Investigating stability and linearity of a German M1 money demand function

Starting from a linear error correction model (ECM) the stability and linearity of a German M1 money demand function are investigated, applying smooth transition regression techniques. Using seasonally unadjusted quarterly data from 1961(1) to 1990(2) it is found that the money demand equation considered is both linear and stable. After extending the sampling period until 1995(4) a clear structural instability due to the monetary unification on 1 July 1990 is found and subsequently modelled. A non-linear specification for the extended period is presented and discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance of periodic time series models in forecasting

The paper provides a comparison of alternative univariate time series models that are advocated for the analysis of seasonal data. Consumption and income series from (West-) Germany, United Kingdom, Japan and Sweden are investigated. The performance of competing models in forecasting is used to assess the adequacy of a specific model. To account for nonstationarity first and annual differences of the series are investigated. In addition, time series models assuming periodic integration are evaluated. To describe the stationary dynamics (standard) time invariant parametrizations are compared with periodic time series models conditioning the data generating process on the season. Periodic models improve the in-sample fit considerably but in most cases under study this model class involves a loss in ex-ante forecasting relative to nonperiodic models. Inference on unit-roots indicates that the nonstationary characteristics of consumption and income data may differ. For German and Swedish data forecasting exercises yield a unique recommendation of unit roots in consumption and income data which is an important (initial) result for multivariate analysis. Time series models assuming periodic integration are parsimonious to specify but often involve correlated one-step-ahead forecast errors. First version received: April 1996/final version received: January 1998     

Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion

We investigate the role of price advertising in a market where consumers are imperfectly informed about prices. We consider a monopolist whose demand depends on price and advertising expenditure. This demand function is derived from optimizing behavior of consumers. Uninformed consumers may pay a cost to visit the seller and obtain price information. Advertising enables the monopolist to increase the number of informed consumers. In equilibrium the uninformed consumers form rational price expectations, and the seller necessarily adopts a random pricing and advertising strategy.     

Erstens: ignorieren, zweitens: diffamieren, drittens: umarmen?

Mass media are an essential factor for the success of small parties, for the media can act in a supporting or an inhibiting way towards these parties. This could be observed for the example of the German Green Party: As the Greens were becoming more and more important in the parliaments, the media changed their formerly very critical view of the party to a more factual and positive reporting. Is the party “Die Linke” now experiencing a similar process? The present study analyses the comments of three national German newspapers from 2005 to 2009, using a quantitative content analysis with the aim of bringing to light how the media acted towards “Die Linke”. The results show that commenting has hardly changed since earlier studies were published. Factual issues only play a marginal role, and the party is judged negatively in all newspapers, with the tageszeitung slightly distinct from the other two papers, though.     

Time Inhomogeneous Multiple Volatility Modeling

Price variations at speculative markets exhibit positive autocorrelationand cross correlation. Due to large parameter spaces necessaryfor joint modeling of variances and covariances, multivariateparametric volatility models become easily intractable in practice.We propose an adaptive procedure that identifies periods ofsecond-order homogeneity for each moment in time. To overcomethe high dimensionality of the problem we transform the multivariateseries into a set of univariate processes. We discuss thoroughlythe implementation of the adaptive technique. Theoretical andMonte Carlo results are given. We provide two applications ofthe new method. For a bivariate exchange rate series we comparethe multivariate GARCH approach with our method and find thelatter to be more in line with the underlying assumption ofindependently distributed innovations. Analyzing a 23-dimensionalvector of asset returns we underscore the case for adaptivemodeling in high-dimensional systems.     

Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial Approach

This article discusses various approaches to pricing double‐trigger reinsurance contracts—a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ‘‘alternative risk transfer.’’ The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double‐trigger reinsurance contracts.