Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

Tax contracts and elections

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks when in office. A government raises taxes for both purposes. We show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government. Moreover, in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter.     

Registered nurses' perspectives on health care and the 2008 presidential election

As this historic presidential election draws near, what do RNs think of our nation's priorities? Which candidates do they think will be most effective in shaping our health care system and addressing the most pressing issues of our time? The results of this survey show that RNs do not identify overwhelmingly with one political ideology or party and, in fact, they closely resemble the public on these political dimensions. The data also show that RNs identify health care issues as the most important problem facing the nation. RNs who believe that it is the responsibility of the government to provide health insurance to those without it, have more confidence in the government to achieve this outcome, and are more likely to be Democrats than Republicans. The presidential election is expected to be highly contested and could be determined by a relatively small margin of votes and, thus, nurses should recognize their chances of influencing the outcome of the election. The data from this survey provide baseline information potentially useful to increasing the political influence of the nursing profession, informing other organizations about where they might align with nurses, and helping candidates and the political parties compete more effectively in seeking the support of roughly 3 million RN voters.     

Planning for balanced growth in Chinese air traffic: A case for statistical mechanics

This paper identifies drivers of variations within air traffic systems highlighting inefficient mechanisms that can lead to system sub-optimality. Domestic air traffic in China is used as a case study. Airports need to respond to local demands with airlines that control parts of the system as agents. The relationship between the agent's behavior and system-wide variations in traffic movements shows how the collective behavior of a relatively few agents can disproportionately influence the system-wide traffic distribution.