Regulation of Location-Specific Externalities from Small-Scale Polluters

Environmental and Resource Economics - Emission damages caused by small-scale polluters such as farms, vehicles, homes and small businesses are often location-specific and such polluters are often...     

The Pricing Structure of Legal Services: Do Lawyers Offer What Clients Want?

Review of Industrial Organization - We analyze clients’ contract choices in auctions where Dutch law firms compete for standard cases such as labor disputes for individuals and collecting...     

Do insurers adjust prices for the adoption of loss prevention technologies? Evidence from Danish municipal contracts

Using data from 40 Danish municipalities on building characteristics, loss prevention technologies, insurance claims, and insurance bids from 2008 to 2019, we investigate whether and how loss prevention technologies influenced contract prices. The insurance bids cover a variety of municipal buildings across a range of risks including fire, water leakage, and building security as well as structure detection and alarm systems. The study shows that the magnitude of historical claims may affect both pricing offers and interest in loss prevention technologies. We do not find that loss prevention technologies have any significant influence on contract price. This suggests inefficiencies in the market from imperfect information.     

OPENING THE FLOODGATES: PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ADJUSTMENTS TO LABOR IMMIGRATION

We investigate the impact of a large immigration shock on occupational wages. We develop a general equilibrium model where individuals sort into occupations and confront testable hypotheses with data. To identify the effect of the labor supply shock, we introduce a novel instrument that exploits that immigrants systematically sort into different occupations than natives. We study the immigration wave to Norway after the Eastern enlargement and find that immigration led to lower relative occupational wages. A quantification of the general equilibrium shows welfare effects of immigration close to zero for natives, but negative effects for the pre-existing population of immigrants.     

Neither market nor hierarchy—coordination costs in the allocation of track capacity in the Swedish railway network

Transaction costs have been an issue since the advent of the deregulation of the European railway markets in the 1990s. Transaction cost economics received renewed attention in research on the deregulated railway markets in the EU after the publications of two influential reports in the early 2010s. In this article, we develop a model that enables classification and measurement of transaction costs and other coordination costs in deregulated markets. This model is then used to analyze the costs of path allocation in the Swedish railway sector and to compare the results with findings in previous research. We also discuss the economic rationale of the distribution of coordination costs among the involved parties. Our key empirical findings are that the total coordination costs in the Swedish market-mimicking path allocation process are as low as or lower than the most cost-efficient market coordination processes studied in railway markets, and that the state administrations take on nearly all the coordination costs in order to minimize the effects of opportunism, rent-seeking and information impactedness. Another finding is that the size of the coordination costs found by different studies seems to be dependent on whether a bottom-up or a top-down approach is used.