50 is the new 30—long-run trends of schooling and retirement explained by human aging

Workers in the US and other developed countries retire no later than a century ago and spend a significantly longer part of their life in school, implying that they stay less years in the work force. The facts of longer schooling and simultaneously shorter working life are seemingly hard to square with the rationality of the standard economic life cycle model. In this paper we propose a novel theory, based on health and aging, that explains these long-run trends. Workers optimally respond to a longer stay in a healthy state of high productivity by obtaining more education and supplying less labor. Better health increases productivity and amplifies the return on education. The health accelerator allows workers to finance educational efforts with less forgone labor supply than in the previous state of shorter healthy life expectancy. When both life-span and healthy life expectancy increase, the health effect is dominating and the working life gets shorter if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for leisure is sufficiently small or the return on education is sufficiently large. We calibrate the model and show that it is able to predict the historical trends of schooling and retirement.     

Is the global economy on the brink of recession?

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Is the global economy on the brink of recession?     

International trade in services: A portrait of importers and exporters

We provide a novel set of stylized facts on firms engaging in international trade in services, using unique data on firm-level exports and imports from the world's second largest services exporter, the United Kingdom (UK). We show that only a fraction of UK firms engage in international trade in services, that trade participation varies widely across industries and that service traders are different from non-traders in terms of size, productivity and other firm characteristics. We also provide detailed evidence on the trading patterns of service exporters and importers, such as the number of markets served, the value of exports and imports per market and the share of individual markets in overall sales. We interpret these facts in the light of existing theories of international trade in services and goods. Our results demonstrate that firm-level heterogeneity is a key feature of services trade. Also, we find many similarities between services and goods trade at the firm level and conclude that existing heterogeneous firm models for goods trade will be a good starting point for explaining trade in services as well.     

农村建设理论与实践——以德国为例

基于德国农村建设保护和设计的理论研究成果,系统分析了德国现代农村建设内涵、依据、标准与现代农村建设理论,以及当前在中国城镇化下农村建设中遇到的问题与挑战,并讨论了中国未来新农村建设的发展趋势。期以德国较为成熟的理念、方法和实践经验为我国新农村建设理论发展与实践应用提供科学参考与技术依据。     

Greasing the wheels of international commerce: how services facilitate firms’ international sourcing

Abstract We use plant‐level data to study the link between the local availability of services and the decision of manufacturing firms to source materials from abroad. We develop a model to generate predictions about how the intensity of international sourcing of materials depends on the availability of services and firm characteristics. These predictions are supported by the data. Greater availability of services across regions, industries, and time increases firms’ foreign sourcing of materials relative to sales. The impact of services differs by firm type. National firms’ sourcing responds to changes in regional service conditions, whereas multinationals tend to be less affected.     

The impact of unions on municipal elections and urban fiscal policies

The efficient decentralized provision of public goods requires that special interest groups, such as municipal unions, do not exercise undue influence on the outcome of municipal elections and local fiscal policies. We develop a new political economy model in which a union can endorse one of the candidates in a local election. A politician that prefers an inefficiently large public sector can, therefore, win an election if the union can provide sufficiently strong support during the campaign. We have assembled a unique data set that is based on union endorsements that are published in leading local newspapers. Our empirical analysis focuses on municipal elections in the 150 largest cities in the U.S. between 1990 and 2012. We find that challengers strongly benefit from endorsements in competitive elections. Challengers that receive union endorsements and successfully defeat an incumbent also tend to adopt more union friendly fiscal policies.     

Consumption-portfolio optimization with recursive utility in incomplete markets

In an incomplete market, we study the optimal consumption-portfolio decision of an investor with recursive preferences of Epstein?CZin type. Applying a classical dynamic programming approach, we formulate the associated Hamilton?CJacobi?CBellman equation and provide a suitable verification theorem. The proof of this verification theorem is complicated by the fact that the Epstein?CZin aggregator is non-Lipschitz, so standard verification results (e.g. in Duffie and Epstein, Econometrica 60, 393?C394, 1992) are not applicable. We provide new explicit solutions to the Bellman equation with Epstein?CZin preferences in an incomplete market for non-unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and apply our verification result to prove that they solve the consumption-investment problem. We also compare our exact solutions to the Campbell?CShiller approximation and assess its accuracy.     

Information Asymmetries as Antecedents of Opportunism in Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Testing Principal-Agent Theory

ABSTRACT

Purpose: A severe problem in supplier selection refers to moral hazard: suppliers not behaving in the expected way once contracted. Principal-agent theory could provide insights on how to reduce this problem. Because buyer–supplier relationships can be interpreted as principal-agent situations, the application of agency theory should facilitate improved supplier selection. Although theoretically compelling, empirical tests verifying this assumption are not prevalent. Regarding the advancement of theory, this paper tests whether both ex ante and ex post information asymmetries influence moral hazard. In particular, in the context of a globalizing economy with a subsequent increase in information asymmetries as a problem in supplier selection, this conceptual approach may be contributive.

Design/methodology/approach: The authors use a set of 87 buyer–supplier relationships to conduct a test, applying a partial least squares model with latent variables. A particularity of the data set is that it contains information on ongoing as well as on discontinued relationships.

Findings: The analysis indicated that both ex ante information asymmetries (operationalized by a reputation variable) and ex post asymmetries (operationalized by a monitoring variable) have shown to be significant and strong antecedents explaining the occurrence of moral hazard. Interestingly, and opposed to the common assumption, the length of a relationship and the amount of direct meetings have not revealed any explanatory significance. Buyer dependency hardly showed influence on supplier opportunism.

Research limitations/implications: Data were collected from a multitude of buyer–supplier relationships from a single firm in the chemical-pharmaceutical industry. Generalizations to other industries still need to be tested. Socially desirable answering behavior cannot fully be excluded because relationship discontinuation is not a desirable situation. In terms of theory implications, this research adds to the notion that both hidden action and hidden intention can lead to moral hazard.

Practical implications: An agency-based analysis can be operationalized with the help of an agency-based supplier classification portfolio. It might be of particular value to firms to discuss those suppliers that scored high in risk of opportunism but did not (yet) reveal any signs of moral hazard. Finally, the strong explanatory power

of reputation alerts buyers to pay more attention to behavioral information on the (potential) supplier available in the market.

Originality/value: Analyzing the occurrence of moral hazard and including terminated relationships adds to the emerging stream of literature on relationship discontinuation in B2B markets. Further, the strong empirical results may encourage researchers to elaborate on principal-agent theory-based assumptions, adding another layer of explanation to buyer–supplier relationships. Findings show that reputation is unduly neglected as supplier selection criterion in current theory and practice.