An indifference trap of voting

In this paper strategic situations of voting and abstentions are analysed in a three-candidate voting model where voters are indifferent to various alternatives and candidates are interested in winning the election and seeing their most preferred alternative being realized. A specific decision problem is analysed, described by an Indifference Trap Game, with respect to, e.g., the corresponding Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, and maximin solution. A second-best outcome is contained in the choice set of all three solutions while the Nash equilibrium concept is compatible with the Pareto efficient outcomes of the game.An alternative scenario where candidates suffer from incumbency but voters still are indifferent to some alternatives also supports the second-best outcome. Again, various solutions concepts are applied. We conclude that indifferent voters imply an eminent coordination problem for the candidates in the given voting game which, in general, ends up in inefficient outcomes. The inherent complexity of the decision situation cannot be sufficiently reduced to single out one and only one outcome.     

Dichotomous decisions based on dichotomously scored items: a case study

In a course in elementary statistics for psychology students using criterion-referenced achievement tests, the total test score, based on dichotomously scored items, was used for classifying students into those who passed and those who failed. The score on a test is considered as depending on a latent variable; it is assumed that the students can be dichotomized into the categories “mastery” (with scores on the latent variable above a cutting score), and “no mastery” (with scores below the cutting score on the latent variable). Two problems are considered: (a) How many students are classified incorrectly? Using the binomial error model a procedure is described for computing the classification proportions: p(mastery, passed), p(mastery, failed), p(no mastery, passed), and p(no mastery, failed), (b) What is the optimal cutting score on a test? Using a loss function a procedure for computing the optimal curring score is described.     

The productivity crisis

Productivity shouldn't be taken for granted, even in a country like the United States. To prevent the kind of serious mistakes that have been made in England, all levels of industry, capital, management, and labor, must be motivated toward productivity.     

Causal ordering and ‘The bank lending channel’

The bank lending channel implies the Federal Reserve can influence real income by controlling the level of intermediated loans. Using the notion of causality developed by Simon (1953) and the causal order methodology developed by Hoover (1990), I test for an operative bank lending channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. I find loans did cause real income; there is evidence that a bank lending channel did exist in the 1960s. The data appears to show, however, that by the early 1990s the bank lending channel was no longer operative. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring a Regional Technical Efficiency Frontier in the Former USSR

Using 1971–90 panel data from a Siberian province, two econometric methods are used side by side to examine technical inefficiency with a suggestion as to how the methods might be used in sequence. Estimates derived from a random effects method reveal that technical inefficiency is both substantial and not time invariant. Results using either a random or fixed effects method suggest that existing estimates of technical inefficiency in centrally planned economies may be biased downward because of the choice of the estimation method. Using either method, the increasing technical inefficiency found is likely to be one cause of the decline in the performance of centrally planned economies and their regions.     

发展中国家的普遍服务政策

该文构建非对称信息模型分析普遍服务政策问题,其中政府对企业在农村提供服务的边际成本具有非对称信息.该文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析.在实施区别定价时,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且降低相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但却是以网络覆盖的减少为代价的.该文的政策结论是:在实施普遍服务政策时,需要综合考虑网络投资的激励和用户承受能力.