OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements

This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement (the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As a response to the climate agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes OPEC's profits. Within a numerical model we find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game in which each player chooses when to fix his decision variables. It is shown that in equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and OPEC chooses to be the follower. It is demonstrated, however, that for both agents the order of move is of minor (numerical) importance. Hence, the players have limited incentives for strategic behaviour.     

The Heckscher–Ohlin model and the network structure of international trade

This paper estimates for 28 product groups a characteristic parameter that reflects the topological structure of its trading network. Using these estimates, it describes how the structure of international trade has evolved during the 1980–2000 period. Thereafter, it demonstrates the importance of networks in international trade by explicitly accounting for their scaling properties when testing the prediction of the “Heckscher–Ohlin” model that factor endowment differentials determine bilateral trade flows. The results suggest that factor endowment differentials increase bilateral trade in goods that are traded in “dispersed” networks. For goods traded in “concentrated” networks, factor endowment differentials are less important.     

Fiscal Autonomy and Total Government Expenditure: An Austrian Case-study

The ongoing debate on the efficiency of a federal system versus a centralized system has lead to a diverse and unclear empirical picture of the effects of fiscal decentralization on public sector growth. For analyzing these effects it is crucial to consider the sub-national decision power on taxing and spending. In the current paper, we test for the effects of fiscal autonomy on total government expenditure using time series from 1955 to 2007 for Austria. Determinants of government expenditure are economic growth, fiscal illusion of policy makers, and the unemployment rate. We additionally account for different degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. Our econometric results suggest that the often-hypothesized dampening effects of fiscal autonomy cannot be corroborated for the Austrian system.     

National information and euro area monetary policy: a generalized ordered choice approach

We empirically analyze the influence of inflationary pressure originating from persistent national misalignments on the ECB’s interest rate decisions between 2000 and mid-2010. To do so, we introduce an indicator that summarizes the threat to euro area price stability originating from self-reinforcing expected inflation differentials. The indicator is computed based on persistent deviations of national expected inflation and GDP growth rates from the corresponding euro area aggregate. It thereby captures area-wide excess demand pressure on the euro area inflation rate. In order to determine the information content of this indicator, we add it to an empirical monetary policy reaction function. We then analyze this reaction function in the framework of a generalized ordered choice model that fits the data a lot better than its commonly used, more restricted counterpart. Within this empirical framework, we find that after controlling for several area-wide aggregates, national information does not provide additional information that is indicative of the ECB’s policy rate decision.     

Why (not) cooperate? A cognitive model of farmers’ intention to join producer groups in Romania

After the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, collective farms were replaced by a large number of small-scale private farms. Although cooperation seems to be a favourable choice for these smallholders, it did not develop as perhaps expected. This article explores the factors that determine the formation of the intention of Romanian vegetable farmers to join marketing cooperatives in the form of so called producer groups. Our theoretical framework refers to Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour, which we model with a structural equation model. We identified as main intention drivers the expectation for better prices and easier access to capital. Perceived family support is another significant factor. The level of distrust is high. Although our trust variable is not significant as a predictor of the intention to cooperate in the model, we find qualitative indications that trust plays a role when the intention is translated into actual behaviour.     

利维坦之形塑:财政、国家能力与治理

财政是国家发展的重要因素,是国家保护公民、提供正义和行政管理的前提。税收是国家获取财政的主要方式,不仅维系着国家与纳税人之间的关系,还与代表制、问责制与国家能力息息相关。揆诸史实,欧洲国家的历史发展验证了财政筹集与制度变革的重要联系,对财政的需求催生了制度的变革,并产生了代议制度。税收是国家能力和国家财权的先决条件,唯有抓住国家治理的税收脉络,在税收、能力、代议制与问责制之间形成了良性的制度循环,方能实现国家治理体系和治理能力的现代化。