A system for evaluating social welfare programs and allocating contributed resources based on citizen input

This paper describes the development and implementation of a social welfare program evaluation system developed by a Community Council to aid the resource allocation decision process of a local United Way. The system assigns a “utility” measure to each program based on how the program satisfies the long-term social welfare goals of the community adjusted for the effect of short range, time dependent criteria affecting the region. Data for the processes described was obtained by quantifying the subjective feelings of the individual members of the Community Council. The results have been accepted by the United Way Organization and are currently being used to assist in the planning and resource allocation functions of the fund.     

The incidence of Cash for Clunkers: Evidence from the 2009 car scrappage scheme in Germany

This paper investigates the German car scrappage program, focusing on the incidence of the premium. We ask how much of the €2500 ($3500) buyer subsidy is actually captured by the demand side. More precisely, we analyze the program’s impact on different car segments, allowing for heterogeneity in incidence at different points in the vehicle price distribution. Using a unique microtransaction data set, we find that the incidence of the subsidy strongly and significantly varies across price segments. Subsidized buyers of cheap cars paid a little more than comparable buyers who did not receive the subsidy, indicating incidence amounts slightly below 100 %. For more expensive vehicles, subsidized buyers were granted large extra discounts on top of the government premium, translating into incidence amounts considerably greater than 100 %. Taken together, this results in an aggregate incidence amount of up to plus €350 million, suggesting that the positive effect for expensive cars overcompensates the negative effect for small cars.     

Repayment behavior in peer‐to‐peer microfinancing: Empirical evidence from Kiva

Based on a sample of microloans (to individuals and to groups) that were refinanced through the peer-to-peer microfinancing platform Kiva, we study the determinants of the repayment behavior of micro-entrepreneurs whose loans are available to international charitable lenders. We perform binary regressions and account for influential factors such as the time required for funding or the type of entrepreneurial activity. The screening and monitoring quality of the microfinance institution which selects the borrowers is a main driver of credit default. We find evidence that the loan size, the loan term and the length of a possible grace period influence the probability of default. Moreover, women demonstrate better repayment behavior which is, however, not the case for groups of women.     

Financial market frictions and diversification

We find new facts that relate the evolution of firm scope to the changing frictions in external capital markets over the last three decades. We find that large, diversified publicly traded firms increase their scope during times of high external capital market frictions, such as in the recent Great Recession. Moreover, during these times firms diversify their investment needs and cash flow across industries. We also find similar phenomena outside diversified public firms. Examining the mergers and acquisitions activity of stand-alone and diversified private firms, we uncover similar patterns. In aggregate data, we find that the composition of mergers shifts from focused to diversifying and back with changes in external market conditions. Our evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that firms diversify their scope in response to tightening in external capital markets.     

Optimal discrete hedging of American options using an integrated approach to options with complex embedded decisions

In order to solve the problem of optimal discrete hedging of American options, this paper utilizes an integrated approach in which the writer’s decisions (including hedging decisions) and the holder’s decisions are treated on equal footing. From basic principles expressed in the language of acceptance sets we derive a general pricing and hedging formula and apply it to American options. The result combines the important aspects of the problem into one price. It finds the optimal compromise between risk reduction and transaction costs, i.e. optimally placed rebalancing times. Moreover, it accounts for the interplay between the early exercise and hedging decisions. We then perform a numerical calculation to compare the price of an agent who has exponential preferences and uses our method of optimal hedging against a delta hedger. The results show that the optimal hedging strategy is influenced by the early exercise boundary and that the worst case holder behavior for a sub-optimal hedger significantly deviates from the classical Black–Scholes exercise boundary.     

Comparing survey data with an official administrative population: assessing sample-selectivity in the IAB Establishment Panel

The IAB Establishment Panel is a large annual establishment survey and serves as a data source for many empirical analyzes, e.g., on labor demand, wages and industrial relations but also for influential policy evaluations. We analyze the selectivity of the IAB Establishment Panel compared with the administrative population of all establishments in Germany to test whether the IAB Establishment Panel is biased towards “good employers”. By design the survey over-samples large, thus high paying and stable establishments. After flexibly controlling for elements of the sampling design, we do not detect any meaningful difference between establishments participating in the survey and the full population regarding key economic performance indicators. If anything, we observe a slight overrepresentation of stable and slow growing establishments. For applied research, the results highlight that “typical” econometric specifications may not be sufficient to control for selectivity.

     

Tullock's Puzzle in Pay‐and‐Play Lobbying

We explain Tullock's puzzle of small payments from special interests to policy‐makers by the hold‐up problem between the two parties. We construct a simple lobbying environment where an uninformed policy‐maker is a price‐setter who sells access to two opposed and privately informed lobbyists. The key equilibrium property is “the curse of the ex ante favored lobbyist”; the lobbyist proposing a project with the higher expected public value ends up worse off than the lobbyist proposing a project with the lower expected public value. In the absence of contribution caps, the ex ante favored lobbyist strategically devalues her project, and the resulting competitive devaluations destroy private values, revenues, as well as correlated public values. Ex ante, the policy‐maker benefits from a binding contribution cap protects the ex ante favored lobbyist, eliminates competitive devaluations, and thus remedies the hold‐up problem.