MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

Qualitative valuation of environmental criteria through a group consensus based on stochastic dominance

This paper introduces a qualitative valuation method to elicit stakeholders' intensities of preferences for a complex environmental issue and multiple social groups. Environmental valuation studies have shown that in any complex environment with a diversity of environmental services, stakeholders have difficulties using a monetary valuation to make trade-offs between different environmental services. Stated preference methods such as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) have been criticised for their individualistic format and assumptions of commensurability between environmental criteria. To alleviate both of these criticisms, we propose a qualitative valuation method. The method contains a discursive step to allow stakeholders to discuss and construct a list of environmental criteria and alternative plans. The list of criteria and plans is subsequently used by a group of experts to formulate an Impact Matrix (IM), which is to be used in the succeeding individualistic steps of the methodology. The first individualistic step consists of asking the stakeholders to rank Alternative Impacts (AIs) in the IM for each single criterion. The stakeholders are then asked to express intensities of their preferences through pairwise comparisons between the AIs of the constructed rank order on each single criterion. These intensities are expressed on a qualitative scale. Subsequently, to provide social intensities of preferences, a social preference (social rank order) is first determined for each single criterion. We propose to use the median value among the intensities of preferences as the social intensity of preference by assuming interpersonal comparability and taking into account stochastic monotonocity. This is a pre-processing step, which allows us to reach social intensities of preferences in the Lar rangeland (Iran), where several social groups have conflicting interests on rangeland services, leading to conflicting preferences on environmental criteria.     

Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint: modeling agglomeration,externalities and trade

A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It covers agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities, and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmental externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.      

Forecasting interest rates with shifting endpoints

We consider forecasting the term structure of interest rates with the assumption that factors driving the yield curve are stationary around a slowly time‐varying mean or ‘shifting endpoint’. The shifting endpoints are captured using either (i) time series methods (exponential smoothing) or (ii) long‐range survey forecasts of either interest rates or inflation and output growth, or (iii) exponentially smoothed realizations of these macro variables. Allowing for shifting endpoints in yield curve factors provides substantial and significant gains in out‐of‐sample predictive accuracy, relative to stationary and random walk benchmarks. Forecast improvements are largest for long‐maturity interest rates and for long‐horizon forecasts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Accounting for control and trust building in interfirm transactional relationships

This paper theorises the accounting-control-trust nexus in interfirm transactional relationships. In the context of such relationships, accounting has predominantly been conceptualised as a control technology. However, in our paper we analyse stable and durable relationships as being the results of interaction between control and trust building. Such an analysis calls for an additional conceptualisation of accounting as a trust building technology. Furthermore, we explain the interaction between accounting for control and accounting for trust building in the context of a process of embedded agency.     

Guest editor's introduction

The views reflected in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily concur with those of his employer.     

Maximising sustainability of Dutch dairy farming systems for different stakeholders: A modelling approach

A multi-attribute sustainability function is included into a dairy farm LP-model by using Weighted Goal Programming. The created Weighted Linear Goal Programming (WLGP)-model is used to maximise sustainability of different Dutch dairy farming systems and to analyse the impact of: (1) maximisation of individual sustainability aspects (economic, social and ecological sustainability) and (2) maximisation of overall sustainability using stakeholder preferences. Maximising the individual aspects of both dairy farming systems, i.e. conventional and organic, shows the trade-offs between different aspects of sustainability. For conventional as well as organic dairy farming maximum scores are highest for external social sustainability. The conventional dairy farm achieves a slightly higher score for overall sustainability than the organic dairy farm for all stakeholders (i.e. consumers and producers). This shows that it is possible for conventional dairy farms, similar to the conventional farm used in the analysis especially regarding the stocking density and under Dutch policy conditions, to achieve equal sustainability scores in comparison with organic dairy farms. It is concluded that the WLGP model is a suitable tool to analyse the sustainability of different dairy farming systems.     

Loosely Coupled Results Control in Dutch Municipalities

This paper analyses the implementation of the ‘dual system’ in Dutch municipalities which was part of a package of New Public Management‐reforms. This system was stimulated by Dutch central government and called for more accountability for performance of municipal managers and the board of mayor and aldermen, as well as for the use of more output and outcome information. Interviews of participants on four different hierarchical levels in 12 municipalities show that the practices of output management at different hierarchical levels are only loosely coupled to each other (‘vertical loose coupling’). We also found some degree of ‘horizontal loose coupling’ at each hierarchical level between result orientation, the development of output indicators and the use of output information for performance evaluation. The paper analyses the reasons why municipalities encounter difficulties in designing a comprehensive and coherent performance management system.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.