Does Inter‐jurisdictional Competition Engender a “Race to the Bottom”? A Meta‐Regression Analysis

A growing literature documents the existence of strategic political reactions to public expenditure between rival jurisdictions. These interactions can potentially create a downward expenditure spiral (“race to the bottom”) or a rising expenditure spiral (“race to the top”). However, in the course of identifying the existence of such interactions and ascertaining their underlying triggers, the empirical evidence has produced markedly heterogeneous findings. Most of this heterogeneity can be traced back to study design and institutional differences. This article contributes to the literature by applying meta‐regression analysis to quantify the magnitude of strategic inter‐jurisdictional expenditure interactions, controlling for study, and institutional characteristics. We find several robust results beyond confirming that jurisdictions do engage in strategic expenditure interactions, namely that strategic interactions: (i) are weakening over time, (ii) are stronger among municipalities than among higher levels of government, and (iii) appear to be more influenced from tax competition than yardstick competition, with capital controls and fiscal decentralization shaping the magnitude of fiscal interactions.     

ANTIDUMPING,INTRA‐INDUSTRY TRADE,AND QUALITY REVERSALS

We examine an export game where two (home and foreign) firms produce vertically differentiated products. The foreign firm is more R&D efficient and is based in a larger and richer market. The unique (risk‐dominant) Nash equilibrium exhibits intra‐industry trade, and the foreign producer manufactures a higher‐quality product. When transport costs are low, unilateral dumping by the foreign firm arises; otherwise, reciprocal dumping occurs. For some parameters, a domestic antidumping policy leads to a quality reversal in the international market whereby the home firm becomes the quality leader. This policy is desirable for the implementing country, though world welfare decreases.     

HOW CAN PUBLIC SPENDING HELP YOU GROW? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Although many studies indicate that both the level and composition of public spending are significant for economic growth, the results in the empirical literature are mixed. This paper suggests that the country sample selection and expenditure classification are important in explaining these conflicting results. The empirical analysis shows that the link between growth and public spending, especially its core component, is strong only for countries with macroeconomic stability and fast GDP per capita growth dynamics, which are also capable of using public funds for productive purposes.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policies in a Transactions‐Based Endogenous Growth Model with Imperfect Competition

This paper's model is capable of explaining the empirical evidence on the mixed growth‐rate effects of fiscal and monetary policies and a nonlinear inflation–growth relation. When monopoly power in the product market is strong/weak, an increase in the money growth rate or the income tax rate promotes/reduces the output growth rate through lowering/raising the equilibrium gross markup and increasing/reducing the net rate of return on capital. The fact that money can generate a positive growth rate effect allows for the appearance of a nonlinear inflation–growth relation. Such a nonlinear relation cannot be caused by changes in the income tax rate.     

Hyperbolic Discounting,Borrowing Aversion and Debt Holding

Analysis of an original Internet‐based survey reveals that debt holding is related to time discounting through: (i) present bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized hyperbolic discount function; (ii) borrowing aversion, captured by a sign effect in that future losses are discounted at lower rates than future gains; and (iii) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate. Hyperbolic respondents are classified naïve if their answers reveal them to be time‐inconsistent procrastinators, and otherwise sophisticated. Naïve respondents with more steeply declining impatience are more likely to be debtors. The sign effect relates negatively to borrowing. Survey responses indicative of high or declining impatience are associated with credit card borrowing and other overborrowing indicators.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

Credit Chains and Mortgage Crises

Here I examine a production economy with a financial sector that contains multiple layers of credit. The latter constitute credit chains that include a simple mortgage market. The focus is on the nature and contagion properties of credit chains in an economy where the financial sector plays a real allocating role, and agents have a serious choice of whether to default on mortgages or not. Multiple equilibria with different rates of default are observed, due to the presence of strategic complementarities. A liquidity crunch is associated with higher rates of default that can trigger a financial crisis as well as constrain the purchase of production factors, leading to reductions in welfare, together with potentially serious effects on real economic activity with the potential of causing deep and widespread recessions.     

Sources of Fluctuations in the Real Exchange Rates and Trade Balances of the G‐7: A Sign Restriction VAR Approach

This paper estimates structural vector autoregression models of output, the real exchange rate and trade balance for the group of seven leading advanced economies (G‐7). Unlike previous studies, we do not impose long‐run purchasing power parity as an identifying assumption; instead, the shocks underlying the model are structurally identified using a set of theory‐consistent sign restrictions. Empirical results show that nominal shocks account for most of the long‐run variability in trade balances across the G‐7 countries. We are able to attribute this finding to long‐run movements in the real exchange rate, as the real exchange rate is significantly affected by nominal shocks in the long run.     

Measurement of Quality of Life and Well‐Being in France: The Drivers of Subjective Well‐Being

Ever since the publication of the Stiglitz Report, France has been heavily involved in the measurement of well‐being. The French Statistical Institute (INSEE) has expanded the scope of its existing surveys. It has also launched an innovative experimental survey which, drawing upon a single statistical source, aims for the first time to explore the different dimensions of both objective and subjective quality of life, as highlighted in the Stiglitz Report. It allows us to study, at the individual level, correlations between these dimensions and the accumulation of deprivations. It has enabled us to better understand the links between determinants generally referred to as objective dimensions of quality of life (such as health or education) and subjective well‐being. This information is of paramount importance for policy makers who cannot act directly on the level of people's satisfaction but can only act upon the levers of objective dimensions. This paper presents the main findings of the experimental survey.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.