Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two different protocols are considered: the egalitarian protocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with equal probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payoffs coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies and the indifference conditions can be reinterpreted in the language of the kernel.     

The Impact of Innovation on Employment in Services: Evidence from Italy

This article investigates the employment impact of innovation in services, using the data gathered through the 1993-95 Italian innovation survey. The empirical evidence shows that the impact of innovation on employment varies greatly across industries and according to the level of qualification of the labour force. Among small firms and in less than a half of the service sectors considered, the employment impact of innovation is positive, particularly in industries that have a strong scientific and technological base. A negative impact of innovation on employment is, on the contrary, found among large firms, capital-intensive industries and in all financial-related sectors (banking, insurance and other financial services). In these industries the labour-saving effect of innovation seems to be linked to the widespread use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) which displace the least qualified employees. In the case of Italy, an overall negative impact of innovation on employment is found. It is argued that this result is affected by the Italian economy's specialisation in the most traditional service industries.