The impact of market actions on firm reputation

Drawing on signaling theory, we hypothesize that a firm's reputation is shaped by its own market actions and the actions of its industry rivals. We view market actions as signals that convey information about the underlying competencies of firms and influence stakeholder evaluations of them. We find that the total number of a firm's market actions, the complexity of its action repertoire, the time lag in rivals' responses to its actions, and the similarity of its repertoire with those of its rivals positively affect its reputation. These results suggest that a firm's reputation is influenced both by its own actions and by its rivals' actions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms

In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend on the initial allocation mechanism for permits in the absence of transaction costs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate this prediction by comparing frequent and infrequent auctioning as well as two different grandfathering schemes under market rules that closely resemble those of the European Union Emission Trading System. Our experimental results suggest that, contrary to theoretical predictions, the initial allocation procedure has the potential to affect efficiency of the final permit allocation. While we do not identify an effect of the initial allocation procedure itself (auction vs. grandfathering), we observe higher final efficiency after infrequent auctioning of permits than for frequent auctioning. Surprisingly, for a grandfathering scheme that distributes permits proportional to expected needs the high initial efficiency is substantially reduced by secondary market trading. An analysis of behavioral patterns shows that permit prices and abatement levels are initially substantially higher if permits are allocated by auction and we also find more over-banking as compared to the grandfathering treatments. Treatment differences diminish in the course of the experiment.     

Environmental variation,strategic change and firm performance: A study of railroad deregulation

Concepts from the literature on the relationship between environmental variation and strategic change are used to analyze the effects of deregulation on strategic management in the railroad industry. Specific hypotheses are presented about the impact of regulation and change in regulation on strategy, strategic change and performance. A survey of experts identified the strategies of 27 railroads prior to and after deregulation. Five different railroad strategies and five different kinds of strategic changes are identified and described. Results suggest that most firms changed their strategies in response to environmental variation, and that those that did change their strategics out-performed those that did not. Among the strategic changes, those involving innovation and contingency strategies were found to be the most profitable. Other empirical results are presented and discussed.     

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On the Credibility of Currency Boards*

The paper compares the credibility of currency boards and (standard) pegs. Abandoning a currency board requires a time‐consuming legislative process and an abolition will thus be well‐anticipated. Therefore, a currency board solves the time‐inconsistency problem of monetary policy. However, policy can react to unexpected shocks only with a time lag, thus the threat of large shocks makes the abolition more likely. Currency boards are more credible than standard pegs if the time‐inconsistency problem dominates. In contrast, standard pegs, that can be left at short notice, are more credible if exogenous shocks are highly volatile and constitute the dominant problem.     

Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price

We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a dominant strategy, we find that bidders have an incentive to overstate their demand in the fixed price mechanism. For some parameter values we find that the fixed price mechanism outperforms the auction.     

Die Folgen eines russischen Erdgasembargos

Wirtschaftsdienst - Sanctions and their effectiveness are at the centre of the discussion about an appropriate response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. At the latest since the...     

Kohleausstieg 2030 unter neuen Vorzeichen

Wirtschaftsdienst - Der russische Angriff auf die Ukraine und die Abhängigkeit der deutschen Energiewirtschaft von russischem Gas führen aktuell zu einer sehr angespannten...