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31.
Hans Schenk 《Empirica》1996,23(3):255-278
This paper suggests that while the static welfare losses of merger predilections among Western firms may not be dramatic, they may lead to substantial dynamic losses when merger-prone firms need to compete with firms which instead focus on equipment investment and investments in R&D. It is suggested that such diverging investment priorities have been the real cause of the deteriorating competitiveness of many of the largest Western enterprises vis-à-vis their Japanese rivals. While mergers are generally taken to be determined by either efficiency or monopoly considerations, this paper argues that Western merger predilections are likely to be generated by a combination of imitative and defensive routines as well. That would make it difficult for firms to unilaterally break away from these competitiveness-threatening investments. If correct, this would imply that competition policies would need to be refocused. However, it is also suggested that the implications for international competitiveness should make merger questions a subject of industrial policies too. In that respect, the paper suggests some basic attitudinal changes.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a Global Forum for Competition and Trade Policy conference in Vienna and at a EUNIP workshop at Åbo Akademi University, Finland. Financial support from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (contract nos. 54473 and 57305) and the European Commission (contract no. ERB CHRX CT94-0454), research assistance from Michel Renirie and Chee-Wai Chan, and helpful comments from the conference and workshop participants, especially Kurt Bayer and Keith Cowling, are gratefully acknowledged. Only the author is responsible for the contents of, and any flaws in the paper. 相似文献
32.
This paper investigates efficiency and equitability issues given a cost sharing method in an economy with a public commodity. We study the concept of a -cost share equilibrium and examine the set of all equilibrium allocations. Finally, we devise a mechanism to implement -cost share equilibria as strong equilibria of an associated non-cooperative game.This paper was written while Shlomo Weber was visiting the University of Bonn. Financial support from theSonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged. We also would like to thank Dieter Bös for valuable comments. 相似文献
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34.
Redistribution as a selection device 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hans Peter Grüner 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,108(2):194-216
This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off. 相似文献
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36.
Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.The authors are grateful to Jeffrey Banks, Steve Ching, Vincent Feltkamp, Bezalel Peleg, Sang-Young Sonn, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
37.
In this paper we consider deterministic seasonal variation in quarterly industrial production for several European countries, and we address the question whether this variation has become more similar across countries over time. Due to economic and institutional factors, one may expect convergence across business cycles. When these have similar characteristics as seasonal cycles, one may perhaps also find convergence in seasonality. To this aim, we propose a method that is based on treating the set of production series as a panel. By testing for the relevant parameter restrictions for moving window samples, we examine the hypothesis of convergence in deterministic seasonality while allowing for seasonal unit roots. Our main empirical finding is that there is no evidence for convergence in seasonality. 相似文献
38.
Richard?BaronEmail author Jacques?Durieu Hans?Haller Philippe?Solal 《Economic Theory》2004,23(2):445-454 (2004)
Summary. We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players.Received: 15 September 2002, Revised: 9 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
C72.Correspondence to: H. HallerWe thank a referee for helpful comments. The hospitality of the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, and the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, is gratefully acknowledged by the third author. 相似文献
39.
Knut?VeistenEmail author Hans?Fredrik?Hoen Jon?Strand 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,29(4):419-433
This paper presents tests of the theoretical validity of the contingent valuation (CV) method. The validity of CV is especially a concern when involving environmental goods with a predominant non-use value. One test of theoretical validity is the adding-up property that implies that a specific good should be equally valued irrespectively of it is being valued directly or built-up sequentially. In this CV study four independent sub-samples stated willingness to pay for the same composite good, or package, using different sequences. One sub-sample valued the composite good directly, while two sub-samples faced built-up sequences valuing first subsets of this composite good. A fourth sub-sample valued the composite good from a dividing-out approach, facing first the valuation of a larger multi-package. Theoretically expected sequencing effects were observed; the subset goods obtained higher values earlier in a sequence, and the dividing-out approach decreased the stated value for the composite good. Most importantly, these CV data did pass the tests of the adding-up property. 相似文献
40.
Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components
such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting
countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries
choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of
international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest
in quality degradation. 相似文献