Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device when finding employment is costly

Abstract In this paper, we study a model that incorporates costly job search into an efficiency wage model. We show that the relationship between wages and detection rates is ambiguous in this framework. The model can generate a positive relationship, consistent with empirically reasonable values for unemployment rates, job finding rates, and employment duration.     

CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

HEADS I WIN,TAILS YOU LOSE: INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING OF EXECUTIVE PAY RIGIDITY

Agency theory argues that pay for performance alleviates the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, the literature finds that institutional monitoring tends to promote the performance–pay linkage, thus aligning the two parties’ incentives. We find that executive compensation rigidity is negatively and significantly associated with firm value. Moreover, ownership by long‐term institutional investors reduces the pay rigidity of top managers in underperforming firms, thus decreasing the value‐destroying effect of the rigidity. Overall, these results reaffirm the role of institutional monitoring in mitigating managerial rent extraction.     

The Hausman test and weak instruments

We consider the following problem. There is a structural equation of interest that contains an explanatory variable that theory predicts is endogenous. There are one or more instrumental variables that credibly are exogenous with regard to this structural equation, but which have limited explanatory power for the endogenous variable. Further, there is one or more potentially ‘strong’ instruments, which has much more explanatory power but which may not be exogenous. Hausman (1978) provided a test for the exogeneity of the second instrument when none of the instruments are weak. Here, we focus on how the standard Hausman test does in the presence of weak instruments using the Staiger–Stock asymptotics. It is natural to conjecture that the standard version of the Hausman test would be invalid in the weak instrument case, which we confirm. However, we provide a version of the Hausman test that is valid even in the presence of weak IV and illustrate how to implement the test in the presence of heteroskedasticity. We show that the situation we analyze occurs in several important economic examples. Our Monte Carlo experiments show that our procedure works relatively well in finite samples. We should note that our test is not consistent, although we believe that it is impossible to construct a consistent test with weak instruments.     

Maximum Likelihood Estimation in Panels with Incidental Trends

It is shown that the maximum likelihood estimator of a local to unity parameter can be consistently estimated with panel data when the cross-section observations are independent. Consistency applies when there are no deterministic trends or when there is a homogeneous deterministic trend in the panel model. When there are heterogeneous deterministic trends the panel MLE of the local to unity parameter is inconsistent. This outcome provides a new instance of inconsistent ML estimation in dynamic panels, and, unlike earlier results of this type, applies when both T →∞ and N →∞.     

Endogenous labor force participation and firing costs

I construct a matching model to explain the labor market transition between employment, unemployment and nonparticipation, and evaluate the quantitative effects of firing costs. The model has several features that are distinguished from previous studies: endogenous labor force participation, different job-search decisions and imperfect insurance markets. I find that the model is able to account for the U.S. labor market, especially the gross labor-force transition rates. I also find that firing costs as a type of firing tax have a negative effect on the layoff rate, the job-finding probability and the participation rate. In particular, the effect of a decrease in the job-finding probability is greater than the effect of a decrease in the layoff rate, and this results in an increase in the unemployment-to-population ratio. Finally, firing costs make individuals' job tenures longer and skew the asset distribution to the right.     

The cross-sectional effect of inflation on corporate investment and employment

This paper examines the cross-sectional effect of inflation on the investment and employment decisions. The paper shows that more heavily capitalized firms tend to have a greater reduction in the capital-labor ratio during an inflationary period. The paper also shows that firms with a higher cost of debt to wage ratios and a larger amount of depreciation shelter tend to use more labor in the inflationary period. Empirical results are generally consistent with these arguments. The authors wish to thank John Anderson, Jim Hodder, two anonymous referees and Cheng F. Lee, the Editor for their helpful comments. All remaining errors are ours.     

Long-term performance of divesting firms and the effect of managerial ownership

We study the long-term performance of firms that divest assets to assess whether gains arise from reducing agency costs. We find that divesting firms underperform control firms before the divestiture and outperform control firms following the divestiture. The poor performance experienced by divesting firms is unrelated to managerial ownership, but the post-divestiture improvement in performance is strongly related to stock ownership by the CEO. The results support the argument that divestitures remove assets that generate negative synergies and that managerial ownership provides strong incentives to improve operations following the divestiture.     

Structural equation model for predicting technology commercialization success index (TCSI)

Expecting high return, many firms try to invest on R&D of new technology. However, critical loss of assets would occur, when a firm fails to commercialize the developed technology. It would be of interest to provide the ideal environment for commercialization from the R&D stage. In this study, we use a structural equation model (SEM) to forecast the technology commercialization success index (TCSI) in relation to technology developer, technology receiver, technology transfer center, and environmental factors. The proposed SEM is fitted based on partial least square (PLS) estimation procedure. Individual TCSI is then found following the approach used for American customer satisfaction index (ACSI) for various combinations of characteristics of the type of technology, technology receiver, and technology developer. We expect that the proposed approach for TCSI can be used as guidance for an ideal match of technology with technology developer and technology receiver.