On optimal investiment strategies

Suppose an investor has a fixed decision horizon and an appropriate utility function for measuring his or her utility of wealth. If there are only two investment vehicles, a risky and a risk-free asset, then the optimal investment strategy is such that, at any time, the amount invested in the risky asset must be the product of his or her “current risk tolerance” and the risk premium on the risky asset, divided by the square of the diffusion coefficient of the risky asset. In the case of more than one risky asset, the optimal investment strategy is similar, with the ratios of the amounts invested in the different risky assets being constant over time.     

ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE INTERPRETATION OF STRATEGIC ISSUES: A NOTE ON CEOS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT*

This paper explores the relationship between organizational context and the interpretation of strategic issues by examining the hypothesis that CEOs' interpretations of foreign investment in the USA are influenced by the organizational context in which they are embedded. Three aspects of organizational context - the global business experience of the firm; the firm's level of organizational inertia (as represented by firm age and size); and the resources available for responding - are examined as predictors of CEOs' perceptions of foreign investment as a threat or an opportunity. Analysis of data from 320 organizations, controlled by industry, shows that global business experience, firm size, and perceived capability are significant predictors of the perception of threat and opportunity. the discussion addresses the implications of these findings for future research on issue interpretation and organizational context.     

The political economy of quality measurement: a case study of the USA slaughter cattle market

As agricultural products move from being economic commodities to quality–differentiated goods, price dispersion within specific markets increases and implicit subsidies from high quality producers to low quality producers are removed. The present paper examines how these distributional effects can influence patterns of support and opposition to changes in marketing arrangements. The simple model developed is calibrated using data from the USA slaughter cattle market. Estimates of the impact on prices of measuring quality more accurately are found to be similar in size to previous estimates of market power price suppression in the market.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

Price Commitment versus Flexibility: the Role of Exchange Rate Uncertainty and its Implications for Exchange Rate Passthrough

The paper investigates the incentives to commit price or retain price flexibility in a model in which exporting firms face different degrees of exchange rate uncertainty. The result shows that introducing exchange rate uncertainty can lead to the endogenous emergence of a unique leader–follower equilibrium; which firm emerges as price leader depends on the substitutability of products, the magnitude of exchange rate uncertainty, and the cost structure. This study may provide one explanation as to why some exporters set price before the realization of the nominal exchange rates (“sticky price”). The results imply exchange rate variability affects exchange rate passthrough.     

Productivity Growth and Some of Its Determinants in the Deregulated U.S. Railroad Industry

This study analyzes the effects of an important postderegulation innovation on rail freight productivity: the elimination of cabooses and related crew members. It also analyzes the overall growth of productivity in rail freight between 1983 and 1997 (using a translog rail cost function estimated over a sample of Class I railroads between 1983 and 1997). The results indicate that elimination of cabooses and associated crew members from freight trains reduced costs by 5-8% on the typical Class I railroad in 1997, equivalent to an annual cost saving of $2 billion to $3.3 billion for all Class I railroads. Moreover, if Class I railroads had no other technological advances since 1983, their 1997 costs (with 1997 factor prices) would have been 36-43% higher than they in fact were. Finally, the results show that overall productivity growth in rail freight did not decelerate between 1983 and 1997; if anything, it accelerated slightly.     

Service Competitiveness – An Anglo-US Study

This article reports on the latest in a series of international comparisons of management practices and performance outcomes of industries in various countries. Here, it is the service industries in the UK and the US which come under the microscope. Among the companies surveyed, there were more world-class performers in the US than the UK, but also more low performers. The concluding part of the article is diagnostic – the authors also suggest measures which could improve performance.