The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

Does a Clean Development Mechanism Facilitate International Environmental Agreements?

When politicians negotiate in international climate conventions they may suffer from incomplete information for each other’s preferences for reaching an agreement. As is known, this may cause failure to reach an efficient cooperative agreement. We study the role of cross border abatement provisions in the likelihood of such failure. For instance, the clean development mechanism was introduced in the context of the Kyoto Protocol to allow countries to make efficiency-enhancing use of cross-country low-cost mitigation opportunities. We use a simple bargaining framework to uncover why this mechanism may reduce the likelihood of reaching an efficient cooperative climate agreement.     

Offset Credits in the EU ETS: A Quantile Estimation of Firm-Level Transaction Costs

International carbon offset certificates were cheaper than European Union Allowances, although they were substitutes within the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). Thus, firms had a strong incentive to use offset certificates. However, a considerable number of firms did not exhaust their offset quota and, by doing so, seemingly forwent profits. While most literature on emissions trading evaluates the efficiency of regulation in a frictionless world, in practice firms incur costs when complying with regulation. In order to assess the relevance of trade-related fixed transaction costs, this study examines the use of international offset credits in the EU ETS. It establishes a model of firm decision under fixed (quantity-invariant) entry costs and estimates the size of such costs rationalizing firm behavior using semi-parametric binary quantile regressions. Comparing binary quantile results with probit estimates shows that high average transaction costs result from a strongly skewed underlying distribution. For most firms, the bulk of transaction costs stems from certificate trading in general, rather than additional participation in offset trading.     

On Environmental Regulation of Oligopoly Markets: Emission versus Performance Standards

By specializing Montero’s (J Environ Econ Manag 44:23–44, 2002) model of environmental regulation under Cournot competition to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic abatement costs, we extend his comparison of firms incentives to invest in R&D under emission and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equilibrium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a welfare-maximizing regulator sets a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while closed-form solutions for the subgame-perfect equilibrium are not possible, we establish numerically that the resulting welfare is always larger under a performance standard.     

Intertemporal Emission Permits Trading Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility

This paper analyzes the effect of emission permit banking on clean technology investment and abatement under conditions where the stringency of the future cap is uncertain. We examine the problem of heterogeneous firms minimizing the cost of intertemporal emission control in the presence of stochastic future pollution standards and emission permits that are tradable across firms and through time. A firm can invest in clean capital (an improved pollution abatement technology) to reduce its abatement cost. We consider two possibilities: that investment is reversible or irreversible. Uncertainty is captured within a two period model: only the current period cap is known. We show that if banking is positive and marginal abatement costs are sufficiently convex, there will be more abatement and investment in clean technology under uncertainty than there would be under certainty and no banking. These results are at odds with the common belief that uncertainty on future environmental policy is a barrier to investment in clean capital. Moreover, under uncertainty and irreversibility, we find that there are cases where banking enables firms to invest more in clean capital.     

Shaping the Relationship Between Economic Development and Carbon Dioxide Emissions at the Local Level: Evidence from Spatial Econometric Models

The debate over the correlation between economic growth and environmental pollution has attracted a great deal of attention from academic researchers and policy makers in recent years. There has been excessive use of spatial econometric models and too much emphasis on statistical procedures in empirical studies. In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by conducting a more rigorous analysis of the relationship between economic growth and \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions in Chinese cities using spatial Durbin models. Our results show that \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions increase monotonically in relation to economic growth at the city level and that the driving effects of economic growth are slightly smaller in central China than in eastern and western China. In addition to economic growth, industry’s share of the economy is a major driver of \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions, while technological improvement, measured by energy intensity per unit of gross domestic product (GDP), and the effectiveness of environmental governance flatten the shape of the environmental Kuznets curve. We provide evidence of local spillover effects of explanatory variables on \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions. Economic competition as well as technological diffusion are found to exist in Chinese cities in relation to \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions. We also find carbon leakage between cities only if the per capita GDP of a given city is less than $493 (in 2010 constant dollars). Results hold when robustness checks are performed. Policy makers should carefully consider regional differences and the inherent spatial interactions between factors when formulating carbon reduction policies.     

Information Exchange and Transnational Environmental Problems

This paper analyzes information exchange in a model of transnational pollution control in which countries use private information in independently determining their domestic environmental policies. We show that countries may not always have an incentive to exchange their private information. However, for a sufficiently high degree of predictability of domestic environmental policy processes, the expected welfare from sharing information is greater than the expected welfare from keeping it private. The minimum degree of policy predictability for which information sharing occurs increases with the level of environmental risk. Intuitively, information exchange can help mitigate the perception of global uncertainty (both political and scientific) that surrounds transnational environmental problems and potentially improve welfare if policymaking processes are sufficiently aligned with evidence-based approaches (predictable).     

Taking Time for the Environment: On Timing and the Role of Delays in Environmental and Resource Economics

Ecosystem transformation and climate change evolve over long time scales. The effects of the economic decisions on the natural environment are also of a long-run character because they relate to investment decisions and capital stocks. At the same time, the economy is short-sighted and subject to different kinds of market failures. The time it takes to notice the changes and adequately address the associated problems affects the dynamics and inertia of the process. We discuss some recent contributions and new research questions that deal with time and timing in environmental and resource economics.     

Non-market Value of Winter Outdoor Recreation in the Swiss Alps: The Case of Val Bedretto

A longstanding interest from environmental economists on winter outdoor recreation has overlooked activities practiced outside the boundaries of winter resorts—e.g. ski mountaineering. This paper implements the Travel Cost Method to estimate consumer surplus per season derived from ski mountaineering and snowshoeing in Val Bedretto—a valley located in the Swiss Alps. In addition, the Contingent Behavior Method is used to estimate the changes in welfare associated with the construction of an alpine center that would provide services aiming to reduce the risk of injury and death associated with winter outdoor recreation. The data is analyzed by means of latent class panel on-site count models. The latent class approach allows us to identify subpopulations that benefit from the alpine center. The results show that 33% of visitors would experience an increase in their consumer surplus per season equivalent to €31 per visitor.     

Fractional Integration Versus Structural Change: Testing the Convergence of $$\hbox {CO}_{2}$$ Emissions

This paper assesses the stochastic convergence of relative \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions within 28 OECD countries over the period 1950–2013. Using the local Whittle estimator and some of its variants we assess whether relative per capita \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions are long memory processes which, although highly persistent, may revert to their mean/trend in the long run thereby indicating evidence of stochastic convergence. Furthermore, we test whether (possibly) slow convergence or the complete lack of it may be the result of structural changes to the deterministics of each of the relative per-capita emissions series by means of the tests of Berkes et al. (Ann Stat 1140–1165, 2006) and Mayoral (Oxford Bull Econ Stat 74(2):278–305, 2012). Our results show relatively weak support for stochastic convergence of \(\hbox {CO}_2\) emissions, indicating that only between 30 and 40% of the countries converge to the OECD average in a stochastic sense. This weak evidence disappears if we enlarge the sample to include 4 out of the 5 BRICS, indicating that our results are not robust to the inclusion of countries which are experiencing rates of growth which are far larger than those of the OECD members. Our results also decisively indicate that a slow or lack of convergence is not the results of a structural break in the relative \(\hbox {CO}_{2}\) emissions series.