Optimal Tax Theory: The Journey from the Negative Income Tax to the Earned Income Tax Credit

What lessons do we learn from optimal tax theory for the design of income redistribution programs? I modify a standard model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with discrete types to consider differences in both earning ability and the disutility of effort. This gives a role for “workfare” in the optimal tax policy. The existence of screening mechanisms can play a role in explaining non‐participation in cash and in‐kind redistribution programs, including Progresa‐Oportunidades, Lifeline Telephone subsidies, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Stigma can increase efficiency of a redistribution program by discouraging participation by individuals near the eligibility thresholds. The Family Assistance Program proposed in the early 1970s lacked adequate stigma for nonworkers, which contributed to a lack of political support. In contrast, the current Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides greater benefits to workers than to nonworkers. Thus the EITC does not require any stigma to screen out individuals who do not work from obtaining benefits. Reasons for separate income support programs for nonworkers and for workers are discussed.     

Indivisibilities and interplant transportation cost: Do they cause market breakdown?

This paper considers the ability of the land market to allocate space among activities when economic agents operate subject to scale economies, and when the agents trade with one another, thus incurring transport cost. The structure of the problem is that of Koopmans and Beckmann. The land market fails to clear properly only for certain parameter values. The inability of the land market to work properly is found to result from the failure of the market to properly price accessibility, or alternatively, from the failure to price congestion. It is a standard externality problem.     

Information-consistent learning and shifts in long-run productivity

Recent macroeconomic research has incorporated learning in an inconsistent manner by assuming agents learn with less information than they use in optimization. We present an information-consistent learning framework and illustrate the effects of violating information-consistency.     

Consumer substitution decisions: an integrative framework

Substitution decisions have been examined from a variety of perspectives. The economics literature measures cross-price elasticity, operations research models optimal assortments, the psychology literature studies goals in conflict, and marketing research has examined substitution-in-use, brand switching, stockouts, and self-control. We integrate these perspectives into a common framework for understanding consumer substitution decisions; their specific drivers (availability of new alternatives, internal vs. external restrictions on choice); the moderating role of a consumer’s commitment to an initially desired alternative; and the affective, motivational, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes of substitution. We use this framework to recommend new avenues for research.     

Input substitutability and vertical integration

Input substitutability in final production is a well-known motive for noncompetitive input producers to integrate with their customers. In models that characterize the noncompetitive input industry as a pure monopoly, whether such integration would increase or decrease final production is ambiguous. The analysis here breaks the total output effect into factor substitution and market power components and discovers that the output ambiguity is sensitive to the specific model of noncompetitive equilibrium assumed. For the empirically most important cases of industrial organization, the sole effect of input substitutability on output is likely to be an unambiguous output increase.For their helpful comments, I am indebted to Stephen Karlson, Li Way Lee, W. G. Shepherd, Stephen Spurr, Hal Varian, and the referee. Any errors in the paper persist in spite of them.