Closing Time for Democracy?

The rejection of the Shops Bill in the House of Commons reveals the extent to which'representative'democracy can subvert the wishes of the majority to those of self-interested pressure groups. Lord Harris of High Cross, who was active in passing the Bill through the House of Lords, details the abuse of parliamentary democracy by Tory and Labour MPs alike, which responds to the noise made by opponents of reform rather than to the numbers who stand to gain.     

Economic impacts of mobile versus fixed broadband

Broadband telecommunication service is growing rapidly and its economic impact is likely to vary considerably around the globe. Considerable interest is being shown in wireless broadband, especially in low income and rural areas. This study focuses on the direct effect (broadband penetration as an input), and separately, the productive efficiency effect of broadband (as an information network externality), using a model developed in Thompson and Garbacz (2007). Aggregate fixed and mobile broadband usage and their effect are analyzed and compared first on a sample of forty-three countries with sufficient data. The same models are used on samples of high income and low income countries. It is hypothesized that the rapid growth of broadband could have a stronger effect for low income countries and their initial levels of network development. Key variables are adjusted to a per household basis, using information on household size. Due to the endogeneity of key variables, instrumental variables are employed to estimate separate equations for mobile broadband and fixed broadband. Predicted values for these variables are used in the final equations in order to adjust for endogeneity and omitted variable bias. The results of the model estimated for the full sample indicate that mobile broadband has an important direct effect on GDP, but fixed broadband has an effect no different than zero. In the models with high and low income samples it is apparent that low income countries derive significantly more benefit from mobile broadband. Estimates from the Stochastic Frontier Model find mobile broadband to be a significant driver of growth via a reduction of inefficiency.     

Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines

In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive manly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred. The 2010 Guidelines reflect a growing belief that in markets where product differentiation is minimal competition tends to be robust and the structural presumptions stated in previous Guidelines were too harsh. By contrast, where product differentiation is substantial the Guidelines?? approach tended to define markets too broadly, overlooking significantly anticompetitive possibilities. Under the 2010 Guidelines unilateral effects analysis relevant markets can be very small, often limited to three or four firms, and excluding some obvious substitutes. Markets in merger analysis are not defined for their own sake, however, but rather to ascertain whether a particular alteration in market structure covered by the merger provisions will be likely to facilitate a price increase. The 2010 Guidelines address four substantive merger concerns: exclusion, restraints on innovation, unilateral effects, and coordinated effects. The Guidelines have a separate section on mergers limiting ??innovation and product variety,?? treated mainly in the category of unilateral effects. The 2010 Guidelines are more flexible than previous Guidelines and also more catholic about the types of harms that mergers might cause and the techniques that can be used to assess them. Older Guidelines were excessively wed to methodologies that were at the forefront of applied merger analysis when they were drafted, but that tended to make the Guidelines obsolete as new methodologies became available. Not only do methodologies change, they are also specific to the situation. Further, they tend to be well developed in the literature and accessible to experts consulted by those defending a merger as well as to the government economists who employ them. To be sure, there is a tradeoff between flexibility and guidance. Often we can have more of one only by giving up some of the other, and that tradeoff is clearly present in the 2010 Guidelines.     

MEASURING THE ATTRIBUTES OF POVERTY AND ITS PERSISTENCE: A CASE STUDY OF ERITREA

This paper tries to identify the correlates of poverty in urban Eritrea using an estimation technique (the DOGEV model) that also allows for the inclusion of a measure of “persistence” in poverty levels from cross‐sectional estimation. The results suggest that 17 percent of the probability of being moderately poor and 22 percent of the probability of being extremely poor in Eritrea was attributable to this “persistence”—a predisposition toward poverty likely due to latent attributes related to past experience of poverty itself. The results also suggest that, in the post‐war economy of the mid‐1990s, those with vocational training fared best among all education groups. Being a war veteran also had a strong negative association with the poverty—reflecting successful attempts to support that group. The receipt of remittances also reduced the likelihood of poverty; though receipts from outside Eritrea had a much stronger effect than receipts from within Eritrea.     

The local best response criterion: An epistemic approach to equilibrium refinement

The standard refinement criteria for extensive form games, including subgame perfect, perfect, perfect Bayesian, sequential, and proper, reject important classes of reasonable Nash equilibria and accept many unreasonable Nash equilibria. This paper develops a new refinement criterion, based on epistemic game theory, that captures the concept of a Nash equilibrium that is plausible when players are rational. I call this the local best response (LBR) criterion. This criterion is conceptually simpler than the standard refinement criteria because it does not depend on out-of-equilibrium, counterfactual, or passage to the limit arguments. The LBR is also informationally richer because it clarifies the epistemic conditions that render a Nash equilibrium reasonable. The LBR criterion appears to render the traditional refinement criteria superfluous.     

Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion

This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields.We wish to thank Johann K. Brunner and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.     

Rate structures in nuclear and non-nuclear US electric utility jurisdictions

This study investigates whether the structure of customer rates for US electric utilities with nuclear power generation is significantly different from the rate structure of non-nuclear utilities. Using previous estimates of the marginal costs of generation by nuclear and fossil-fuel plants, and of transmission and distribution, tests are made to determine if pricing practices are similar in nuclear and non-nuclear jurisdictions. The results show that the rate structure for the nuclear utilities is inefficient, with industrial rates significantly higher than first-best or second-best pricing criteria allow, whereas the rates for non-nuclear utilities are second-best efficient, with a slight favouritism toward the industrial class.