Justice Failure: Efficiency and Equality in Business Ethics

This paper offers the concept of “justice failure,” as a counterpart to the familiar idea of market failure, in order to better understand managers’ ethical obligations. This paper takes the “market failures approach” (MFA) to business ethics as its point of departure. The success of the MFA, I argue, lies in its close proximity with economic theory, particularly in the idea that, within a larger scheme of social cooperation, markets ought to pursue efficiency and leave the pursuit of equality to the welfare state. As a result, the core ethical responsibility of business actors is to avoid profiting off of market failure. After reviewing this approach I challenge its emphasis on efficiency. I argue that just as we note the suboptimal efficiency of actual markets (market failure), we should also take seriously the suboptimal equality of actual welfare states (what I call “justice failure”). Taking this idea seriously results in a whole other set of ethical responsibilities for businesses to take into account; in addition to market imperfections and regulatory lacunae, managers should also avoid profiting from, and exacerbating, structural inequalities and injustices. I offer an outline of the kinds of injustices and inequalities that would have bearing on business ethics, and the kinds of ethical responsibilities that this approach suggests that business actors should take into account.     

Mean‐variance efficiency of the market portfolio and futures trading

We derived an intertemporal capital asset pricing model in which the mean‐variance efficiency of the market portfolio is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. We obtained this result by modeling a frictionless, continuously open financial market in which nonredundant futures contracts are available for trade, in addition to cash assets. Introducing such contracts modifies the way investors optimally allocate their wealth. Their portfolios then comprise the riskless asset, a perturbed mean‐variance‐efficient portfolio of cash assets, and a perturbed mean‐variance‐efficient portfolio of futures contracts. Furthermore, a (3 + K) mutual fund separation is obtained, with K being the number of economic state variables, in lieu of the usual (2 + K) fund separation. Mean‐variance efficiency of the market portfolio is a necessary condition only when cash assets are the sole traded assets. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 21:329–346, 2001     

Market structure and performance in intellectual property: The case of copyright collectives

Copyright collectives are associations to whom authors transfer copyrights for purposes of exploitation. These collectives grant licenses for the use of works in their repertory, they negotiate and collect royalties which they distribute to their members and they take legal actions against those who infringe the copyrights to which they hold title. This paper investigates the consequences of the formation of collectives on the number of copyrighted works produced and circulation of these works in the framework of a model of joint production. Welfare issues are also addressed.     

Collusive tax evasion and social norms

Although collusive tax evasion by buyers and sellers of commodities and also by employers and employees is widespread all over the world, it has rarely been analyzed in the tax evasion literature. To fill this gap and to compare collusive tax evasion with independent tax evasion, this paper develops a simple noncooperative game-theoretic model and confirms the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper focuses on the effect of social norms and theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the tax compliance norm has a stronger negative effect on the magnitude of collusive tax evasion than on independent tax evasion. The reason for this result is that in a collusive tax evasion game with multiple equilibria social norms affect the range of equilibria and act as an equilibrium selection device, whereas social norms need to be strongly internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly.     

The role of public intervention in R & D

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) we emphasize the rule of uncertainty in achieving an efficient allocation of resources to R & D activities; (2) we identify and discuss optional mechanisms that are directed at minimizing the role of uncertainty in determining R & D decisions; and (3) we analyze the role of public intervention in R & D via a formal structure. More specifically, we explain why and under what conditions a risk-averse decision-maker will invest less than a government in research and inventive activities. Sufficient conditions that lead to private underinvestment in these activities are established. Furthermore, if the option of buying information exists, then we identify a set of private governmental contracts that may lead to the acceptance of a research project that a priori is unfeasible.     

A note on Model Reference Adaptive System (MRAS) estimate with infinite variance

This paper discusses the estimation of a parameter in an autoregressive model with infinite variance. A recursive estimation procedure based on minimizing the prediction errors is provided. It is also shown that the model reference adaptive system estimate for an AR (1) model given in Aase (1983) is a special case.     

Getting the most out of advertising and promotion

Until recently, believing in the effectiveness of advertising and promotion was largely a matter of faith. Despite all the data collected by marketing departments, none measured what was really important: the incremental sales of a product over and above those that would happen without the advertising and promotion. Thanks to a qualitatively new kind of marketing data, that situation is changing. "Single source" data correlate information on actual consumer purchases (available from universal-product-code scanners used in supermarkets and drug-stores) with information on the corresponding television advertising those consumers receive or on the promotion events they see. This allows managers to measure the incremental impact of advertising and promotion and to improve marketing productivity. To take advantage of the new single-source data, however, managers have to throw out much of the conventional wisdom about advertising and promotion that has grown up over the years. They must learn how to evaluate marketing differently by continually examining the appropriate balance between advertising and promotion. They must also train their sales force to do a different and extremely important job: to demonstrate to retailers the consumer pull of the company's advertising and promotion programs, as well as the effect of these programs on retailer profitability.     

The Informativeness of Relative Performance Information and Its Effect on Effort Allocation in a Multitask Environment

Prior research documents that providing relative performance information (RPI) motivates employees to increase effort; however, a potential downside of RPI is that it also motivates employees to distort their effort allocations between tasks such that it can be detrimental to overall firm performance. This study investigates via an experiment how the informativeness of RPI affects employees' effort allocations and performance in a multitask environment. We investigate the informativeness of two RPI design choices that are observed in practice: detail level and temporal aggregation. Regarding detail level, firms may provide each employee's performance ranking on tasks, which is less informative than providing the actual performance score of each employee. Regarding temporal aggregation, firms may provide RPI that is reset each period, which is less informative than RPI that is based on cumulative performance. We find RPI detail level and temporal aggregation interact to influence effort distortion. Specifically, we find that, compared to reset RPI, cumulative RPI leads to greater distortion of effort away from firm‐preferred allocations and that this effect is magnified when RPI provides actual performance scores rather than performance rankings. Finally, high levels of effort distortion hurt overall performance, thereby demonstrating the potentially detrimental effect of effort distortion on performance. Results of our study enhance our understanding of how firms can use their control over the design of RPI to enhance its usefulness in directing employees' effort in multitask environments by highlighting the role that informativeness of information can have on employee behavior.     

Managerial Discretion and Task Interdependence in Teams

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.