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Ohne Zusammenfassung     

The US Dollar and the Euro as International Currencies

For many decades the US dollar has remained unchallenged as the world’s dominant international currency. What is behind its persistent pre-eminence in the international monetary system and can this be expected to last? Could the euro rival or even surpass the dollar as the leading currency? If it did, what would be the consequences for Euroland?      

The wisdom of deliberate mistakes

Before the breakup of the Bell System, U.S. telephone companies were permitted by law to ask for security deposits from a small percentage of subscribers. The companies used statistical models to decide which customers were most likely to pay their bills late and thus should be charged a deposit, but no one knew whether the models were right. So the Bell companies made a deliberate mistake. They asked for no deposit from nearly 100,000 new customers randomly selected from among those who were considered high risks. Surprisingly, quite a few paid their bills on time. As a result, the companies instituted a smarter screening strategy, which added millions to the Bell System's bottom line. Usually, individuals and organizations go to great lengths to avoid errors. Companies are designed for optimum performance rather than for learning, and mistakes are seen as defects. But as the Bell System example shows, making mistakes--correctly--is a powerful way to accelerate learning and increase competitiveness. If one of a company's fundamental assumptions is wrong, the firm can achieve success more quickly by deliberately making errors than by considering only data that support the assumption. Moreover, executives who apply a conventional, systematic approach to solving a pattern recognition problem are often slower to find a solution than those who test their assumptions by knowingly making mistakes. How do you distinguish between smart mistakes and dumb ones? The authors' consulting firm has developed, and currently uses, a five-step process for identifying constructive mistakes. In one test, the firm assumed that a mistake it was planning to make would cost a significant amount of money, but the opposite happened. By turning assumptions on their heads, the firm created more than dollar 1 million in new business.     

The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin

Before the crisis of 1997/98, the East Asian economies—except for Japan but including China—pegged their currencies to the US dollar. To avoid further turmoil, the IMF argues that these currencies should float more freely. However, the authors’ econometric estimations show that the dollar's predominant weight in East Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre‐crisis levels. By 2002, the day‐to‐day volatility of each country's exchange rate against the dollar had again become negligible. Most governments were rapidly accumulating a “war chest” of official dollar reserves, which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters. From the doctrine of “original sin” applied to emerging‐market economies, the authors argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country. And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.     

Die mittelfristigen Folgen der Wechselkurspolitik für Leistungsbilanz und Inflationsrate

Summary Nowadays it is uncontested that price elasticities of demand for exports and imports are high enough to secure an improvement of the current account of the balance of payments in the case of an exchange rate devaluation. Indeed it may take some time until the effects materialize and the primary effect may even run in the opposite direction. However, doubts arise about the favourable reaction of the current account if secondary price and wage effects are taken into consideration—what has been done more thoroughly in recent times.The present study deals with the medium term aspects of exchange rate changes in Austria. In order to quantify exchange rate effects on foreign trade and prices double weighted exchange rate indices and double weighted foreign trade price indices were computed and a simple econometric model was built. Behavioural equations for quantities and prices of exports and imports (as far as possible, disaggregated for raw materials, energy and manufactures), for domestic prices and wages were estimated. In addition to this model exchange rate effects on tourism were considered separately. In order to evaluate the consequences of the revaluation of the Austrian Schilling simulations were run under the assumption that in the period 1972 till 1976 Austria had kept constant the average exchange rate of the currencies of its main trading partners (competitors). The main results are as follows: If Austria had pursued a constant exchange rate policy in terms of the export weighted exchange rate index during the years 1972 to 1976 instead of actually revaluating the Schilling by 19 percent the volume of exports would have been higher by 1 billion Schilling (at 1970 prices) whereas the volume of imports would have been lower by 16 billions Schilling; measured in current prices exports and imports would have been higher by 59 billions and 60 billions, respectively, and the receipts from tourism would have grown faster by 12 billions. Therefore, the trade balance would have deteriorated by 1 billion and the current account would have improved by 11 billions. By 1976 consumer prices and wages would have reached a higher level (+7 3/4 percent and +5 1/4 percent, respectively). The results of this study are not in contradiction to those obtained in comparable work for other countries.There is some indication pointing to a further deterioration of the current account in the longer run: The revaluation caused profit squeeze which hits exporters as well as import competing domestic producers may weaken investment and the ability to maintain market shares. The revaluation could favour the sheltered sector of the economy in comparison to the exposed sector and shift the structure of the economy to the disadvantage of the current account.     

Why did policy ignore the harbingers of the crisis?

An analysis of the monetary authorities’ reports for 2005 to 2007 reveals that they were well aware of the risks of the financial crisis. They, however, tended to overemphasise the risks outside their control and to neglect those, at least partially under their control. Central banks should and could have acted already in 2005. Academic studies and their own assessments clearly indicated an accumulation of risks. Monetary authorities didn’t react as (1) they believe in self-regulating markets, and (2) in monetary instruments’ ineffectiveness to prevent bubbles, as well as (3) their tendency to assigning an extremely low probability to potential risks. This is not untypical for expert assessments: Risk assessment for complex systems is extremely complicated. If feasible at all, it would require extraordinarily complex techniques to take into account the tight coupling of system components and their complex interaction. This will not be possible in the foreseeable future. As a result reducing the system’s complexity appears to be the only way to reduce the probability and the severity of future financial crises.