Asymptotic consequences of neglected dynamics in individual effects models*

We assess the asymptotic consequences of estimating static models based on cross-section or panel data, when in reality the data are generated by a dynamic relationship, involving lagged dependent and current and lagged exogenous variables as well as individual effects. If the exogenous variable follows a stationary process, then the static estimators usually underestimate its long-run effect. This inconsistency is less severe, the higher the autocorrelation of the exogenous variable. If the exogenous variable follows a random walk with or without individual-specific drift, then the estimators are found to be consistent for the long-run effect.     

A geometric approach to finite sample and large deviation properties in two-way ANOVA with spherically distributed error vectors

This article investigates a two-way ANOVA model with interactions assuming that the vector of error variables possesses a general spherically symmetric distribution instead of a multivariate normal one. Via a geometric approach we study a test for the usual hypothesis of non-interaction under this general assumption. Moreover, based on a certain geometric representation formula, we establish exponential large deviation rates of the least squares estimators in the above model for a specific class of spherical distributions.This research was partially supported by a special research grant from Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Bonn, F. R. Germany.     

Meta-ethical Reasoning: Applied to Economics and Business Principles

A bstract . Ethics and ethical thinking involve two primary and interdependent elements of analysis: the individual and the society. Economic thought dichotomized these two elements into the individual (competitive capitalism ) or the society (Marxist socialism ), with one element being the cause, and the other the effect. Views of economic reality were developed not on the basis of the interdependence of the individual and the society but their mutual antagonism.
Economic thought is based on the scientific reasoning of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its abstract definition of reality narrowed the significance of the concrete appearances of things in favor of the rules (science) that define things. Science requires both an objective causal order (independent of human definitions and beliefs) and the development of laws (independent of the human observer or participant) that explain the nature of the objective world. Ethical reasoning requires that economic causality be defined to include both the individual and the society. Ethical reasoning is needed to bring together both the scientific and the metaphysical for human meaning. The science of means must be joined to the human purposes of ends.     

The Delphi method, impeachment and terrorism: Accuracies of short-range forecasts for volatile world events

Two experiments examined the effects of iterated polling and feedback on prediction accuracy for volatile world events using the Delphi paradigm. In both experiments, participants predicted rapidly changing geopolitical events. The first experiment occurred during the litigation surrounding the Clinton/Lewinsky affair in 1998. Results indicated that feedback improved individual and group accuracy for predictions of whether an event would occur. These types of predictions derived from group consensus were approximately 90% accurate, which was significantly higher than the average individual participant's accuracy. Neither polling nor feedback had much effect on time course predictions. The second experiment occurred during the American military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In Experiment 2, participants were polled three times to determine if increasing the number of iterated polls would improve Delphi accuracy. The results showed that accuracy improved from the first to the second poll but not from the second to the third. The groups predicted whether these scenarios would occur with approximately 75% accuracy, which was significantly higher than the accuracy of any individual participant. Once again, the Delphi procedure did not enhance time course predictions in Experiment 2.     

Institutional Ownership, Strategic Choices and Corporate Efficiency: Evidence from Japan

Based on the tenets of capital allocation systems theory, stewardship theory, and 'going concern' concept of business, institutional ownership is proposed to affect corporate productivity, both directly and indirectly, in large Japanese corporations through a set of four firm-level choices: product/market development, R&D intensity, capital intensity, and leverage. Using data on 118 corporations drawn from five industry sectors in Japan, and applying a partial mediation technique, this study tests an integrated, causal model of the relationships among these variables. Results show mixed support for the model. No direct relationship between institutional ownership and productivity is observed. However, institutional ownership affects productivity indirectly through R&D intensity and leverage. Although product/market development and capital intensity also affect productivity, institutional ownership has no significant relationship with them.     

A Jump-diffusion Model for Exchange Rates in a Target Zone

We propose a simple jump-diffusion model for an exchange rate target zone. The model captures most stylized facts from the existing target zone models while remaining analytically tractable. The model is based on a modified two-limit version of the C OX , I NGERSOLL and R OSS (1985) model. In the model the exchange rate is kept within the band because the variance decreases as the exchange rate approaches the upper or lower limits of the band. We also consider an extension of the model with parity adjustments, which are modeled as Poisson jumps. Estimation of the model is by GMM based on conditional moments. We derive prices of currency options in our model, assuming that realignment jump risk is idiosyncratic. Throughout, we apply the theory to EMS exchange rate data. We show that, after the EMS crisis of 1993, currencies remain in an implicit target zone which is narrower than the officially announced target zones.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

Econometric Cost Structure Estimates for Cellular Telephony in the United States

This article estimates economies of scale for a sample of five cellular telephony firms in the United States. We reject constant returns to scale for all but the smallest firm studied; the remaining firms exhibit decreasing returns to scale. This finding suggests that scale economies cannot be used to justify the current regulated duopoly structure of United States cellular markets.     

The Role of Multinational Firms in the Wage-Gap Debate

The observation of an increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages in the high-income countries and in some cases in low/middle-income countries has led to considerable discussion and controversy as to its cause. Virtually none of the analyses have considered a role for multinational investment in explaining the wage-gap phenomenon. This paper adapts the authors' earlier work to consider what role multinationals might play in factor markets. It identifies circumstances under which investment liberalization is likely to raise the wage gap in both the skilled-labor abundant and the unskilled-labor abundant country.     

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.