Allocating Tradable Permits on the Basis of Market Price to Achieve Cost Effectiveness

It is a well known result that distributional constraints can lead to an imperfectly competitive permit market where the emission target is no longer met at least cost. In this paper, we suggest an allocation rule for tradable permits which can handle this problem. If the permit allocation is dependent on the market price for permits, this allocation rule can achieve both cost effectiveness and meet specific requirements for cost distribution across agents.     

Blockholder leverage and payout policy: Evidence from French holding companies

This paper focuses on dominant owners’ use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders have tax incentives to structure their leverage in pyramidal holding companies and study the effect of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. We find no difference in payout policy and financial behavior during the 1999 to 2008 period between firms with levered owners and other firms. However, in the years 2009 to 2011 following the crisis, dividend payouts increase in proportion to pyramidal debt of dominant owners. We inspect pyramidal entities individually and find that on average only 60% of dividends are passed through to the ultimate owners, with the rest predominantly used to meet debt service obligations of the pyramidal entities.     

Free trade agreements in a small,open country: The case of Norway

Negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) has been a high political priority for Norway. Today, it has agreements with 41 countries outside the European Union (EU)/the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), resulting in one of the world's most extensive FTA networks. FTAs cover about 10% of Norway's trade—a share likely to increase in the future. These agreements eliminate tariffs on a substantial number of traded products and have gradually become more comprehensive, covering an expanding range of non‐tariff areas. Hence, they may have trade‐promoting effects beyond tariff reductions as such. On the other hand, the non‐tariff provisions often do not go further than what has already been dealt with in other international agreements or practised domestically, so their overall effect may be limited.     

From imperial to regional trade preferences: Its effect on europe’s intra- and extra-regional trade

From Imperial to Regional Trade Preferences: Effect on Europe's Intra- and Extra-Regional Trade. - Europe's switch from imperial to regional trade preferences has certainly raised the share of its trade that is intra-regional, but this does not necessarily mean Europe is becoming less economically integrated with the rest of the world. This paper shows that the propensity for European GDP to be traded with non-Europeans - which trebled during the hundred years to 1928 - has fallen little since then. The reason is that the re-direction of Europe's trade has been accompanied by a considerable degree of opening up to trade with non-Europeans. Data are also presented for Eastern and Western Europe separately from 1928. The hope is that Europe's latest regional integration initiatives will be able to continue this trend, rather than lead to a “Fortress Europe” outcome.     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.     

The reverse home-market effect in exports: a cross-country study of the extensive margin of exports

Do small countries have higher proportions of firms that export in manufacturing industries than large ones? As small countries are well known to be more open than large ones, it may appear uncontroversial to claim that the answer is yes. Nevertheless, this contradicts predictions from many standard trade models positing a home-market effect in the number of manufacturing firms and exporters. In this article, I present a theoretical model where a home-market effect in the number of firms coexists with a reverse home-market effect in the number of exporters: as in standard models, the number of firms in a small country relative to that in a large one is lower than relative income, but, in contrast to standard models, the relative number of exporters is larger. As a consequence, small countries will have higher proportions firms that export in manufacturing industries—a claim I support empirically.