Determinants of Israeli Judicial Discretion in Issuing Injunctions against Strikers

The study examines all cases (1990–7) in Israel in which employers petitioned the labour court to issue an injunction against striking workers, and identifies how judges use their discretion in deciding the petition. The findings indicate that, judicial rhetoric to the contrary, the labour court limits its considerations almost solely to the parties' formal compliance with the legal rule. The implications of these findings for the relationship of the legal and industrial relations systems are discussed, particularly with reference to the dual task of labour law: to govern the industrial relations system, and to facilitate its autonomy.     

Bonding and Bridging Associational Social Capital and the Financial Performance of Local Authorities in Israel

Abstract

This study explores whether bridging and bonding social capital differ in their impacts on government performance at the local level and the extent to which these impacts vary between localities exhibiting differing socioeconomic resources. The study is based on an analysis of 256 local authorities in Israel. The findings show that bridging and bonding social capital do differ in their respective effects on government performance and that the nature of the relationship of each type of capital with government performance varies by the community's socioeconomic profile. Poor communities with high densities of bridging social capital were characterized by lower deficits as a percentage of total municipal budgets, more accurate expenditure forecasts and greater spending on services per capita.     

The demand for regulation of financial disclosures: The case of the insurance industry

Policyholders and other claimants in insurance companies are interested in “solidity,” i.e., the ability of insurers to meet their claims obligations in both the short run and the long run. Insurance regulators exist in order to represent the interests of consumers. Great emphasis is placed by the regulators of the market on the mandatory and uniform disclosure of relevant financial and operating aspects of insurers. This paper employs simple gametheoretic techniques to address two aspects of the general issue of the desirability of establishing a regulator to assess the solidity of insurers. First, why would uniform information about insurers be desirable? Given that uniformity is desirable, it could be achieved by voluntary agreement of insurers or via regulation. The second issue is how that uniformity is to be achieved; that is, what is the value of a regulator in achieving uniformity? Insurance provides an interesting instance of the general problem. A key determinant is the structure of costs and benefits of securing voluntary agreements across firms.     

INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE UNDERPRICING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: FURTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Information Asymmetry is usually assumed in most explanations of the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). In Baron's (1982) model, the underwriter is better informed than the issuing firm concerning the demand for the IPO. The greater uncertainty associated with the demand will lead to a greater underpricing due to the enhanced value of the underwriter's expertise. In the case that the issuer is also an informed investment banker, Baron's hypothesis predicts no underpricing. Our results based on Canadian investment bankers do not support Baron's hypothesis.     

Fixed versus variable rate financing: The influence of borrower,lender, and market characteristics

Previous research has analyzed the problem faced by borrowers who must choose between fixed rate and variable rate loans when each loan carries different cost and risk characteristics and the borrowers face various income and employment prospects. In addition, the existing literature contains theoretical and empirical studies of how lenders react when given the ability to offer both fixed and variable rate financing. This article unifies the two strands of research to develop and test a model of the equilibrium proportion of variable rate lending. Results indicate that factors related to borrower, lender, and market characteristics are significant determinants of the equilibrium proportion of variable rate credit originated.     

THE SENSITIVITY OF THE PRIME RATE TO MONEY MARKET CONDITIONS

Commercial banking's institutional setting can make one bank's profits dependent upon the pricing strategies of its rivals. In this environment, widely disseminated prime rate quotes, loan contracts with “most-favored-customer” clauses, and rule-of-thumb pricing techniques can result in prime rate outcomes that jointly maximize banks' market values. In this paper the relationship between the prime and money market rates is examined over the last decade to determine if the prime rate behaves more like a competitive money market rate than an oligopolistic price.     

EVIDENCE ON HOW COMPANIES CHOOSE BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND OPEN-MARKET STOCK REPURCHASES

Dividends and open-market stock repurchases are by far the two most common mechanisms for distributing excess cash to shareholders. This article identifies and then tests three potentially important factors for the corporate choice between increasing cash dividends and initiating openmarket stock repurchases. More specifically, the authors argue that companies are more likely to distribute cash to investors through open-market repurchases than through dividend increases when (1) management believes its stock is undervalued, (2) management compensation packages include stock options, and (3) the company's stockholder base is dominated by institutional investors.
To test these three explanations, the authors use a matched-pair design in which each company announcing an open market repurchase program in a given year is matched with a comparable-size firm from the same industry that increased its cash dividends but did not initiate an open-market repurchase program. As predicted, the results suggest that equity undervaluation, management compensation, and the level of institutional holdings are all important contributors to corporate choices between dividend increases and open-market repurchases.