Administrative cooperation and disease control in cross-border pork production

In recent years, the continuous structural change in the value chain of modern food production has been characterised by an increasing international division of labour among manufacturing companies. A regional specialisation of primary agricultural production is especially apparent in meat production. Thus, the German–Dutch border area has developed into a region of unprecedented intensive pork production. While The Netherlands specialises in piglet production, the production of fattened pigs continues to grow in northwest Germany. As a result of this increasing transnational value chain development, German imports of Dutch piglets have risen continuously since 2000. However, this structural interweaving of pork production between The Netherlands and Germany has resulted in many new challenges for the cooperation between the various participants and in particular for the administrative authorities in the field of food and feed safety as well as efficient animal disease control. The motivation for this exploratory study stems from the lack of scientific work on this topic to date. The aim of this research is to illustrate the relevance of functioning cross-border cooperation in the food sector, using commodity flow structures and disease spread analysis. Results indicate that cross-border cooperation between authorities during a CSF epidemic can reduce the risk of recurrence and the duration by 50%.     

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*

The government wants an infrastructure‐based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public–private partnership? Or should it choose traditional procurement (i.e., delegate the tasks to different firms)? Each task entails unobservable investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that, depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling can either stimulate or discourage investments. Moreover, we find that if renegotiation cannot be prevented, public–private partnerships might lead the government to deliberately opt for technologically inferior projects.     

Erratum on the MBG/NBD Model

This erratum clarifies an inconsistency in the equation provided by Batislam, Denizel, and Filiztekin [Batislam, E.P., Denizel, M., & Filiztekin, A., (2007). Empirical validation and comparison of models for customer base analysis. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24 (3), 201–209] for the conditional expected number of future transactions used in their modified beta geometric/negative binomial distribution model. The derivation of the appropriate expression is carried out by means of parameter updates, which are an elegant alternative to integral calculus.     

Accounting for preference dependency in target costing – a note

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Target costing is a well-established strategic cost management tool in theory and practice. The original target costing model implies independence of...     

Coarse matching with incomplete information

We study two-sided markets with heterogeneous, privately informed agents who gain from being matched with better partners from the other side. Our main results quantify the relative attractiveness of a coarse matching scheme consisting of two classes of agents on each side, in terms of matching surplus (output), an intermediary’s revenue, and the agents’ welfare (defined as the total surplus minus payments to the intermediary). Following Chao and Wilson (Am Econ Rev 77: 899–916, 1987) and McAfee (Econometrica 70:2025–2034, 2002), our philosophy is that, if the worst-case scenario under coarse matching is not too bad relative to what is achievable by more complex, finer schemes, a coarse matching scheme will turn out to be preferable once the various transaction costs associated with fine schemes are taken into account. Similarly, coarse matching schemes can be significantly better than random matching, while still requiring only a minimal amount of information.     

Conflicting tasks and moral hazard: Theory and experimental evidence

We study a multi-task principal-agent problem in which tasks can be in direct conflict with each other. In theory, it is difficult to induce a single agent to exert efforts in two conflicting tasks, because effort in one task decreases the success probability of the other task. We have conducted an experiment in which we find strong support for the relevance of this incentive problem. In the presence of conflict, subjects choose two efforts significantly less often when both tasks are assigned to a single agent than when there are two agents each in charge of one task.     

Public‐private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering

A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service. Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public‐private partnership, the tasks of building and managing are bundled, whereas under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate private contractors. The two provision modes differ in their incentives to innovate and to gather private information about future costs to adapt the service provision to changing circumstances. The government agency’s preferred mode of provision depends on the information‐gathering costs, the costs of innovation efforts, and the degree to which effort is contractible.