Welfare Economics with Intransitive Revealed Preferences: A Theory of the Endowment Effect

Economists use the standard rational model to predict behavior after a policy change and to determine the policy's welfare implications. Recent experimental observations are casting doubt on the predictive accuracy of the standard model, but the more realistic behavioral alternatives often provide a poor basis for making normative evaluations. This paper suggests that we can still predict behavior and measure welfare within the same model. We show that optimizing agents with standard preferences will in some cases behave as if they are subject to an endowment effect. Even so, we may still be able to uncover information about their preferences.     

INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES IN OIL AND GAS LEASING

This paper discusses the theory and measurement of information externalities in oil and gas leasing. A study of leases issued in the Gulf of Mexico reveals significant positive information externalities resulting from prior development of adjoining leases. According to a recent court decision, these effects provide an added consideration in the determination of a "fair and equitable" division of revenues from federal tracts adjoining state lands, as required by the 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act     

Strategic Subsidiary Disclosure

Although subsidiary disclosures in firms’ filings with the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC; Exhibit 21) represent the most granular required public disclosure of a firm's geographic footprint, little is understood about the quality of the disclosure, and anecdotal evidence suggests firms may not fully comply with the disclosure requirements. We use data provided by multinational firms to the Internal Revenue Service regarding their foreign subsidiary locations to explore the accuracy of public subsidiary disclosures on Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K per SEC rules. The overall incidence of nondisclosure is low, suggesting that most firms comply with Exhibit 21 disclosure rules, and that for most applications, Exhibit 21 disclosures provide a reasonable proxy for locations of significant subsidiaries. Nevertheless, there is some evidence of nondisclosure, particularly when subsidiaries are in tax havens, when the firm is more highly scrutinized in the media, or when the firm has other characteristics consistent with low-quality disclosures such as SEC comment letters.     

Search Costs and Re-Employment Wage Gains for Displaced Workers

Involuntary job separation generally leads to lower re-employment wages. However, 20–30 percent of displaced workers experience re-employment wage gains. Theoretically, workers with higher search costs accept jobs when the marginal benefit of search is relatively high. When displaced, these workers experience wage gains because they are forced into additional search. Using data from the Displaced Worker Survey, we find that higher search costs (measured as the wage residual from the predisplacement job) are associated with higher re-employment wages.     

Implicit Employment Contracts: The Limits of Management Reputation for Promoting Firm Productivity

Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating postproduction firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity, which depends on levels of owner investment and employee productive effort, when managers have an incentive to favor the owner's interests over those of the employee. Drawing on research in psychology and behavioral economics, we argue that reputation concerns can more effectively promote firm productivity when manager compensation is relatively insensitive to how much the owner is allocated after production occurs. Consistent with our predictions, we find that reputation concerns lead to greater firm productivity and higher payoffs for all firm members, but only when manager pay is relatively insensitive to the owner's ex post allocation. In addition to offering testable empirical implications, our theory and results are important because they can help explain why executive compensation is, in practice, surprisingly insensitive to owner returns.     

Older Married Workers and Nonstandard Jobs: The Effects of Health and Health Insurance

We examine the effects of health and health insurance coverage on older married workers' decisions to work in temporary, contract, part-time, self-employment, and regular full-time jobs. We model the behavior of older married workers as interdependent, showing that one spouse's health and insurance status affects the employment of the other. In general, we find that men and women are less likely to be employed in regular full-time jobs when they are in fair or poor health and are more likely to be in regular full-time employment when their spouses are in poor health.     

A Medieval Controversy About Profit and Loss Allocations

This paper analyses a controversy between Maimonides and Rabbi Abraham Ben David of Posquierres over the allocation of partnership profits and losses in the absence of a partnership contract. The Maimonidean allocation system depends upon whether the partnership is formed for business or non-business (consumption) activities. The controversy concerns the notion of indivisibilities in partnership capital. This early debate is analysed in light of the modern—including game-theoretic—cost allocation literature.     

The Week-End Effect in Common Stock Returns: The International Evidence

This paper examines the daily stock market returns for four foreign countries. We find a so-called “week-end effect” in each country. In addition, the lowest mean returns for the Japanese and Australian stock markets occur on Tuesday. The remainder of the paper answers four questions. Are seasonal patterns in foreign stock markets independent of those previously reported in the U.S.? Do Japan and Australia exhibit a seasonal one day out of phase due to different time zones? Do settlement procedures across countries bias week-end effects? Does the seasonal pattern in foreign exchange offset the week-end effect in stocks for Americans investing overseas?     

Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This implies weaker return responses at the time of the earnings announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with higher transaction costs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coefficients are lower for firms with higher transaction costs. Using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In addition, we show, using a combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms with higher transaction costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy. Our results indicate that transaction costs can provide an explanation not only for the persistence but also for the existence of PEAD.     

Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud

There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether firms that are aggressive in their financial reporting exhibit more or less tax aggressiveness. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the association between aggressive tax reporting and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. Relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness to triangulate our evidence, we generally find that tax aggressive U.S. public firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud. However, we caution that our results are sensitive to how tax aggressiveness is measured. More specifically, four (two) of the five (three) proxies for firms’ effective tax rates (book‐tax differences) load positively (negatively) during the 1981–2001 period, implying that fraud firms are less tax aggressiveness. Our inferences persist when we isolate the 1995–2001 period in which accounting impropriety steeply rose and corporate tax compliance steeply fell. Moreover, we continue to find that tax aggressive firms are less apt to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements when we apply factor analysis to identify tax avoidance with a common factor extracted from the underlying proxies and match on propensity scores to ensure that the fraud and nonfraud samples have very similar nontax characteristics.