Long difference instrumental variables estimation for dynamic panel models with fixed effects

This paper proposes a new instrumental variables estimator for a dynamic panel model with fixed effects with good bias and mean squared error properties even when identification of the model becomes weak near the unit circle. We adopt a weak instrument asymptotic approximation to study the behavior of various estimators near the unit circle. We show that an estimator based on long differencing the model is much less biased than conventional implementations of the GMM estimator for the dynamic panel model. We also show that under the weak instrument approximation conventional GMM estimators are dominated in terms of mean squared error by an estimator with far less moment conditions. The long difference (LD) estimator mimics the infeasible optimal procedure through its reliance on a small set of moment conditions.     

A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk

We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages.JEL Classification: J40, L20, M50Alexander Matros: We are grateful to Karl Wärneryd and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Much of this paper was written while Matros was a Research Fellow at University College London and Friebel was at SITE, Stockholm. We are grateful for their research environmennt. The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research Center for Economic Learning and Social Evolution.     

Is family leadership always beneficial?

There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the drivers of their performance. Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family firms go wrong; others claim that family management removes costly agency problems and encourages stewardship. Our thesis is that these disagreements can only be resolved by distinguishing among different types of family firms. We argue that family CEOs will outperform in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership and underperform in larger firms with more dispersed ownership; they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more dispersed or firms are larger and ownership is more concentrated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intention and behavior: a Bayesian meta-analysis with focus on the Ajzen–Fishbein Model in the field of environmental behavior

We employ a Bayesian normal hierarchical model to investigate the relationship between intention and behavior as it is posited by Ajzen and Fishbein’s theory of planned behavior (TPB). Area of application is the field of environmental behavior. Eleven studies reporting correlations between intention and behavior were identified. Our Bayesian hierarchical model expects a correlation of r _xy = 0.54 between those variables. This effect size is above average with regard to meta-analyses, which include other, non-environmental areas of application.     

For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment

The Kreps–Wilson–Milgrom–Roberts framework is one of the most renowned ways of modeling reputation-building. Once the number of repetitions of the game is considered as a choice variable, such a framework can fruitfully be employed to study the optimal length of the commitment to a relationship. We analyze a model where a principal plays with an agent a finitely repeated trust game, characterize the optimal length of the relationship between principal and agent when the principal’s preferences on the agent’s type stochastically change over time and show that a commitment to a stable relationship may be optimal (even) in very unstable environments.      

Who trusts others more? A cross-European study

Using the European Social Survey, the paper documents the endowments and the individual determinants of trust across Europe. Self-declared trust is higher in northern countries, in particular Scandinavia; it is lower in southern countries, in particular Italy, Portugal and Greece. At the EU-15 level, we find that a number of factors, such as schooling, family background, labor market status, and a recent history of traumatic experiences, are associated with trust. We also find evidence of heterogeneity for some of the determinants across European countries.