The political economy of transient “New” protectionism

Zusammenfassung Die politische ?konomie des vorübergehenden “neuen” Protektionismus. - Der Verfasser zeigt, da\ der Protektionismus im internationalen Handel mit Schuhwaren von 1970 bis 1977 niedrig war, dann infolge der Einführung von nichttarif?ren Ma\nahmen zwischen 1978 und 1982 betr?chtlich anstieg und in letzter Zeit fast verschwunden ist. Die Exportbeschr?nkungsabkommen, die die USA zwischen 1977 und 1981 mit Japan und Südkorea abgeschlossen hatten, l?sten eine Welle des Protektionismus in Europa aus. Als aber diese Abkommen 1981 ausliefen, wurde die Protektion in Europa abgebaut. Die Protektion für Schuhwaren verschwand schnell, weil es den Arbeitskr?ften offenbar verh?ltnism?\ig leicht fiel, eine neue Besch?ftigung zu finden, und weil die Gewinne in der Branche hoch blieben, und zwar insbesondere für Hersteller in den USA und Europa, die Importeure von Schuhwaren wurden. Dies ergibt sich nach einer Analyse von sieben Standardhypothesen aus der Literatur zur Polit?konomie des Protektionismus.

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Resumen La economia politica del “nuevo” proteccionismo transitorio. - El autor demuestra que la protección en el comercio international del calzado fué baja en el período 1970–1977, aumentó significativamente a raíz de la introductión de medidas no-arancelarias entre 1978 y 1982 y casi desapareció en los últimos a?os. Los “orderly market agreements” entre los EE.UU., Japón y Corea del Sur entre 1977 y 1981 dieron lugar a una ola de proteccionismo en Europa. Cuando estos acuerdos expiraron en 1981, empero, se redujo la protection en Europa. La protección al calzado desapareció rápidamente, aparentemente porque los trabajadores tenían facilidad de encontrar un empleo nuevo, y porque las ganancias permanecieron altas en esta industria, particularmente para productores de los EE.UU. y europeos, quienes pasaron a ser importadores de calzado. Estos son los resultados después de haber examinado siete hipótesis standard sobre la economía política del proteccionismo.

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Résumé L’économie politique du transitoire ?nouveau? protectionisme. - L’auteur démontre que le protectionisme au commerce international de l’industrie de la chaussure a été très bas pendant les années 1970–1977, mais s’est accru signif?cativement par l’introduction des mesures non-tarifaires pendant les années 1978–1982 et a presque disparu les dernières années. Les ?orderly market-agreements? des Etats-Unis avec le Japon et la Corée du Sud entre les années 1977 et 1981 ont déclenché une vague de protectionisme en Europe; mais quand les règlements américains ont expiré en 1981, la protection en Europe a été abrogée. La protection de l’industrie de la chaussure a disparu rapidement, évidemment parce que les ouvriers n’ont pas eu de difficulté de trouver de nouveaux emplois et parce que les profits de l’industrie sont restés hauts, particulièrement pour les producteurs des Etats-Unis et de l’Europe qui sont devenus des importateurs de chaussures. Ce sont les résultats après l’examen de sept hypothèses de la littérature qui s’occupe de l’économie politique du protectionisme.

     

The Market Value of Reducing Cancer Risk: Hedonic Housing Prices with Changing Information

In this paper, we use housing price changes occurring after the release of a regulatory agency's environmental risk information to estimate the value people place on cancer risk reduction. Using a large original data set on the repeal sales of houses, matched with detailed data on hazardous waste cancer risk and newspaper publicity, we find that housing prices respond in a rational manner to changes in information about risk. Since the new information indicated that the sites in our sample pose relatively low cancer risk, the informational release led residents to lower their risk beliefs, resulting in an average housing price increase of $56 to $87. This price change implies a statistical value per case of cancer of $4.3 million to $8.3 million, which is similar to the estimates obtained in labor market studies of the value of a statistical life. Newspaper publicity about the local sites increased housing prices, suggesting that residents perceived the news as good.     

Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.     

Housing Market Conditions, Listing Choice and MLS Market Share

In some housing markets, a seller may hire a broker to multiple list or exclusively list a property for sale or may bypass the brokerage industry and list the property privately as a "sale by owner." This article introduces a new model that illustrates the factors which will impact on the broker's and seller's preferred type of listing. An implication of the model is that if the choice is available, sellers and real estate brokers will employ a multiple listing service more often during slower market periods where the volume of sales is low and properties are more difficult to sell. An empirical analysis of Vancouver data yields results consistent with these arguments.     

Savings growth and the path of utility

Abstract.  We derive an expression relating the change in instantaneous utility to the growth of net (genuine) saving in an economy with multiple stocks and externalities that maximizes welfare in the utilitarian sense. This result is then shown to hold for decentralized competitive efficient economies as well, to yield an extension of the Hartwick rule: instantaneous utility is non-declining along a development path if genuine saving is decreasing. By way of example the rule is applied as a constant genuine saving rate rule in a simple Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz economy. The rule yields a path with unbounded consumption and higher wealth than on the standard Hartwick constant consumption path.     

THE FOUNDING OF THE GLASGOW CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1783

G lasgow claims the distinction of being the first city in the United Kingdom to have established a Chamber of Commerce. Its first meeting was held on 1st January 1783. Important as this event was, it would be wrong to imagine that it marked an entirely new departure, for before this merchants and manufacturers frequently held meetings to discuss matters of common interest. Professor Redford has shown¹ that the founding in 1794 of the Manchester Commercial Society was preceded by that of various other organisations whose purpose was sometimes to represent the interests of the local business community.     

Teaching ethics to marketing and logistics majors: A transformative learning experiment

Within the context of a transformative learning field experiment, the ethical ideologies of marketing majors, logistics majors, and nonbusiness majors were found to differ. Based on this finding, a field experiment was conducted to determine the effect (if any) that ethics instruction has on marketing and logistics majors versus nonbusiness majors. Students' knowledge of basic ethical principles and their ability to assess the application of these principles to ethical dilemmas were tested with a new assessment instrument. The major findings suggest (a) transformative learning ethic exercises have pedagogical potential and (b) dissimilar ethical predispositions between marketing and logistics majors versus nonbusiness majors confirms the need for customizing ethics pedagogy by college major.     

Taxation,Fines, and Producer Liability Rules: Efficiency and Market Structure Implications

This paper analyzes the comparative efficiency of producer liability rules and regulatory policy in short-run and long-run competitive equilibria with endogenous product safety. Pigouvian taxes on output and safety provision fail to achieve the long-run social optimum. An appropriately designed policy involving fines on accidents and subsidies on safety provision achieves efficiency; however, the optimal policy may involve the taxation, not the subsidization, of product safety. Tort liability also leads to efficient outcomes but may be associated with perverse structural changes. For example, increased liability exposure may induce de novo entry in hazardous sectors, even with fully capitalized firms.