As in developing countries than in developed countries. These results call the attention on the possible implications for least developed economies and challenge the adequacy of a globally harmonized IPRs systems.     

The effects of upcoding,cream skimming and readmissions on the Italian hospitals efficiency: A population-based investigation

In this paper we analyze the effects of some distortions induced by the prospective payment system, i.e. upcoding, cream skimming and readmissions, on hospitals' technical efficiency. We estimate a production function using a population-based dataset composed by all active hospitals in an Italian region during the period 1998–2007. We show that cream skimming and upcoding have a negative impact on hospitals' technical efficiency, while readmissions have a positive effect. Moreover, the results indicate that private hospitals engage more in cream skimming than public and not-for-profit ones, while we observe no ownership differences regarding upcoding. Not-for-profit hospitals have the highest readmission index. Last, not-for-profit and public hospitals have the same efficiency levels, while private hospitals have the lowest technical efficiency.     

Cheating,emotions, and rationality: an experiment on tax evasion

The economics-of-crime approach usually ignores the emotional cost and benefit of cheating. In this paper, we investigate the relationships between emotions, deception, and rational decision-making by means of an experiment on tax evasion. Emotions are measured by skin conductance responses and self-reports. We show that the intensity of anticipated and anticipatory emotions before reporting income positively correlates with both the decision to cheat and the proportion of evaded income. The experienced emotional arousal after an audit increases with the monetary sanctions and the arousal is even stronger when the evader’s picture is publicly displayed. We also find that the risk of a public exposure of deception deters evasion whereas the amount of fines encourages evasion. These results suggest that an audit policy that strengthens the emotional dimension of cheating favors compliance.     

Risk parity portfolio optimization under a Markov regime-switching framework

We formulate and solve a risk parity optimization problem under a Markov regime-switching framework to improve parameter estimation and to systematically mitigate the sensitivity of optimal portfolios to estimation error. A regime-switching factor model of returns is introduced to account for the abrupt changes in the behaviour of economic time series associated with financial cycles. This model incorporates market dynamics in an effort to improve parameter estimation. We proceed to use this model for risk parity optimization and also consider the construction of a robust version of the risk parity optimization by introducing uncertainty structures to the estimated market parameters. We test our model by constructing a regime-switching risk parity portfolio based on the Fama–French three-factor model. The out-of-sample computational results show that a regime-switching risk parity portfolio can consistently outperform its nominal counterpart, maintaining a similar ex post level of risk while delivering higher-than-nominal returns over a long-term investment horizon. Moreover, we present a dynamic portfolio rebalancing policy that further magnifies the benefits of a regime-switching portfolio.     

Corporate codes of ethics and cash holdings: International evidence

In the presence of agency costs, managers retain cash for their own benefit at the expense of shareholder wealth. Extending prior literature on the role of corporate governance in mitigating the effects of agency conflicts on corporate cash holdings, we study a governance mechanism that has largely been overlooked, namely, corporate codes of ethics. We find a negative association between code of ethics quality and cash holdings, which suggests that managers hold less cash when the firm has a strong code of ethics in place. The effect is greater when agency costs are elevated due to weaker country-level investor protections. We also find that payouts and the marginal value of cash holdings to investors are increasing in code quality. Overall, our results are consistent with codes of ethics helping to limit opportunistic behaviour from managers when determining the firm's level of cash holdings.     

The double‐edged effect of knowledge acquisition: How contracts safeguard pre‐existing resources

Research summary : Acquiring knowledge on a partner's pre‐existing resources plays an important yet ambiguous role in collaborative relationships. We formally model how contracts trade off productive and destructive uses of knowledge in a buyer‐supplier relationship. We show that, when the buyer's pre‐existing resources are vulnerable to the revelation of sensitive knowledge, the supplier overinvests in knowledge acquisition as it expects to use the knowledge as a threat in price negotiations. A non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract prevents such overinvestment and reduces the supplier's ability to expropriate the buyer ex post. Our results extend to the cases of renegotiable closed‐price contracts, repeated interactions between a buyer and a supplier, and the use of nondisclosure policies. We draw theoretical, empirical, and managerial implications from our model. Managerial summary : This study yields new insights regarding the use of contract design in protecting pre‐existing, nonrelationship specific assets in buyer‐supplier arrangements. Anecdotal examples illustrate the “dark side” of these arrangements where opportunistic suppliers exploit knowledge of buyers' pre‐existing resources to seek rent and appropriate value. When a supplier is likely to act harmfully, a closed‐price contract that specifies the price of the supplier's component upfront may reduce the supplier's incentives to overinvest in acquiring and exploiting knowledge of the buyer's pre‐existing resources. As such, when a buyer's pre‐existing resources are highly valuable, and thus more vulnerable to use by the supplier outside of the arrangement, a non‐renegotiable closed‐price contract is more efficient. Additionally, limited disclosure policies and informal agreements based on repeated interactions complement indirect governance via price contracts. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International trade and financial integration: a weighted network analysis

The authors analyse patterns of international trade and financial integration using complex network analysis. The combination of both binary and weighted approaches delivers more precise and thorough insights into the topological structure and properties of international trade and financial networks (ITN and IFN). It is found that the ITN is more densely connected than the IFN, while both types of network display a core–periphery structure. This hierarchical organization is more pronounced in financial markets, suggesting that the bulk of trade in financial assets occurs through a handful of countries acting as hubs. High-income countries are better linked and form groups of tightly interconnected nodes. This kind of structure can explain why the recent financial crisis has spread rapidly among advanced countries while reaching emerging markets only in a second phase.     

A century of equity premium predictability and the consumption–wealth ratio: An international perspective

This paper re-examines the predictive ability of the consumption–wealth ratio (cay) on the equity premium using hand-collected annual data spanning one century for four major economies. In addition to statistical tests of out-of-sample forecast accuracy, we measure the economic value of the predictive information in cay in a stylized asset allocation strategy. We find that cay does not contain predictive power prior to World War II, when a structural break occurs for all countries. In the postwar period, while statistical tests provide mixed evidence, economic criteria uncover substantial predictive power in cay, further enhanced when allowing for economically meaningful restrictions.