Autocorrelation and masked heterogeneity in panel data models estimated by maximum likelihood

In a panel data model with random effects, when autocorrelation in the error is considered, (Gaussian) maximum likelihood estimation produces a dramatically large number of corner solutions: the variance of the random effect appears (incorrectly) to be zero, and a larger autocorrelation is (incorrectly) assigned to the idiosyncratic component. Thus heterogeneity could (incorrectly) be lost in applications to panel data with customarily available time dimension, even in a correctly specified model. The problem occurs in linear as well as nonlinear models. This article aims at pointing out how serious this problem can be (largely neglected by the panel data literature). A set of Monte Carlo experiments is conducted to highlight its relevance, and we explain this unpleasant effect showing that, along a direction, the expected log-likelihood is nearly flat.     

Who benefits from privileged peers? Evidence from siblings in schools

By comparing siblings attending the same school at different points in time, we investigate whether the effect of peer quality on long-term labor market outcomes varies with parental background. We find that exposure to better peers—who have higher mean parental education—increases lifetime earnings of disadvantaged students, coming from families with low parental education, but penalizes privileged students from better educated families. These results suggest that desegregation policies that allocate disadvantaged students to schools with better peers produce long-term benefits. We discuss mechanisms and show that human capital accumulation, ordinal rank and network effects contribute to explain our findings.     

Financial Liberalization, Property Rights, and Growth in an Overlapping-Generations Model

Using an endogenous growth model in which countries differ with respect to property rights protection, the paper analyzes the growth and welfare effects of removing capital controls, and studies the political support for a reform which improves the quality of property rights. When these are poorly protected, liberalization of capital movements may foster growth in the short run but eliminates it in the long run. The removal of capital controls may benefit agents at the time of liberalization, hurting future generations. Ceteris paribus , political support for a reform of property rights is stronger in the closed than in the open economy.     

Trade Costs,Trade Balances and Current Accounts: An Application of Gravity to Multilateral Trade

In this paper we test the well-known hypothesis of Obstfeld and Rogoff (NBER Macroeconomics Annual 7777:339–390, 2000) that trade costs are the key to explaining the so-called Feldstein–Horioka puzzle. Our approach has a number of novel features. First, we focus on the interrelationship between trade costs, the trade account and the Feldstein–Horioka puzzle. Second, we use the gravity model to estimate the effect of trade costs on bilateral trade and, third, we show how bilateral trade can be used to draw inferences about desired trade balances and desired intertemporal trade. Our econometric results provide strong support for the Obstfeld and Rogoff hypothesis and we are also able to reconcile our results with the so-called home bias puzzle.

On the relation between ownership dispersion and the firm's market value

Firms with widely-held ownership are relatively few. Shareholders controlling a firm are willing to forego the benefit of portfolio diversification because they can obtain a ‘rent from control’ at the expense of minority shareholders. This entails relevant conclusions for financial theory: (1) the total market value of a closely-held firm is lower, and its cost of capital higher than that of an identical widely-held firm is lower and its cost of capital higher than that of (3) different prices of control and minority shares and disconuities may impede evolution from closely to widely-held ownership.