Towards new agreements on international trade liberalization

Zusammenfassung Zu neuen Abkommen über Liberalisierung des internationalen Handels. — Die Vielfalt der nichttarif?ren Handelshemmnisse steht ihrem allgemeinen und linearen Abbau—analog den Zollverhandlungen der Kennedy-Runde — bislang entgegen. In der vorliegenden Studie wird daher vorgeschlagen, für jedes Land einen ?Zolltarif der nichttarif?ren Handelshemmnisse? zu berechnen, indem auβertarif?re Maβnahmen in Form von Zoll?quivalenten quantifiziert werden. Dabei ist die zentrale Hypothese, daβ jedes Handelshemmnis die Differenz zwischen heimischen Erzeugerpreisen und Importpreisen vergr?βert; diese Differenz—gemessen in vom Hundert des Importpreises—ist das Zoll?quivalent. Die Methode der Quantifizierung sollte je nach Art der statistischen Daten gew?hlt werden. Drei M?glichkeiten werden vorgeführt, und zwar für homogene Produkte ein direkter Preisvergleich am Beispiel des Steinkohlebergbaus, für heterogene Produkte ein Elastizit?tsansatz am Beispiel der feinkeramischen Industrie und ein Vergleich von Warenk?rben am Beispiel der Textilindustrie. Abschlieβend werden m?gliche Divergenzen zwischen Protektionswirkungen und Protektionsabsichten untersucht.

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Resumen Hacia un nuevo acuerdo sobre la liberalizatión del comercio international. —La diversidad de barreras no arancelarias existente se ha mostrado como obstáculo a una desarme general y lineal análogo a las reducciones arancelarias en la ronda Kennedy. En el presente trabajo los autores proponen el establecimiento, en cada pais, de un ?arancel aduanero de las trabas no arancelarias? que se obtiene mediante la calculación de equivalentes arancelarios de aquellas trabas. La premisa central es que cualquier barrera a la importatión aumenta la diferencia entre los precios industriales domésticos y los de importación; esta diferencia, expresada como porcentaje del precio de importación, corresponde al equivalente arancelario. El método de cuantificación a aplicar deberá regirse por los datos estadfsticos disponibles. Los autores presentan très posibilidades, a saber: para productos homogéneos una comparación de precios directa, tomándose como ejemplo la industria extractiva del carbón, para productos heterogéneos un concepto de elasticidad, sirviendo de ejemplo la industria de la cerámica, y una comparación de la cesta de productos, utilizándose como ejemplo la industria textil. Finalmente los autores analizan posibles divergencias entre los efectos y las intenciones de medidas proteccionistas.

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Résumé Vers de nouveaux accords sur la libéralisation du commerce international. —La diversité des barrières non-tarifaires au commerce a jusqu’ à présent empêché leur réduction universelle et linéaire—conformément aux réductions tarifaires du ?Kennedy Round?. Dans l’article que voici on propose donc de calculer pour chaque pays un tarif douanier des barrières non-tarifaires en quantifiant les mesures non-tarifaires sous forme d’équivalents de tarifs. L’hypothèse qui en sert de base soutient que chaque barrière au commerce international augmente la différence entre les prix du marché national et ceux du marché mondial; cette différence — exprimée en pourcentages des prix d’importation—représente l’équivalent du tarif douanier. La méthode de quantification doit être adaptée aux données statistiques qu’on possède. Trois possibilités sont discutées en détail: pour les produits homogènes, la comparaison directe démontrée à l’exemple de l’industrie minière du charbon; pour les produits hétérogènes, un calcul d’élasticité demontre à l’exemple de l’industrie de poterie, et la comparaison de paniers de marchandises démontrée à l’exemple de l’industrie textile. Finalement, sont examinées les divergences possibles entre les effets du protectiónnisme et l’intention protectionniste.

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Riassunto Di nuovi accordi sulla liberalizzazione del commercio internazionale. —La molteplicit à degli ostacoli commerciali non tariffari sta finora in opposizione —analogamente aile trattative doganali del Kennedy-Runde—alla sua generale e lineare demolizione. Nel presente studio viene perció proposto di calcolare per ogni Paese una ?tariffa doganale degli ostacoli commerciali non tariffari?, mentre provvedimenti extratariffari sono quantificati in forma di equivalenze doganali. Inoltre l’ipotesi centrale è che ogni ostacolo commerciale ingrandisce la differenza tra prezzi di prodotti nazionali e prezzi d’importazione; questa differenza—misurata in per cento del prezzo d’importazione—è l’equivalenza doganale. Il metodo delia quantificazione dovrebbe essere scelto a seconda del genère dei dati statistici. Tre possibilit à sono presentate, e cioè per prodotti omogenei un diretto confronto dei prezzi sull’esempio dell’industria mineraria del carbone, per prodotti eterogenei un’impiego di elasticit à sull’esempio dell’industria di cerámica fine e un confronto di canestri di merci sull’esempio dell’industria tessile. In ultimo sono analizzate possibili divergenze tra effetti di protezione e intenzioni di protezione.

     

Enige statistische aspecten van simulatie

Summary When using simulation, the results of the computation should be analised to determine confidence limits and sensitivity. These can be improved by longer runs or by more sophisticated programming, both leading to increased cost. Some aspects of how to optimize simulation experiments are treated and of a simple queuing problem the influence of length of run, antithetic random numbers and control variables is compared with the analytical answers.     

The problem of optimum stratification and allocation withq=n/N>0

Summary Dalenius/Gurney [1951] published necessary conditions for the stratum boundaries, so that with Neyman's optimal allocation of the sample sizen the variance of the sample mean will become a minimum. They introduced in the variance of the sample mean for the sample sizesn _h the opti mal values according to Neyman and differentiated this variance with respect to the stratum boundaries. Because Neyman's allocation formula yields only feasible solutions forn _h N _h , the conditions ofDalenius result in wrong, i.e. nonfeasible solutions, if one of the restrictionsn _h N _h (h=1 (1) L) is violated.By the example of a logarithmic normal distribution with =0, =1,5 forL=2 the behaviour of the Dalenius-Neyman-minimum and that of the feasible minimum will be shown in dependence on the sampling fractionq=n/N and a critical valueq _c will be given. For valuesq>q _c the Dalenius-Neyman-minimum is no longer feasible.For the same logarithmic normal distribution andL=2 (1) 10 this critical sampling fractionq _c will be given (section 5).For different values of andq the optimal stratum boundaries and sampling fractions are listed in section 6 forL=2;3;4.     

De Wet en de kansspelen

In the Netherlands all gambling is forbidden except in a few cases specially mentioned in the law. Time and again specialists in probability theory or statistics are called upon to testify as experts in lawsuits against law evaders. This paper discusses the part played by the experts in such legal procedures. It is pointed out that according to Dutch jurisprudence there does not exist an exclusive distinction between games of chance and games of skill. A simple declaration by an expert that a given game is largely based on chance suffices to see the game sentenced as against the law. This and various other related questions are discussed in detail and illustrated by examples taken from personal experience in the courts.     

ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews

This paper is the first attempt to analyze ITC Commissioner voting behavior on sunset reviews of antidumping cases. Sunset determinations entail greater complexity than initial antidumping investigations because ITC commissioners must account for the impact of dumping protection as well as competitive forces on industry conditions. Empirical findings indicate that ITC voting is based on both sunset regulation and nonstatutory factors. Results reveal apparent biases against Chinese competitors and poorer nations generally, and favorable treatment toward U.S. steel producers and high-wage industries. There is also evidence of preferential treatment of industries located in states of Senate oversight committee members. JEL no. F13