Sentiment and stock prices: The case of aviation disasters

Behavioral economic studies reveal that negative sentiment driven by bad mood and anxiety affects investment decisions and may hence affect asset pricing. In this study we examine the effect of aviation disasters on stock prices. We find evidence of a significant negative event effect with an average market loss of more than $60 billion per aviation disaster, whereas the estimated actual loss is no more than $1 billion. In two days a price reversal occurs. We find the effect to be greater in small and riskier stocks and in firms belonging to less stable industries. This event effect is also accompanied by an increase in the perceived risk: implied volatility increases after aviation disasters without an increase in actual volatility.     

MISUSE AND OPTIMUM INSPECTING STRATEGY IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

Assets misuse by an agent and the optimal audit inspecting strategy are analyzed in this paper. The agent and the principal are acting to maximize their expected utility and both are characterized by risk aversion. The agent's decision about a theft takes into account the probability of benefiting from the stolen assets but also the probability of being penalized if caught. The principal's decision about the optimal number of audit teams, hence, the probability of uncovering the theft, takes into account the cost involved, the probability of one team of auditors uncovering the theft and the agent's decision about the theft. We get two response curves which describe the optimal behavior of both the agent and the principal and show that there may be a Nash solution to the problem. Since in real life there are often many principals (shareholders) with different utility functions, a set of efficient strategies is offered using the First and Second degree Stochastic Dominance rules. A numerical illustration which clarifies the methodology and displays the applicability of the model is also provided.     

The Effectiveness of Canadian Oil- and Gas-Pipeline Price Regulation 1976–82

This paper examines the effectiveness of the oil and gas-pipeline price-regulation system in Canada during the seven years beginning January 1976. Results for a threefold analysis are reported. When the seven-year period was considered as a whole, the regulatory system was not found to be ineffective in implementing the “comparable-earnings” and “capital-attraction” criteria. This finding also holds for the pre-October 1980 National Energy Plan-announcement period. The regulatory system was not effective, however, in achieving its proclaimed goals on a yearly basis. The “consumer-protection” hypothesis could not be rejected for the Canadian oil and gas-pipeline regulatory system. Résumé Ce mémoire examine l'efficacité de la réglementation relative aux prix d'utilisation des gazoducs et oléoducs au Canada sur une période de sept ans à partir de janvier 1976. Les résultats de cette analyse comportent trois volets. Si l'on tient compte globablement des sept années qui sont évaluées, la réglementation ne se montre pas inefficace du point de vue des profits comparatifs et de la facilité d'obtention de capitaux. Ces résultats s'appliquent à la période précédant la mise en vigueur de la Politique énergétique nationale en octobre 1980. Cependant, la réglementation n'atteint pas les objectifs fixés. L'hypothèse de protection du consommateur ne pouvait ětre rejetée dans le cas de la réglementation relative aux prix d'utilisation des gazoducs et oléoducs au Canada.     

Estimating Beta

This paper presents evidence that Ordinary Least Squares estimators of beta coefficients of major firms and portfolios are highly sensitive to observations of extremes in market index returns. This sensitivity is rooted in the inconsistency of the quadratic loss function in financial theory. By introducing considerations of risk aversion into the estimation procedure using alternative estimators derived from Gini measures of variability one can overcome this lack of robustness and improve the reliability of the results.     

Auditor independence, self-interested behavior and ethics: some experimental evidence

Our paper presents the results obtained in a laboratory environment in which subjects revealed their beliefs about an uncertain state of the world and then participated in a simple task which required them to report on whether the report of a second party is consistent with the subjects’ beliefs. Because maintaining prior judgements (audit independence) which were in disagreement with the second party’s decision (a potential for a qualified audit opinion) were costly to the subject, a situation was created in which the subject might compromise her beliefs at a price. The results suggest that amoral, self-interested profit-maximizing behavior does not generally characterize the subjects in this experiment. Furthermore, subjects compromise their beliefs less often, i.e., breach independence, the higher their scores on a Defining Issues Test, but more often, the greater the cost of adhering to their beliefs.     

The Economic Significance of the Cross-Sectional Autoregressive Model: Further Analysis

We reexamine whether investors can gain abnormal returns using the cross-sectional autoregressive model of stock returns. We find that the pattern of abnormal returns obtained is inconsistent over the time period 1934–94. We adjust for the higher commission costs in the pre-May 1 1975 period, a point overlooked in Jegadeesh (1990), by assuming a conservative one-way transaction cost of 0.75%. For the post-May 1 1975 period, we use a one-way transaction cost of 0.25%. The results show that investors who invest only on the long side would earn insignificant 'after-transaction cost' abnormal returns in the post-World War II period, 1946–94. The 'after-transaction cost' abnormal return from the short strategy is about 0.5% for the period 1946–94. This article shows that an investor would not earn abnormal returns using this model considering that it is more costly in practice to sell securities short and that most investors would not earn interest on short sale proceeds.     

Tests of the efficiency of the U.S. rights offering market: An option pricing approach

The efficiency of the U.S. market for stock purchase rights is empirically analyzed in an options framework, in which prices of rights, given the prices of underlying stock, are examined with regard to the possibilities of actually earning above-normal profits, considering the risk taken. Two neutral hedging tests for market efficiency, along with a simple buy-and-exercise trading strategy, are applied to daily traded rights data. Results from ex-post hedging tests suggest that the trading strategy based on the rights valuation model is able to differentiate between overpriced and underpriced rights so as to generate substantial book profits. The positive ex-ante hedge return, found to exist empirically, is completely eliminated once transaction costs are introduced, lending support for the efficient U.S. rights offering market on an after-transaction cost basis.     

Accounting data and asset valuation: Theory

Firms and divisions which are not traded on organized exchanges are often valued without the benefit of market data. Accounting data is used instead. One suggested approach is to use accounting beta as a proxy for market return beta. In the context of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, we provide a theoretical justification for such a procedure. Our results provide a set of sufficient conditions so that return betas and accounting betas are equal. Our results also suggest a general methodology for evaluating projects and untraded firms using accounting data. The method underlying the derivation here is very general and can be applied in deriving testable restrictions between fundamentals, broader in context than that of accounting variables.     

Small firm effect: The case for banks

This article contributes to the small firm effect literature by examining weekly returns on common stocks of 73 banks for the 19-year period from 1969 to 1987. It differs from previous research in this area in both the analytical tool employed and the sampled firms. The findings suggest that the small firm effect is strong, is persist over long investment periods, and is monotonically increasing with the increase in firms' size.