Specialisation,localisation, and trade value in the wake of cross-border production sharing. The Central Eastern European Countries' case

We focus on five among the sectors in which most of the CEECs’ trade in middle products with EU-15 is concentrated. Over the second half of the 1990s, we observe remarkable changes in both production and trade specialization as well as a significant relocation of industries within CEECs. Using jointly trade and production data we outline co-movements in the adjustment of specialisation patterns. We also show that the redistribution of activities at the regional level reflects the relocation of industries at the global level. Finally, we try to detect the scope of fragmentation of production characterizing each industry and the ways in which CEECs are moving along the “internationally sliced-up value chain”. (JEL: F10, F14, F15)     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF MIXED OLIGOPOLY

Abstract. In this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly, that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments.     

Business cycles in Italy: A statistical investigation

This paper conducts a statistical analysis of post-war economic fluctuations in Italy. It is argued that business cycles in this country qualitatively conform to the general character of the phenomenon, a result which confirms existing evidence. A temporal stability analysis of stylized facts shows that some statistically significant changes in the empirical regularities occurred after 1973, but they did not alter the main qualitative features of the business cycle. The evidence thus supports interpretative models of the Italian business cycle which incorporate a stable propagation mechanism.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

基于成本的物流中心优化设计研究

如何有效地优化物流中心布局设计 ,以便在控制成本的同时提升产品的附加值 ,是众多企业面临的一个共同问题。本文从物流中心设置及配送方案着手 ,提出了相关的优化方法以期解决这一问题。     

The Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals in a Complex World

We develop a nonlinear exchange rate model with heterogeneous agents. Some agents adopt a “fundamentalist” forecasting rule, while others use a “chartist” forecasting rule. We show that the model is capable of explaining the empirical puzzles relating to exchange rate movements. In particular, the model explains the “exchange rate determination” and PPP puzzles, the excess volatility, and fat tails in exchange rate returns.     

Sectoral Energy- and Labour-Productivity Convergence

This paper empirically investigates the development of cross-country differences in energy- and labour productivity. The analysis is performed at a detailed sectoral level for 14 OECD countries, covering the period 1970–1997. A σ-convergence analysis reveals that the development over time of the cross-country variation in productivity performance differs across sectors as well as across different levels of aggregation. Both patterns of convergence as well as divergence are found. Cross-country variation of productivity levels is typically larger for energy than for labour. A β-convergence analysis provides support for the hypothesis that in most sectors lagging countries tend to catch up with technological leaders, in particular in terms of energy productivity. Moreover, the results show that convergence is conditional, meaning that productivity levels converge to country-specific steady states. Energy prices and wages are shown to positively affect energy- and labour-productivity growth, respectively. We also find evidence for the importance of economies of scale, whereas the investment share, openness and specialization play only a modest role in explaining cross-country variation in energy- and labour-productivity growth.      

BOT投资方式分析

BOT是国际上一种新兴的投资方式，它既缓解了东道国政府基础设施急需建设和资金困难的矛盾，同时也带动了资本输入国国民经济、科学技术和管理水平的提高。主要对BOT投资方式的含义、法律特征、法律性质以及我国BOT投资立法的完善问题进行分析，以期引起人们对BOT投资方式及其立法的更多思考。     

Service Quality,Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector

This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting.