Information Asymmetry and Quarterly Disclosure Decisions by Firms: Evidence From the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This study investigates whether the new quarterly disclosure reporting requirement issued by the Tokyo Stock Exchange was related to the reduction of the degree of private information‐based trade and the liquidity of listed stocks in Japan, or as a reverse causality, helped dichotomize good firms and bad firms as a separating signaling equilibrium. We use the probability of asymmetric information‐based trade (Adjusted PIN) as a measure of information asymmetry and the probability of symmetric order‐flow shock (PSOS) as a measure of market illiquidity. We use a sample of public firms from 2002 to 2007 that chose to either disclose or not disclose quarterly financial reports. We find that the disclosing firms had lower information asymmetry (Adjusted PIN), lower symmetric order‐flow shocks (PSOS), and lower private information‐based trade (PIN). When we conduct further difference‐in‐differences tests, we find that the firms with lower information asymmetry and higher liquidity had a higher tendency to disclose their financial statements and vice versa. Thus, the new disclosure requirement did not necessarily improve the information asymmetry and liquidity of firms, but instead helped good and bad firms form a case for a separating signaling equilibrium.     

Cartel Stability in a Delivered Pricing Oligopoly

Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location. We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however, agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two.     

Dynamic Analysis of Imitation and Technology Gap

This paper investigates how imitation activities affect the technology gap between developing and developed countries using a North-South model in which the variety of goods is expanding over time. If imitation productivity is high enough, nonrivalrous ideas and inexpensive labor enables developing countries to reduce their technological backwardness by imitating products even if their initial level of technology is far behind the technology in developed countries. We also show that the rise of imitation productivity may benefit both developing and developed countries if they prefer a sufficient variety of goods.     

Price regulation,product location,and welfare

This paper investigates the imposition of a binding price ceiling and how it affects overall welfare and the location of a monopolist that is price-discriminating between two markets. The analysis shows that the imposition of a price-ceiling induces the monopolist to locate at the regulated market and that the imposition may actually reduce welfare. The setting is extended to a duopoly market. Two types of regulation are considered. The welfare implications of the regulations are discussed.      

Lesser evil? Public opinion on regulating fake news in Japan,South Korea,and Thailand – A three-country comparison

This study quantitatively examines and compares public opinion on regulating fake news, and factors affecting the opinion in three Asian countries: Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. Based on the third-person effect, it is hypothesised that the perceived harm of fake news on society increases people's support for fake news regulation. In parallel, according to the lesser evil principle, it is also anticipated that people will be less supportive of regulating fake news if they are aware that there are other non-regulatory counter fake news solutions such as fact-checking. Using original survey data collected from the three countries (n = 5218) and multi-group SEM, it is found that while the first hypothesis holds for all three countries, the second one holds only for Japan and South Korea (the two mature democracies), but not for Thailand (the semi-democratic country). This finding implies that the lesser evil principle also applies in Asian countries, but only in mature democracies where freedom of speech is protected.     

Defending Home against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms*

We consider exclusive contracts a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, because of the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an anticompetitive exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.     

Which is better for durable goods producers,exclusive or open supply chain?

We explore the supply chain problem of a downstream durable goods monopolist, who chooses one of the following trading modes: an exclusive supply chain with an incumbent supplier or an open supply chain, allowing the monopolist to trade with a new efficient entrant in the future. The expected retail price reduction in the future dampens the profitability of the original firms. An efficient entrant's entry magnifies such a price reduction, causing a further reduction of original firms' joint profits. In equilibrium, the downstream monopolist chooses the exclusive supply chain to escape further price reductions, although it expects efficient entry.     

The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.     

Topic tones of analyst reports and stock returns: A deep learning approach

We present a novel approach that analyzes topics and tones of analyst reports using a deep neural network in a supervised learning approach. By letting trained classifiers evaluate topics and tones of the reports, we find that incorporation of topic tones significantly enhances the accuracy of predicting cumulative abnormal returns, increasing adjusted ${\mathrm{R}}^2$ from 6.1% without considering textual information to 17.9% with detailed topic tones. This improvement is primarily driven by the inclusion of opinion and corporate fact type of topics. Our findings highlight importance of topic assessment to make the most use of analyst reports for informed investment decisions.