Potential Conflict and Inefficiencies Arising in Agri‐environmental Management

We characterise the welfare implications of uncoordinated policy decisions in the presence of multiple externalities, illustrated with an aquifer. We concentrate on the problem of coordination that can occur when distinct agricultural and water authorities implement their respective policies (to optimise food production and groundwater use) with environmental concerns in mind. We represent this problem as an open‐loop Nash game, which compares the game‐theoretical solution to a centrally planned solution. We show that the inefficiencies arise from differences in the account taken of relevant costs by different authorities. We demonstrate that the magnitude of the inefficiency generated by the absence of coordination of our authorities varies depending on the weights put on environmental benefits by each authority, and discuss the implications of analysis for future research and policy.     

On Shapley–Shubik equilibria with financial markets

In this paper, we extend the Shapley–Shubik model to a two period financial economy, and essentially address the question of the existence of an equilibrium. More precisely, we show the existence of nice equilibria, i.e. situations in which prices for both assets and commodities are strictly positive. Even if the general lines of the proof are largely influenced by the paper of Dubey and Shubik (J Econ Theory 17:1–20, 1978), most of the arguments are new because of the financial nature of the economy. It forces us to deal with a generalized Nash equilibrium, and to proscribe the use of arguments which only work with a single cash-in-advance constraint.      

Loan officer gender and loan repayment performance. Evidence from greenfield microfinance institutions in Cameroon1

We explore whether loan officer gender affects loan repayment performance in Cameroonian microfinance institutions (MFIs). After controlling for demand-side factors (borrower characteristics), lending methodology, loan contract terms, year, and industry fixed effects, we apply a pooled probit model to a unique loan-level dataset including more than 7000 loans approved between 2007 and 2012 by two Cameroonian commercial MFIs. We find that loans granted and monitored by male loan officers perform better than those granted by female officers and that loans approved under joint liability contracts and monitored by male loan officers are less likely to fall into arrears. Our findings also show that the performance advantage of male loan officers over female officers is confirmed only during bad times. Compared to female loan officers, male loan officers seem to intensify their monitoring efforts during a crisis period. The results are robust after controlling for selection bias and are less sensitive to a change in the loan repayment performance measurement.