The composition of interest: The judaic prohibition

An interest charge is made up of an award for waiting known as the real rate of interest, a premium for risk and compensation for transaction costs. Where inflation exists the lender seeks further compensation. In order to understand the composition and evolution of different versions of the usury prohibition it is necessary to ask which components of an interest charge are prohibited by each version. The Judaic prohibition has two aspects which are of particular interest to business historians and students of usury. First, the general rule is that a reward for waiting is prohibited. This focuses on the time-based part of interest charge. Second, interest is prohibited because it amounts to placing a stumbling block before the blind. This focuses on the typical gullibility of the borrower confronted by a more expert, better funded lender. Economics confirms and enriches our understanding of these important aspects of the prohibition. They achieve this by increasing our understanding of two facts: first, that the borrower is a gullible individual subject to irrational and inconsistent behaviour; and, second, that this behaviour relates to the waiting aspect of interest which is proscribed in the prohibition. How far these insights apply to other civilisations' prohibition, particularly those which derive from the Judaic prohibition, merits further study; so also do the ethical lessons of the Mosaic rules for a globalised society based on capitalism.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.     

Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners,Management Entrenchers,or Takeover Bid Signals?

In this paper we investigate the effect of golden parachute (GP) adoptions on shareholder wealth. We control for the potential effect a GP adoption has on the probability that a firm will receive a takeover bid by investigating the wealth effects for firms that are in play when the GP is adopted. We find that announcements are wealth neutral when firms are in play and wealth increasing when firms are not in play when a GP is adopted. The results suggest that GPs have no influence on the success of a tender offer, refuting the hypotheses that they either align manager and shareholder interests or that they entrench inefficient managers. The difference in the results for in-play and not-in-play firms is consistent with the hypothesis that GPs signal an increased likelihood that a firm will receive a takeover bid.     

Relationship of direct nursing care hours to DRG and severity of illness

Great variation in nursing resource use is documented within DRGs. Much of this variation may be explained by patient severity of illness. Variance in nursing resource use within DRGs can be reduced by using a severity of illness instrument to score patients.