Antecedents of employee involvement with the comparative model

Instead of discussing employee’s performance that previous researchers emphasized in their studies on the work behavior of employees, this study analyzes employee involvement from the viewpoint of their emotional labor, organizational culture, and the intimacy relationships between employees and their supervisors. Large-scale financial holding conglomerates in Taiwan and subsidiaries of Hong Kong-based conglomerates were selected as the populations for the research. The result of the empirical analysis indicates that emotional labor has a significantly positive effect on the involvement of employees; the stronger the intimacy relationship between employees and their supervisors is, the higher the employee involvement will be, strong culture has a significantly negative effect on the involvement of employees, and there is a significant difference in a number of dimensions among some Chinese enterprises in Taiwan & Hong Kong. This study has the following characteristics in comparison with the previous studies: (1) The theoretical structure of this study is formed based on an integrated prospect of internal organizational structure, personal factors of employees and their interpersonal relationship; (2) the study focuses on a comparative study of regional enterprises, which was seldom emphasized in literature; (3) the study uses the Non-Linear Fuzzy Neural Network Model and multivariate analysis approach as tools for the research and may contribute more to the theory in this field.     

The deregulation of international trucking in the European Union: form and effect

We describe the regulatory regime under which international trucking operated in Western Europe until the mid-1980s, the deregulatory process that followed, and the effect of this deregulation. We find that deregulation had a large positive effect on the growth of international trucking. We also find that shippers shifted toward more outsourcing of their trucking needs, but this occurred to an even greater extent in local and national road transport. We conclude that other factors beside the deregulation of international trucking affected the organization of the industry at the time. Finally, despite concerns voiced by member countries, we find no evidence that deregulation disproportionately favored carriers of countries that were initially more (or less) involved in international trucking, nor that it has favored low-wage countries.      

On the multiplicity of option prices under CEV with positive elasticity of variance

The discounted stock price under the Constant Elasticity of Variance model is not a martingale when the elasticity of variance is positive. Two expressions for the European call price then arise, namely the price for which put-call parity holds and the price that represents the lowest cost of replicating the call option’s payoffs. The greeks of European put and call prices are derived and it is shown that the greeks of the risk-neutral call can substantially differ from standard results. For instance, the relation between the call price and variance may become non-monotonic. Such unfamiliar behavior then might yield option-based tests for the potential presence of a bubble in the underlying stock price.     

Pacifying monogamy

This paper proposes a theory of institutionally imposed monogamy. In a society where many women are allocated to the elite, there are high returns for the non-elite men to rebel. Monogamy, or “constrained” polygyny, can pacify non-elite men, and thus serve the elite’s reproductive interests. The more unequal is the society, the stricter constraints the elite want to impose on themselves. This suggests how monogamy might have arisen in response to rising class cleavages, e.g., in the wake of the introduction of agriculture. Another result is that, if the elite can write a law that commits not only themselves but also any group that would come to replace them in a rebellion, then polygyny will be more constrained than if they cannot. We speculate that the Church in Europe may have facilitated the imposition of such binding constraints.     

Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow–Debreu that is used to study trade ex ante with private state verification. Under the assumption that agents are prudent, equilibrium is characterized by the fact that agents consume bundles with the same utility in states that they do not distinguish. This is a weaker condition than the restriction of equal consumption imposed by Radner (Econometrica 36(1), 31–58, 1968), therefore, some no trade situations are avoided and the efficiency of trade increases.     

Die Geschäftsleiterkontrolle im Versicherungsaufsichtsrecht

The material risks, which can derive from insurance companies, legitimate the severe limitation of the insurance company manager’s constitutional right of the freedom of work. The reliability in insurance company managers is basically assumed. It can regularly only dispensed with a qualified infringement of law, not by a decline in moral standards. In this context the eligibility of infringements has to be detected by a valuation. Therefore the criteria besides the whole purpose of the German Insurance Supervision Act (VAG) are met in: The gravity of the offence, the reference to the occupation, frequency, the future comportment as well as the time lapse. Business judgements are categoricaly not approachable to the supervision of reliability.     

Individual Agents,Firms, and the Real Estate Brokerage Process

This study examines how individual agents affect house selling prices and time on the market while controlling for brokerage firm-specific effects as well as supply and demand conditions that vary by neighborhood. Firm size effects disappear once firm specialization and agent characteristics are taken into account but geographic concentration by firms leads to higher selling prices. For individual agents, neither sex nor selling own listings affects price or selling time, but there are gains from partnering transactions across firms. Agents who specialize in listing properties obtain higher prices for their sellers while those who specialize in selling obtain lower prices for their buyers. Houses nearer to other transactions of an agent sell for higher prices. Finally, greater scale of listing and selling activity by an agent tends to lower selling price or lengthen the time on the market.