Addressing the Legitimacy Gap in the Israeli Corporatist Revival

Since the mid-1980s, Israel's labour law and industrial relations have transitioned from a Continental corporatist system to an Anglo-American pluralist system. The process has been characterized by greater fragmentation of the labour market and the system of interests' representation. However, in recent years, there have been several episodes of nationwide collective agreements and social pacts. These agreements resonate with a second generation of social corporatist bargaining that has been identified in some European countries. In this article, I question the legitimacy of the new agreements. The legitimacy gap evolves from the use of corporatist instruments against the backdrop of a pluralist system. I discuss the attempts to increase the legitimacy of the corporatist instruments, pointing to their limited success. Future attempts must consider solutions that track the hybrid nature of the industrial relations system and devise institutions that bring together the traditional corporatist social partners and the new pluralist agents. Of particular importance is the need to consider the role of the new associations in civil society that voice the interests of the growing segment of disadvantaged workers in the secondary labour market.     

Social Security with Heterogeneous Populations Subject to Demographic Shocks

In a previous paper, we showed how a pay-as-you-go social security scheme, based on voluntary contributions, can be an appropriate institution to reach an optimal sharing of risks among generations in the presence of demographic uncertainties. We study here the functioning of such schemes when there are different population strata, with different demographic shocks and wages. We show that while a collective voluntary pay-as-you-go scheme can provide efficient intergenerational risk sharing, it is likely to be destabilized by pensions funds specialized by agents' types. This is true both when there is a complete set of contingent markets, where the risk pooling capabilities of a collective fund are potentially of less interest, and when markets are incomplete. In this last circumstance, a collective fund may help the living agents to share their intragenerational risks. However, we show that the resulting allocation does not Pareto dominate the outcome of individual funds by agent types, and that there are incentives for agents to separate from any collective organization.     

Where Do Unions Add Value? Predominant Organizing Principle,Union Strength and Manufacturing Productivity Growth in the OECD

This article deploys comparative historical data on 14 OECD countries to examine the significance of predominant union structure for the impact of union strength on the (medium‐term) growth in hourly labour productivity in manufacturing. The analysis shows that where craft and general unionism predominates, union strength has a deleterious impact on productivity growth. Where enterprise unionism predominates, union strength is irrelevant. However, where industrial unionism predominates, union strength promotes productivity growth. These effects exist independently of established economic influences on aggregate productivity growth. The findings are interpreted as displaying the importance of the character of the governance that unions provide for their productivity impact.