狄骥思想之德式解读

在迪特·格林看来,狄骥核心思想在于对法兰西第三共和国中后期主流的法秩序概念和法学方法进行了彻底批判,认为其所处时代的法学尚停留在形而上学阶段。在对"法律"和"立法"严格区分的基础上,狄骥将法律中唯意志主义的所有形式剔除而凸显"客观法"。"社会连带之事实"在整个狄氏思想脉络中成为其解释"客观法"内容之依据,并因此着力摒弃大革命法秩序核心观念:如"主权"自由"与"主观权利"。迪特·格林认为狄骥学说全部目的在于使得政治权力及个人意志均遵循客观法,使用"公共服务"概念摒弃"公共权力"并试图以全新的方式定义"国家"     

Understanding Why Consumers Don't Skip Pre-Roll Video Ads

Pre-roll advertising is a novel form of online video advertising that provides consumers with an option to skip after viewing a brief forced segment. Pre-roll ads are unique from other forms of online advertising because pre-roll ads play in exactly the space in which consumers are expecting to view their intended content. Such interruption and obstruction not only heightens consumer irritation but also causes attention-getting tactics, which are redundant in a highly attentive state, to backfire. For these reasons, existing ad avoidance literature may not adequately address this unique format. Employing a large industry data set of pre-roll ads representing multiple countries and product categories, we empirically examine skipping behavior using a broader range of ad characteristics than previous research. We propose that less complex affective ad characteristics increase skipping by failing to engage cognitive resources and therefore leaving cognitive resources available to experience irritation. We further posit that, in a pre-roll context, attention-getting ad characteristics are not only superfluous but actually increase the likelihood consumers recognize pre-roll content as advertising and skip. Our empirical findings support these assertions, identifying new factors driving ad avoidance, and calling into question the applicability of attention-getting advertising approaches in the novel pre-roll environment.     

Do Firms Spend More on Suppliers That Have Environmental Expertise? An Empirical Study of U.S. Manufacturers’ Procurement Spend

Stakeholders expect focal firms to improve their environmental performance. While firms may be able to accumulate the environmental expertise needed to achieve this goal internally, doing so may require significant time and resource commitments. Alternatively, buyer firms can leverage their suppliers’ existing environmental expertise and gain access to such expertise when they purchase products and services from these suppliers. The purpose of this study was to develop and test theory regarding under what conditions suppliers’ environmental expertise influences a buying firms’ procurement spend with these suppliers. We ground our study in transaction cost economics and agency theories and empirically test our hypotheses using a unique buyer–supplier dyadic data set. We find that buyer firms are willing to increase their overall business spend with suppliers that have strong environmental expertise, particularly when the buyer firms are more profitable and have higher levels of absorptive capacity. However, we find the opposite effect when the buyer firm’s executive compensation is linked to the firm’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Likewise, we also find that the buyer firm’s environmental concern ratings negatively moderate the relationship between the supplier’s environmental expertise and the buyer’s procurement spend with the supplier.     

Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games

Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10 min.     

Problems of urban development planning

In developing countries the urbanisation process poses one of the most serious problems, for it creates unemployment, utmost poverty and aggravates the general situation. In this article the case of indonesia is discussed and possible strategies for a future improvement of such a situation are pointed out.     

Fixed price plus rationing: an experiment

This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed. If demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to alleviate the effects of being rationed. This effect is the more intense the lower the price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices. In the experiment we observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play. However, subjects tend to overbid the equilibrium strategy when prices are high and underbid when prices are low. We explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it.

---

Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.