Obsoleszenz — ein Synonym für die Konsumgüterproduktion in entfalteten Marktwirtschaften

Zusammenfassung Wie im Titel angedeutet, gehen die Verfasser davon aus, daß sich hinter dem Obsoleszenz-Phänomen keine besondere Absatzstrategie der Unternehmen und daher kein eigenständiges Erkenntnisobjekt verbirgt. Die von bürgerlichen und marxistischen Kritikern vielfach geäßerte Ansicht, mit zunehmender Vermachtung/Monopolisierung der Märkte seien die Waren schlechter geworden, wird nicht geteilt. Nach wie vor werden bei uns sehr viele «gute» sowie «schlechte» Konsumgüter hergestellt, je nach dem wie die Produktivkräfte sowie die Konkurrenz um die zahlungskräftige Nachfrage es erlauben. Was die bekannten gesamtgesellschaftlichen Probleme (Umweltbelastung, Rohstoffknappheit etc.) verursacht und die Wissenschaften auf dem Plan gerufen hat, ist nicht die abnehmende Qualität der Waren, sondern die erweiterte Reproduktion kapitalistischen Wirtschaftens schlechthin. Die «ungeheure Warenansammlung» kann wissenschaftlich nicht zerlegt werden in eine unanfechtbare Normalität (=technischer Fortschritt) und moralisch abzulehnende Auswüchse (=Obsoleszenz); ebensowenig signalisieren Obsoleszenzstrategien die allgemeine Dekadenz des Monopolkapitals. Der Reichtum an Konsumgütern ist vielmehr zu begreifen als dialektisches Resultat einer Erwerbsgesellschaft, die-beispielhaft konkretisiert-überdimensionierte Fernsehgeräte zum Kauf anbietet, nachdem sie zuvor technisch ausgereifte Geräte entwickelt hat.

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As indicated by the title the authors are convinced that obsolescence is no special marketing strategy. Therefore the phenomenon should not be regarded as a subject worthy of study by itself. The authors reject the hypothesis that product quality is eroded by increasing monopolization, a position taken by bourgeois as well as marxian critics. In market economies there will always be production of good and bad consumer goods depending on productive capacity and sellers' competition for effective demand. The well-known social problems (pollution, shortage of raw materials, etc.) are not caused by decreasing product quality but are due to the need for reproduction of capital on a larger scale.The enormous production of goods cannot be separated by scientific methods into (a) an economic normality (technical progress) and (b) a perverse exaggeration not acceptable on moral grounds (obsolescence). Neither do the strategies of obsolescence indicate the decadence of monopolistic capitalism. Instead the abundance of consumer goods should be interpreted as a dialectic result of a society's profit maximization. To give an example: After well-equipped television sets with a high technical standard had been developed, the system starts supplying units of a hypertrophic size and capacity.

     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

Comparing spatial concentration and assessing relative market structure in air traffic

Traffic distributions of air traffic and their concentration have been measured through Gini, an index that contrasts in many ways with other more established ones, such as Herfindahl's. This research is extended in the sense that it perceives spatial concentration in air transport as an aggregate of complex networks that are subject to multiple constraints, such as geopolitics or technology. We propose a multi-layered analytic approach where network operators are economic agents that behave in strategic ways. It allows for comparing air traffic between airports in Europe with that of the US and, in particular, introduces a normative component by isolating patterns in airlines' strategies that coincide with more or less welfare-oriented degrees of spatial concentration in light of the above constraints.     

The Workout of Banking Crises: A Macroeconomic Perspective

This paper provides a macroeconomic perspective for governmentinterventions in banking crisis. Such crisis occur when a largenumber of banks fail to meet capital requirements or are insolvent.Using a macroeconomic model with financial intermediation, ouranalyis suggests that strict enforcement of capital-adequaterules suffices in prosperous periods. Capital requirements serveas an indicator for crises interventions in critical stateswhich may require interest rate intervention and restructuringof the banking industry. These policies can be reinforced byrandom bailouts and temporary financial relief, with a largepercentage of the costs being covered by current and futureowners of banks. (JEL D41, E4, G2)     

Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.     

Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences

Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public Choice35 (1980), 437-455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81.