The Case for Stabilizing China＇s Exchange Rate： Setting the Stage for Fiscal Expansion

China＇s financial conundrum arises from two sources. First, its large saving （trade） surplus results in a currency mismatch because it is an immature creditor that cannot lend in its own currency. Instead, foreign currency claims （largely US dollars） build up within domestic financial institutions. Second, economists, both American and Chinese, mistakenly attribute the surpluses to an undervalued RMB. To placate the USA, the result was a gradual and predictable appreciation of the RMB against the dollar of 6 percent or more per year from July 2005 to July 2008. Together with the fall in US interest rates since mid-2007, this one- way bet in the foreign exchanges markets not only attracted hot money inflows but inhibited private capital outflows from financing China＇ s huge trade surplus. Therefore, the People＇s Bank of China had to intervene heavily to prevent the RMB from ratcheting upwards, and so became the country＇s sole international financial intermediary as official exchange reserves exploded Because of the currency mismatch, floating the RMB is neither feasible nor desirable, and a higher RMB would not reduce China＇ s trade surplus. Instead, monetary control and normal private-sector finance for the trade surplus require a return to a credibly fixed nominal RMB/USD rate similar to that which existed between 1995 and 2004. However, for any newly reset RMB/USD rate to be credible as a monetary anchor, foreign ＂China bashing＂ to get the RMB up must end. Then the stage would be set for fiscal expansion to both stimulate the economy and reduce its trade surplus.     

Aggressive Orders and the Resiliency of a Limit Order Market

We analyze the resiliency of a pure limit order market by investigating the limit order book (bid and ask prices, spreads, depth and duration), order flow and transaction prices in a window of best limit updates and transactions around aggressive orders (orders that move prices). We find strong persistence in the submission of aggressive orders. Aggressive orders take place when spreads and depths are relatively low, and they induce bid and ask prices to be persistently different after the shock. Depth and spread remain also higher than just before the order, but do return to their initial level within 20 best limit updates after the shock. Relative to the sample average, depths stay around their mean before and after aggressive orders, whereas spreads return to their mean after about twenty best limit updates. The initial price impact of the aggressive order is partly reversed in the subsequent transactions. However, the aggressive order produces a long-term effect as prices show a tendency to return slowly to the price of the aggressive order.We thank Theo Nijman, Erik Theissen, Rob van den Goorbergh, Josef Zechner (editor) and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on an earlier draft as well as seminar participants at the EEA-conference in Venice, the CFS Conference on Market Design in Eltville, CORE, Leuven and Tilburg. The first and last authors gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from FWO-Flanders under contract G.0333.     

Global gamesmanship

Competition among multinationals these days is likely to be a three-dimensional game of global chess: The moves an organization makes in one market are designed to achieve goals in another in ways that aren't immediately apparent to its rivals. The authors--all management professors-call this approach "competing under strategic interdependence," or CSI. And where this interdependence exists, the complexity of the situation can quickly overwhelm ordinary analysis. Indeed, most business strategists are terrible at anticipating the consequences of interdependent choices, and they're even worse at using interdependency to their advantage. In this article, the authors offer a process for mapping the competitive landscape and anticipating how your company's moves in one market can influence its competitive interactions in others. They outline the six types of CSI campaigns--onslaughts, contests, guerrilla campaigns, feints, gambits, and harvesting--available to any multiproduct or multimarket corporation that wants to compete skillfully. They cite real-world examples such as the U.S. pricing battle Philip Morris waged with R.J. Reynolds--not to gain market share in the domestic cigarette market but to divert R.J. Reynolds's resources and attention from the opportunities Philip Morris was pursuing in Eastern Europe. And, using data they collected from their studies of consumer-products companies Procter & Gamble and Unilever, the authors describe how to create CSI tables and bubble charts that present a graphical look at the competitive landscape and that may uncover previously hidden opportunities. The CSI mapping process isn't just for global corporations, the authors explain. Smaller organizations that compete with a portfolio of products in just one national or regional market may find it just as useful for planning their next business moves.     

The Economic Impact of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy versus Out‐of‐Court Restructuring

Companies in financial distress have usually been able to choose between working out an agreement with their creditors (“private restructuring”) or entering into more expensive and lengthier formal Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. But 2015 rulings in two cases by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York may force distressed firms to enter Chapter 11 rather than seek negotiated out‐of‐court settlements. Using a large sample of U.S. companies that experienced financial difficulty during the period 2006–2014, the authors found that the companies that filed for bankruptcy and went through Chapter 11 proceedings experienced significantly more job losses and reductions of economic output than companies achieving out‐of‐court restructurings, both overall and on a per‐case basis. The authors' estimates of the overall losses in output associated with Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases ranged as high as 2.3% of 2014 GDP, as compared to at most 0.3% of GDP in the case of out‐of‐court negotiations. At the same time, the authors estimate that as many as 2.2 million job losses were attributable to cases involving bankruptcies while the out‐of‐court cases were associated with the loss of at most about 300,000 jobs. But, as the authors concede, these findings are exaggerated by a clear self‐selection bias—one that stems from the well‐documented tendency of more fundamentally profitable, and hence more solvent, companies to choose private restructuring over bankruptcy. Despite this limitation, the study provides a useful point of departure for future studies that aim to quantify the costs to the U.S. economy of limiting or removing the option of companies with valuable operations but the “wrong” capital structures to work out their financial difficulties outside of the bankruptcy court.     

Folgen der Finanzkrise für die globalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen

Ohne Zusammenfassung Prof. Dr. Rolf J. Langhammer, 61, ist Vizepr?sident des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel. Prof. Dr. Gunther Schnabl, 42, ist Leiter des Instituts für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universit?t Leipzig. Jürgen Matthes, 41, Dipl.-Volkswirt, leitet das Referat Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik im Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft K?ln. K. MIchael Finger, 62, Dipl.-Volkswirt, war bis vor Kurzem Senior Economist in der Economic Research and Statistics Division der WTO. Prof. Dr. Andreas Freytag, 46, hat den Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik der Friedrich-Schiller-Universit?t Jena inne und ist Senior Fellow beim European Centre for International Political Economy; Sebastian Voll, 25, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftspolitik der Friedrich-Schiller-Universit?t Jena.     

Beyond Balassa and Samuelson: real convergence,capital flows,and competitiveness in Greece

To better understand the convergence process prior and since the European financial and debt crisis, we scrutinize the role of capital flows for competitiveness in Greece and a set of six other euro area member countries (Portugal, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic). For this purpose the paper extends the seminal Balassa–Samuelson model by international capital markets with a particular focus on their impact on national wage policies. Capital flows are assumed to be able to invert the traditional direction of transmission of real wage increases from the tradable sector to the non-tradable sector and to make real wages increase beyond productivity increases. The augmented Balassa–Samuelson model is extended to trace cyclical deviations of real exchange rates from the productivity-driven equilibrium path. Panel estimations for the period from 1995 to 2013 reveal correlations in line with the Balassa–Samuelson effect, if Greece is excluded from the panel. For Greece, this in turn implies indication in favour of a credit-driven real wage increases beyond productivity increases what we call a “pseudo” Balassa–Samuelson effect.     

Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty

Variable rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under left-wing and right-wing governments. Fluctuations of economic activity result from uncertainty about the electoral outcome and the exact timing of elections. However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the degree of electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using polling data, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of variable rational partisan cycles.