Partnership,reciprocity and team design

This paper studies the effect of intention-based reciprocity preferences on the free-riding problem arising in partnerships. Our results suggest a tendency of efficient partnerships to consist of members whose sensitivity to reciprocity is – individually or jointly – sufficiently high. Sufficient conditions for the implementation of the efficient strategy profile require a reciprocity-based sharing rule so that each partner gets a fraction of the output, which is a percentage of his own sensitivity to reciprocity with respect to the overall sensitivity in the team. Finally, we introduce the concept of psychological strong Nash equilibrium and show that it allows for the unique and collusion-proof implementation of the efficient strategy profile.     

Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design

Our paper reconsiders the triadic design proposed by Cox (Games and Economic Behavior 46:260–281, 2004) to identify trust and reciprocity in investment games. Specifically, we extend the design in two directions. First, we collect information on investors’ choices by using both the direct-response (as does Cox) and strategy methods. Using the latter, we are able to condition reciprocity on initial inequality, which is endogenous when investigating reciprocity. We demonstrate that the triadic design provides evidence for reciprocity once that initial inequality is considered. Second, we elicit expectations and test their coherence with the triadic outcomes. By examining the relationship between trust actions and expected gains, we analyze whether investors’ expectations are consistent with their behavior. Finally, we test for the existence of an emotional bias, i.e., whether expectation mismatches induce trustees to change actual choices from the planned ones.     

Protection for sale with imperfect rent capturing

Abstract .  Grossman and Helpman (1994) explain tariffs as the outcome of a lobbying process. In most empirical implementations of this framework protection is instead measured using non-tariff barriers. Since tariffs allow the government to fully capture the rents from protection, while non-tariff barriers do not, the existing parameter estimates of the protection for sale model are likely to be biased. To address this problem, we augment the framework by considering instruments that allow partial capturing. Our specification is supported by the data, where we find that only 72–75% of the rent from protection is appropriated by the government.     

Goodwill write-off and financial market behaviour: An analysis of possible relationships

The aim of this contribution is to verify whether there exists a reaction of financial markets to the new accounting method for goodwill introduced by SFAS 142 and IAS 36. Our research hypothesis is that financial markets should have no significant reaction to the goodwill write-off following the impairment test, since the latter's outcome represents an economic estimate without financial significance. The hypothesis was checked by the analysis of the companies added to the Standard & Poor's Europe 350 index over a three-year period, taking note of goodwill write-off announcements and relating them with the stock market prices and their volatility. The results demonstrate a correlation between the goodwill write-off and the behaviour of financial markets, while the same connection cannot be evinced for prices volatility. Also, what comes out from our analysis is that markets need a relatively long period, over one semester, before absorbing in full the effects resulting from the write-off announcement.     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

Expected Future Budget Deficits,the Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Dynamics in a Finite Horizon Model

This paper uses an optimizing open economy general-equilibrium model to investigate the macroeconomic effects of current and expected future budget deficits. It is shown that current and expected future budget deficits are positively correlated with the current account deficit, the capital stock and the real exchange rate, but negatively correlated with the domestic real interest rate and consumption, along the stable path approaching the steady state. The paper also demonstrates that the world real interest rate is positively correlated with consumption, foreign assets and the domestic real interest rate, but negatively correlated with the capital stock and the real exchange rate. Received April 11, 2001; revised version received October 25, 2001     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY SHOCKS IN SVAR MODELS: A GRAPHICAL MODELLING APPROACH

We apply graphical modelling (GM) theory to identify fiscal policy shocks in SVAR models of the US economy. Unlike other econometric approaches – which achieve identification by relying on potentially contentious a priori assumptions – GM is a data based tool. Our results are in line with Keynesian theoretical models, being also quantitatively similar to those obtained in the recent SVAR literature à la Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , and contrast with neoclassical real business cycle predictions. Stability checks confirm that our findings are not driven by sample selection.