Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple-trait distributions

This paper studies the population dynamics of multiple preference traits in a model of intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents socialize and transmit their preferences to their children with endogenous intensities. Populations concentrated on a single cultural group are in general not stable. There is a unique stable stationary distribution, and it supports two or more cultural groups, in particular those with greater intolerance with respect to others' traits. The larger the heterogeneity of intolerance levels across cultural groups, the smaller the number of traits that are supported in the stable stationary distribution.     

Benefit Transfers in Italy: An Empirical Study of Mobility Lists in the Milan Area

This paper uses administrative data on mobility lists in the largest economic region of Italy, Lombardia, to test whether the more favourable treatment of older workers, who can draw benefits longer and transfer a larger sum to potential employers, affects in a positive way their hazard from unemployment into a permanent job. Our reduced form estimates show that older workers who draw benefits longer have a significantly lower hazard than their younger colleagues. The reduction in the hazard from unemployment is particularly pronounced for older women in the sample. Apparently, the negative effect of the treatment on the supply side, due to a higher reservation wage, prevails in our data over the positive effect, stimulated by the larger potential benefit transfers. We conclude that, if the aim of the policy is to increase the hazard from the list into a permanent job, the treatment should be modified either by reducing passive income support or by increasing the potential for benefit transfers, or, finally, by reducing the entitlement period.     

艺术,不作为,政治

[注]译自Giorgio Agamben,"Art,Inactivity,Politics",inThinking Worlds The Moscow Conference on Philosophy,Politics,andArt(《思想世界:莫斯科哲学、政治学和艺术研讨会》),NY,Sternberg Press,2008.p.197-204近三年来我的研究一直聚焦于可被描述为经济与治理的神学系谱的那种东西。我试图展示当前经济与治理在社会生活一切领域上的支配,是在早几个世纪的基督教神学中,在——为协调单子论和三位一体——神学家把三位一体呈现为某种神圣的"经济",作为上帝组织与治理神圣生命与被造世界的方式的时候,是如何取得(形成)其范式的。     

The evolution of conventions in minimum effort games

The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff functions. The main aim of the present paper is to study the coordination problem arising in a not necessarily symmetric minimum effort game with two players. The sources of asymmetry can be twofold: the productivity of effort and the distribution of the join output. To select among the Pareto ranked equilibria we use the stochastic stability criterion. We show that, for any configuration parameters, the set of stochastically stable equilibria coincides with the set of potential maximizers. We also show that when the disutility of effort is linear, the Pareto dominant equilibrium is stochastically stable provided that the distributive parameter belongs to a well defined range. When the disutility of effort is nonlinear no distributive arguments can be used to successfully affect the selection process. Lastly we prove that the connection between stochastic stability and maximum potential can fail when more than two agents are considered.