An integrated multi-model credit rating system for private firms

This paper presents a integrated credit risk modelling approach for private firms which fulfil 2001 Basel Accord requirements in the case of the adoption of the foundation approach. Our model comprises: (a) a bottom-up technique to initially assess the through-the-cycle one-year Probability of Default (PD) and (b) a top-down approach to refine and calibrate this historical PD in a forward-looking credit risk assessment based on next year’s economic outlook. We present findings from applying this model to a large sample of client firms of the Bank of Rome.     

Bounds for Functions of Dependent Risks

The problem of finding the best-possible lower bound on the distribution of a non-decreasing function of n dependent risks is solved when n=2 and a lower bound on the copula of the portfolio is provided. The problem gets much more complicated in arbitrary dimensions. When no information on the structure of dependence of the random vector is available, we provide a bound on the distribution function of the sum of risks which we prove to be better than the one generally used in the literature.     

A general theory of controllability and expectations anchoring for small-open economies

Rational expectations are often used as an argument against policy activism, as they may undermine or neutralize the policymaker’s actions. Although this sometimes happens, rational expectations do not always imply policy invariance or ineffectiveness. In fact, in certain circumstances rational expectations can enhance our power to control an economy over time. In those cases, policy announcements can be used to extend the impact of conventional policy instruments. We present a general forward-looking policy framework and use it to provide a formal rationale for testing when policymakers can and cannot expect to be able to manage expectations. To describe the relevance of our results applications are shown for policy design in small-open economies. Those are the cases where domestic policies are at their weakest and our ability to influence expectations most constrained.     

Debt enforcement,investment, and risk taking across countries

We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder–debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41 countries with heterogeneous debt enforcement characteristics. Consistent with our model, we find that the relation between debt enforcement and firms’ investment and risk depends on the firm-specific probability of default. A differences-in-differences analysis of firms’ investment and risk taking in response to bankruptcy reforms that make debt more renegotiable confirms the cross-country evidence.     

SME financing and the choice of lending technology in Italy: Complementarity or substitutability?

This paper investigates SME financing in Italy. The literature distinguishes between two main different lending technologies (LTs) for SMEs: transactional and relationship LTs. We find that banks lend to SMEs by using both LTs together, independently of the size and proximity of borrowers. Moreover, we show that the use of soft information decreases the probability of firms being credit rationed. Finally, we find that more soft information is produced when the bank uses relationship LT as primary technology individually or coupled with transactional LT. Our results support the view that LTs can be complementary, but reject the hypothesis that substitutability among LTs is somehow possible for outsiders by means of hardening of soft information.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Reversal

For standard irreversibility theory the prospect of acquiring better information in the future should induce more flexible decisions: the “irreversibility effect”. This result relies on the definition of an irreversible position as one that would be technically or economically impossible to reverse. In practice, many positions can be reversed at an affordable cost. In this case an increase in informativeness alone is not enough to bias decisions in favour of more flexibility. We look for restrictions on decision sets, information structures and preferences that make possible to study the effect of information on flexibility. JEL Classification No: D81, D9     

Competition among regulators and credit market integration

We analyze the incentives for independent bank regulators with financially integrated jurisdictions to form a regulatory union. Externalities lead competing regulators to choose suboptimally low standards. Centralized regulation, however, entails a loss of flexibility if equal standards must be applied across jurisdictions. We find that, first, centralized regulation will more likely emerge among relatively homogeneous jurisdictions/countries. Second, centralized regulation will be unanimously preferred to independence only if it entails standards higher than those of the country with the highest individual standards. Third, financial integration among more than two jurisdictions may prevent partial unions, which, in turn, may prevent more comprehensive agreements.     

Pricing Bonds and Bond Options with Default Risk

The pricing of bonds and bond options with default risk is analysed in the general equilibrium model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). This model is extended by means of an additional parameter in order to deal with financial and credit risk simultaneously. The estimation of such a parameter, which can be considered as the market equivalent of an agencies' bond rating, allows to extract from current quotes the market perceptions of firm's credit risk. The general pricing model for defaultable zero-coupon bond is first derived in a simple discrete-time setting and then in continuous-time. The availability of an integrated model allows for the pricing of default-free options written on defaultable bonds and of vulnerable options written either on default-free bonds or defaultable bonds. A comparison between our results and those given by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) is also presented.     

Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?

Supervisory stress tests assess the impact of an adverse macroeconomic scenario on the profitability and capitalisation of a large number of banks. The results of such stress test exercises have recently been disclosed to the public in an attempt to restore confidence and to curb bank opaqueness by helping investors distinguish between sound and fragile institutions. In an unprecedented effort for transparency, the 2011 European Union stress test lead to the release of some 3400 data points for each of the 90 participating banks. This makes it an ideal setting to investigate a number of hypotheses on the information role of the stress tests.     

Filling vacancies: an empirical analysis of the cost and benefit of search in the labour market

This paper investigates empirically the factors that affect the cost–benefit ratio of employers’ search. The empirical analysis is based on a small Dutch data set containing individual information on filled vacancies. It is found that firms that use advertisements during recruitment are sensitive to labour market conditions; their search cost per applicant rises (drops) in tight (slack) labour markets because of the diminished ability of advertisements to generate applicants in tight labour markets. Furthermore, it is found that the high search cost incurred by posting identical vacancies is more than compensated for by the benefits from having a larger flow of applicants.